This is just an idea with the aim of providing equitable benefit of canteen profits to all units in a station and a method to run canteens without involving combatants in peace stations
All units and formation headquarters in the army have regimental funds for the welfare of troops and other expenses required for running units. The major source for regimental funds in most units and formations is canteen profits.
Every unit, big or small therefore sets up a small(or large) unit run canteen wherever they are located, whether peace or field. In field stations, it is accepted that sale will be limited to the soldiers serving in the unit during the tenure, and a few ex servicemen in the area, while in peace stations, everyone tries to maximise sale. This is because in peace stations, there are more mess parties, regimental 'barakhanas' and other events that involve expenditure. Add to this the long term trend of subsidizing the CO's or formation commander's existence through regimental funds (after all, they're institutions, and therefore, must live in luxury paid for by the unit or formation), and many a canteen officer is on the lookout to increase sales.
One of the factors affecting canteen sales is location of a canteen. A unit located on a main road, near a shopping complex etc hits the jackpot and rings in the money on the canteen cash register. However, a unit located in the interiors of the military station or even a smaller unit often has to deal with poor sales(as even their own soldiers and their families patronize the better stocked canteens) and by extension, low incomes in their regimental funds. Many formation headquarters(often those with commanders or deputies whose personal 'requirements' are high) identify units which have well run, profitable canteens and force them to part with a share of the canteen profit through convenient 'policy' letters. In addition, large station canteens in most stations hog premium locations, special privileges and most of the profits, a share of which is not given to other units in the station. Most ex-servicemen are also 'allotted' to these station canteens, increasing the profits of these canteens.
If each unit runs a canteen, each staffed with 2 to 3 soldiers, a big military station can easily have 150 to 200 men (thats two companies!) just running these ventures. This also leads to a CSD canteen existing in every corner of military stations, most selling the same limited inventory.
Combat units and their commanders should preferably not get involved in running canteens and generating profits for their regimental funds. Its a facility provided to all military personnel and, if possible, it should be done without the involvement of combat unit personnel. At the same time, since these personnel patronize the canteens resulting in profits, a share of these profits should rightfully be shared with all these units. Due to the environment in operational areas, it is essential to run a unit canteen to provide basic items to soldiers, since military units are deployed in far flung areas and a station canteen as in peace stations is not practical.
A different model of running canteens in peace stations could change the dynamics of handling and spending of canteen profits, and probably even overcome the restrictions placed by CAG recently.
All unit run canteens in peace stations should be amalgamated into station canteens (may be with multiple outlets in a military station spread over a large area). The size / turnover could be based n the number of dependant personnel in the station. These canteens could be manned and run by re-employed officers and staff under station headquarters / sub area. However, the profit generated by the canteen should be distributed among all units in the station, proportional to their authorised strength. No diversion of profits outside the station(to sub areas etc, other than a small fixed percentage from each station canteen) should be permitted. The success of this concept will depend on equitable and fair distribution of profits between formation headquarters and units, preferably based on an army wide policy. The concept of unit run canteens in peace stations should then be done away with.
Advantages:
Combatant manpower in units is not tied down in canteen related duties.
Optimisation of effort in transporting stores and stocking canteens from the depots.
All units in the station will get a share of the station canteens profits based on their manpower. COs do not have to worry about generating funds for their units. If a certain canteen located in the station has high sales volumes, all units in the station will benefit from it.
A percentage of profits can be used to support welfare projects in the station. This fund can be diverted before dividing the profits among dependant units, and welfare centres can be set up in military stations with permanent staff, instead of expecting units and formation headquarters to provide funds and resources.
Formation headquarters will obviously receive a very small share of the profit unlike in the other system since their strength is smaller than a subunit's. This can be enhanced by a small percentage depending on the level of headquarters.
Misuse of canteen profits to fund unethical projects like furnishing appointment houses etc can be curbed through transparent accounting.
There will be no need to maintain canteen accounts in units in peace stations.
Station amenities like movie halls can be directly funded by adopting this method instead of asking units for subscription.
and many more....
I'm sure there will be problems in adopting this system, but it could be developed into a viable model for managing canteens. Modifications could result in good workable model that is also acceptable to all. So reply with your ideas!
Tuesday 31 March 2015
Friday 27 March 2015
On Police - Military Cooperation...
Well, I thought, let me write something different this time. We've all interacted with the police at various times during our lifetime, and I'll list two of my interactions that stood out. You be the judge.
Gujjar Agitation, Rajasthan, 2007.
I was the commander ( a major) of one of the army columns sent to assist the civil administration when the Gujjars (caste / tribe in Rajasthan) decided to block the National Highway between Jaipur and Agra for their perceived grievances. Among others, one of the districts where life had practically ground to a halt was 'Karauli', which we had to stabilize. Well, we reached the district headquarters after a five hour drive from Alwar, one officer, three JCOs(warrant officers) and 75 men in our army trucks and jeeps. All along, we found groups of (senior) police officers huddled inside various buildings trying to figure out a way to break the deadlock (just the previous day, an attempt to forcibly remove the 30,000 odd Gujjars from the national highway had been unsuccessful, with many a policeman beaten up by the mob), We found the district SP (Superintendent of Police) holed up in his office and looking distinctly scared. So I told him that we should go around the district and decide on an action plan to get things back to normal. He refused and said that it was unsafe to go out. I did manage to convince him a couple of days later, and he moved out, with a truck-full each of policemen ahead of, and behind his car. During one of our patrols, when I entered a police station in a fairly big town in the district, I found a DIG of police (Deputy Inspector General, equivalent to an army Brigadier ) sitting on the Inspector's chair. The moment he saw me, he said with relief "..thank God you're here. The police station is under grave threat. I've deployed four companies of policemen to protect us. We(I) need protection so why don't you deploy your army column around the station? The people won't mess with you.." I told him that we were there to restore peace, and not to protect the police in the riot affected district, but he was not convinced...
Counter Insurgency Operations, Baramula District, 2011
This was during the period of intense civil agitation in the Kashmir valley when I was commanding my regiment. We were responsible to run the convoy from Srinagar to one of the outlying towns, 90 km away. One day, my column commander, a major, called me on my phone and told me that the convoy had been stopped by a posse of policemen near Baramula and a DSP(deputy Superintendant of Police, equivalent to a Captain) had placed his men on the road, blocking the army vehicles. Stopping a military convoy on the road is unsafe - a static convoy of vehicles in a hostile area with threat of stand-off attacks is vulnerable and is practically a dead duck. The police officer said that some hired trucks in the convoy were suspected to be carrying illegal timber and he needed to check them. On hearing this, I told my officer to move the convoy immediately, grab the police officer by his collar and shove him into the major's Jeep, and take him to Srinagar. The trucks could then be safely checked inside the convoy ground. I also called my brigade commander and GOC(General Officer Commanding) and informed them. (We subsequently didn't have to carry the police officer to Srinagar, and next day, the local DIG apologized to the General for trying to stop the convoy.)
I wonder why police officers in this country behave the way they do? And if this is the way they behave with the army, I wonder what they do with the public!!
Gujjar Agitation, Rajasthan, 2007.
I was the commander ( a major) of one of the army columns sent to assist the civil administration when the Gujjars (caste / tribe in Rajasthan) decided to block the National Highway between Jaipur and Agra for their perceived grievances. Among others, one of the districts where life had practically ground to a halt was 'Karauli', which we had to stabilize. Well, we reached the district headquarters after a five hour drive from Alwar, one officer, three JCOs(warrant officers) and 75 men in our army trucks and jeeps. All along, we found groups of (senior) police officers huddled inside various buildings trying to figure out a way to break the deadlock (just the previous day, an attempt to forcibly remove the 30,000 odd Gujjars from the national highway had been unsuccessful, with many a policeman beaten up by the mob), We found the district SP (Superintendent of Police) holed up in his office and looking distinctly scared. So I told him that we should go around the district and decide on an action plan to get things back to normal. He refused and said that it was unsafe to go out. I did manage to convince him a couple of days later, and he moved out, with a truck-full each of policemen ahead of, and behind his car. During one of our patrols, when I entered a police station in a fairly big town in the district, I found a DIG of police (Deputy Inspector General, equivalent to an army Brigadier ) sitting on the Inspector's chair. The moment he saw me, he said with relief "..thank God you're here. The police station is under grave threat. I've deployed four companies of policemen to protect us. We(I) need protection so why don't you deploy your army column around the station? The people won't mess with you.." I told him that we were there to restore peace, and not to protect the police in the riot affected district, but he was not convinced...
Counter Insurgency Operations, Baramula District, 2011
This was during the period of intense civil agitation in the Kashmir valley when I was commanding my regiment. We were responsible to run the convoy from Srinagar to one of the outlying towns, 90 km away. One day, my column commander, a major, called me on my phone and told me that the convoy had been stopped by a posse of policemen near Baramula and a DSP(deputy Superintendant of Police, equivalent to a Captain) had placed his men on the road, blocking the army vehicles. Stopping a military convoy on the road is unsafe - a static convoy of vehicles in a hostile area with threat of stand-off attacks is vulnerable and is practically a dead duck. The police officer said that some hired trucks in the convoy were suspected to be carrying illegal timber and he needed to check them. On hearing this, I told my officer to move the convoy immediately, grab the police officer by his collar and shove him into the major's Jeep, and take him to Srinagar. The trucks could then be safely checked inside the convoy ground. I also called my brigade commander and GOC(General Officer Commanding) and informed them. (We subsequently didn't have to carry the police officer to Srinagar, and next day, the local DIG apologized to the General for trying to stop the convoy.)
I wonder why police officers in this country behave the way they do? And if this is the way they behave with the army, I wonder what they do with the public!!
Thursday 5 March 2015
10 Things About the Indian Army That Helped me Grow
This is not a definitive list, and I'm sure many others can be added. But when I wrote about the AVSC and man management, my wife told me that I come across as a disgruntled and grumpy officer to those who don't know me.
So let me start with what I count as my achievements:
So let me start with what I count as my achievements:
- OP Officer at Siachen Glacier in 1996. Wounded in the head but still alive and kicking!
- Instructor at School of Artillery.
- Nominated to the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington in competitive vacancy among top 5, shortlisted for Staff College in UK.
- Brigade Major of an Armoured Brigade
- UN mission in Congo as Military Observer.
- Tenure in Military Secretary's Branch (where it mattered)!
- Commanded my regiment in Kashmir for two years without casualties, suicides, or operational failures during the mass agitation period of 2010 -12 and implemented my ideas without worrying about norms or rocking the boat.
- Colonel General Staff of a RAPID straight out from command of unit.
- Nominated for Higher Defence Management Course in 2014 (but refused it and opted for release from the Army)
So what are those 10 things?
I met my wife thanks to the Army. What were my chances of being in Nasirabad on 27 September 1998 if I was not in the Army? And it gave me the courage to marry her even though all norms of society were against it.
A great set of friends that's still growing. I have friends who are in their 70s and some in their 20s. The Indian Army is a great social equalizer.
Ability to interact freely with a doorman and the CEO of a company without feeling uncomfortable.
Ability to interact freely with a doorman and the CEO of a company without feeling uncomfortable.
The confidence to address a gathering of people and take charge if required.
Discern between right and wrong, a sense of duty towards country and society. And not towards my friends,relatives, religion, or 'clan'. (I don't have a caste, otherwise I'd have included that as well)
Discern between right and wrong, a sense of duty towards country and society. And not towards my friends,relatives, religion, or 'clan'. (I don't have a caste, otherwise I'd have included that as well)
The right way to drink in a social gathering without making a fool of myself !
Understanding people from all kinds of backgrounds, cultures, religions and places.
The opportunity to read hundreds of books. Which other job pays you to sit in a bunker for months on end, and read all the books you want?!
A series of great bosses who tolerated my ideas, heard what I had to say, and permitted me to do what I wanted, even if it was untried and they didn't agree with me. And never being forced to do wrong.
And lastly (for the purpose of this blog only, otherwise the list is long, really long) Real life skills to transition seamlessly from the armed forces to the civvy street. But more on that later.
AFT Quashes Army’s promotion policy for Colonels: My take on it All
I thought that I must write down my thoughts on the whole issue, especially having been at the right time and place when the controversy was being created. I do not intend to give the juicy details of who said and did what, but focus on the issues. Let me keep it short and simple.
The Issue
750 odd Colonel's vacancies were released by the government sometime in 2008(or was it 2006?). In 2004/05, the selection board for promotion from Major to Lt Col was done away with. Everyone would become Lt Col on completion of 13 years service. But the vacancies for Colonels did not increase much in 2004, making the pyramid steeper at that level.
Here is an illustration:
Majors Lt Col's Vacs Colonel's Vacs
(No change)
2003 100 (50% promoted) 50 (50% promoted) 25
So 25 out of 50 Lt Cols would become Colonel.
2007 100 (timescale promotion) 100 (25% promoted) 25
All figures are illustrative only. Don't get emotional about them.Please!
A similar number of officers were becoming Colonel, but dissatisfaction perceived was much higher. (Only 25 out of 100!What is this Army coming to!)
Now, additional vacancies were released to ease the pain. It could have been divided proportionally among all arms and services or pro rata vacancies (All of them have gone through the same kind of shit, only in different settings). So giving everyone a 50% chance to become Colonel and to command a unit seemed fair.
Well, the powers that be decided that only some should get this windfall; field allowance for serving in difficult areas is not enough, it must be enhanced with liberal promotions. Irrespective of contribution (or lack of it..) to the organisation during these 'difficult' tenures.
So what are the advantages of keeping promotion approvals at or below 50%:
We don't dilute standards. If you're not in the top half of your batch, do you really deserve to command your unit? Even if you're in Infantry or Artillery or Armoured Corps? And still call yourself a professional army?!!
There is no disparity between arms and services. And there shouldn't be. (At least upto Colonels. But more on that later.) Remember, we're all on the same side (On a serious note, all officers compete within their corps till Colonel, so we should not compare life in Infantry with life in ASC or EME) For instance, an EME Lt Col may be responsible for technical readiness of all guns in an arty brigade, while an artillery Lt Col may be a battery commander looking after only his 6 guns. So who deserves to get promoted more than the other? We don't know. But can they be compared? NO. So an EME or ASC (or Engineer / Mechanised Infantry) guy should have a similar chance of becoming a Colonel in competition with his batch mates. Lets say 50% for all arms, to keep it simple.
Everyone can't be given a 70% chance of promotion. If you do have a hundred vacancies, you can only divide them 50-50, or 70-30. Not 60-50. So if someone decides to take 70, it had better be you. Otherwise you end up at the wrong end of a promotion board result.
And we really don't want to be like the IPS or IAS where everyone has rank, but no one seems to be doing anything much.
Command of formations is for elites with relevant experience. Period. The key word is 'elite'. Command of formations is not for officers from 'the arm' or 'arms'. So why are we hellbent on giving it to 'wrong' officers from the 'right' arm / regiment/ battalion? Work the statistics. ( maybe someone at HDMC can work out the probability of an officer in the 50-60% bracket from the top making it to Major General as a project or thesis!)
So if we agree on the basics, we can move on. But when some enlightened souls bring in a 'Command Exit' model (whatever in the hell is that!!) without consulting those in the business of managing officers' promotions on a daily basis, all hell is bound to break loose. Even if the 'yes men' keep denying it to their bosses. By the way, if someone who remained awake during maths lectures at NDA went through that spreadsheet, it would probably take him 5 minutes to punch holes in it. That long if he was 'slow on the uptake'.
These are the questions that have been going around:
Which arm/service stood to gain by this tweak? Everyone seems to know.
Who were the power players? We don't know that openly. The concerned officers (and very senior ones, as well as those who've now become very senior) displayed lack of honesty and moral courage.
Was there no one who objected? Not many who gained from it all. And those who didn't object - they don't matter in any case.
So what happened due to this hijacking of 'good order and military discipline' in the army?
A large percentage of officers from certain arms became Colonel (and brigadier, and major general...). Full marks, AVSC aim has been met. We've improved the 'satisfaction level' (for some, but everyone cannot be satisfied)
A large percentage of officers from certain some arms became commanding officers at a young age.(Full marks, AVSC aim has been met for some, yet again)
And what about the incidents of failure of command among those very arms? Most incidents have not been recorded or even acknowledged as that.("After all, he's from that arm and done so well. This should not affect his Higher Command prospects..lets help him out..") Halo Effect. Is there a relation between lower age of command WITH lower standards of selection and these incidents? (CDM and HDMC student officers now have more ideas for studies)
"So what if some officers didn't become Colonel in spite of being in the top 40% of their batch? They had a 'ball' during the last twenty years, didn't they? All those guys who barely scraped through JC, command of their sub units, and were not even in the top 50% will make up for these disgruntled elements who're psc and outstanding subunit commanders (but in the wrong corps) .."
etc. etc.
So what is the issue?
Is it that vacancies need to be redistributed? Yes, in the immediate future, in the most practical way possible. And it'll take 5 years. Because this has been moving in a different direction for the last 5 years.
But more than that, our commanders must work towards regaining the faith of all officers. From all arms and services. Even if these officers can't do shit about all this.
Because they perceive a wrong doing by their commanders(including those who stood by and watched things happen).
How do we ensure that this doesn't happen again? We need to understand that right or wrong is more important than 'convenient or inconvenient'. Incidentally, what is right is more often than not, inconvenient. At all levels. The boss is not always right. We need to groom our officers to stand up for what is right, and not follow the superior, or 'regimental izzat' BLINDLY. .... the list is long (should the CO report and take action on an incident of attempted rape by one of his unit jawans? or sort it out internally?).
Units are not families, and officers are not to be 'taken care of' like a spoilt child. A military unit is a fighting machine ( even an ASC company (Tk tptr) Type C is, believe me) and so officers have to be held accountable. An officer must uphold the highest standards of leadership (including fairness towards his command and comrades, which seems to have been missing here) even when his peers and boss say that its okay to be otherwise.
"This is alright, we heard it all. But what practical things can you do?"
Put your dissent on file. Don't put up 'draft' notings.
Don't allow loopholes in policy letters and procedures. Make them well.
Do not implement a weak policy for 'flexibility'. Make someone high up sign a 'waiver' if he wants to favour someone - and watch his hands shake!
add your own....
The link for an article on the AFT judgement is here http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aft-quashes-armys-promotion-policy-for-colonels/
These are my opinions and not statement of facts. And I am open to changing them on seeing evidence indicating otherwise.
The Issue
750 odd Colonel's vacancies were released by the government sometime in 2008(or was it 2006?). In 2004/05, the selection board for promotion from Major to Lt Col was done away with. Everyone would become Lt Col on completion of 13 years service. But the vacancies for Colonels did not increase much in 2004, making the pyramid steeper at that level.
Here is an illustration:
Majors Lt Col's Vacs Colonel's Vacs
(No change)
2003 100 (50% promoted) 50 (50% promoted) 25
So 25 out of 50 Lt Cols would become Colonel.
2007 100 (timescale promotion) 100 (25% promoted) 25
All figures are illustrative only. Don't get emotional about them.Please!
A similar number of officers were becoming Colonel, but dissatisfaction perceived was much higher. (Only 25 out of 100!What is this Army coming to!)
Now, additional vacancies were released to ease the pain. It could have been divided proportionally among all arms and services or pro rata vacancies (All of them have gone through the same kind of shit, only in different settings). So giving everyone a 50% chance to become Colonel and to command a unit seemed fair.
Well, the powers that be decided that only some should get this windfall; field allowance for serving in difficult areas is not enough, it must be enhanced with liberal promotions. Irrespective of contribution (or lack of it..) to the organisation during these 'difficult' tenures.
So what are the advantages of keeping promotion approvals at or below 50%:
We don't dilute standards. If you're not in the top half of your batch, do you really deserve to command your unit? Even if you're in Infantry or Artillery or Armoured Corps? And still call yourself a professional army?!!
There is no disparity between arms and services. And there shouldn't be. (At least upto Colonels. But more on that later.) Remember, we're all on the same side (On a serious note, all officers compete within their corps till Colonel, so we should not compare life in Infantry with life in ASC or EME) For instance, an EME Lt Col may be responsible for technical readiness of all guns in an arty brigade, while an artillery Lt Col may be a battery commander looking after only his 6 guns. So who deserves to get promoted more than the other? We don't know. But can they be compared? NO. So an EME or ASC (or Engineer / Mechanised Infantry) guy should have a similar chance of becoming a Colonel in competition with his batch mates. Lets say 50% for all arms, to keep it simple.
Everyone can't be given a 70% chance of promotion. If you do have a hundred vacancies, you can only divide them 50-50, or 70-30. Not 60-50. So if someone decides to take 70, it had better be you. Otherwise you end up at the wrong end of a promotion board result.
And we really don't want to be like the IPS or IAS where everyone has rank, but no one seems to be doing anything much.
Command of formations is for elites with relevant experience. Period. The key word is 'elite'. Command of formations is not for officers from 'the arm' or 'arms'. So why are we hellbent on giving it to 'wrong' officers from the 'right' arm / regiment/ battalion? Work the statistics. ( maybe someone at HDMC can work out the probability of an officer in the 50-60% bracket from the top making it to Major General as a project or thesis!)
So if we agree on the basics, we can move on. But when some enlightened souls bring in a 'Command Exit' model (whatever in the hell is that!!) without consulting those in the business of managing officers' promotions on a daily basis, all hell is bound to break loose. Even if the 'yes men' keep denying it to their bosses. By the way, if someone who remained awake during maths lectures at NDA went through that spreadsheet, it would probably take him 5 minutes to punch holes in it. That long if he was 'slow on the uptake'.
These are the questions that have been going around:
Which arm/service stood to gain by this tweak? Everyone seems to know.
Who were the power players? We don't know that openly. The concerned officers (and very senior ones, as well as those who've now become very senior) displayed lack of honesty and moral courage.
Was there no one who objected? Not many who gained from it all. And those who didn't object - they don't matter in any case.
So what happened due to this hijacking of 'good order and military discipline' in the army?
A large percentage of officers from certain arms became Colonel (and brigadier, and major general...). Full marks, AVSC aim has been met. We've improved the 'satisfaction level' (for some, but everyone cannot be satisfied)
A large percentage of officers from certain some arms became commanding officers at a young age.(Full marks, AVSC aim has been met for some, yet again)
And what about the incidents of failure of command among those very arms? Most incidents have not been recorded or even acknowledged as that.("After all, he's from that arm and done so well. This should not affect his Higher Command prospects..lets help him out..") Halo Effect. Is there a relation between lower age of command WITH lower standards of selection and these incidents? (CDM and HDMC student officers now have more ideas for studies)
"So what if some officers didn't become Colonel in spite of being in the top 40% of their batch? They had a 'ball' during the last twenty years, didn't they? All those guys who barely scraped through JC, command of their sub units, and were not even in the top 50% will make up for these disgruntled elements who're psc and outstanding subunit commanders (but in the wrong corps) .."
etc. etc.
So what is the issue?
Is it that vacancies need to be redistributed? Yes, in the immediate future, in the most practical way possible. And it'll take 5 years. Because this has been moving in a different direction for the last 5 years.
But more than that, our commanders must work towards regaining the faith of all officers. From all arms and services. Even if these officers can't do shit about all this.
Because they perceive a wrong doing by their commanders(including those who stood by and watched things happen).
How do we ensure that this doesn't happen again? We need to understand that right or wrong is more important than 'convenient or inconvenient'. Incidentally, what is right is more often than not, inconvenient. At all levels. The boss is not always right. We need to groom our officers to stand up for what is right, and not follow the superior, or 'regimental izzat' BLINDLY. .... the list is long (should the CO report and take action on an incident of attempted rape by one of his unit jawans? or sort it out internally?).
Units are not families, and officers are not to be 'taken care of' like a spoilt child. A military unit is a fighting machine ( even an ASC company (Tk tptr) Type C is, believe me) and so officers have to be held accountable. An officer must uphold the highest standards of leadership (including fairness towards his command and comrades, which seems to have been missing here) even when his peers and boss say that its okay to be otherwise.
"This is alright, we heard it all. But what practical things can you do?"
Put your dissent on file. Don't put up 'draft' notings.
Don't allow loopholes in policy letters and procedures. Make them well.
Do not implement a weak policy for 'flexibility'. Make someone high up sign a 'waiver' if he wants to favour someone - and watch his hands shake!
add your own....
The link for an article on the AFT judgement is here http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aft-quashes-armys-promotion-policy-for-colonels/
These are my opinions and not statement of facts. And I am open to changing them on seeing evidence indicating otherwise.
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