People Management and End to End Leadership

 

Yesterday, news channels and social media were covering the untimely and unfortunate death of a young woman intern at a large global consulting firm due to overwork and work-related stress. Apparently, the company did not do enough even after the event, and the woman's mother had to send out an open letter to the company's India head to get a response from them.

I am reminded of the time when I served in the army - stress induced deaths and suicides were worrying the Army, more so than the Navy or the Air Force, probably because of larger number of people. Managing stress among the men was an organizational focus area throughout the time I was a subunit commander as a Major and Lt Col, and a commanding officer. Why did I leave out officers from the scope? Probably because officers were expected to be mentally tougher due to the focus on mental fitness standards established by the Service Selection Boards, and officer suicides were practically nonexistent (or not in enough numbers to warrant a response at the organization level).

When I took over command of my regiment in an intense CI operations environment on the Line of Control somewhere West of Srinagar in 2010, one of the first things I was told by my Subedar Major (SM) was "Sir, we will be sharing your mobile number with all the men in the regiment. There are orders that any soldier should be able to reach the CO directly in case he is mentally disturbed or stressed and be able to communicate his problems." 

This was in line with the orders and policy in the formation or even, across the Army and sounded good - everyone has a direct line to the boss, who can take instant decisions to solve their problems. Typically, the problems men faced included not getting leave to go back home on time for an event, land related issues in the extended family back home, wife and children's health issues, and for bachelors - some of them wanted to marry a particular girl and their families would not allow it for caste, religion or other reasons. It'll take time to change society in the villages and smaller towns, where most soldiers come from. 

There also were 'work' related stresses - the monotony and lack of sleep due to repeated deployments on the line of control (patrols and ambushes are mostly carried out in the night to stop infiltration - imagine being awake every second night for 3 to 4 months on end), without much contact with your family and knowing what was happening at home, eating the same food without much variation and sleeping in wet/ soggy vermin infested bunkers. On convoy protection duty, the men would man open army trucks with weapons ready to fire, whether snow or rain every day for 9 to 12 hours. The route was dotted with numerous villages, so there always was the risk of firing on civilians by mistake. This was usually for a couple of months or longer at a time, and they were constantly expected to be alert enough to ward off a terrorist attack from anywhere on the mountains along the route. Every day.

On top of this, if their immediate boss, the NCO or JCO did not rotate them out of that deployment in three months, they had the 'pleasure' of enjoying these facilities and the work even longer. The first level of officer leadership was a hit and a miss, because there simply were too few of them available to lead (the army suffers from shortage of officers in the units) - most majors (subunit commanders) would also be rotating through various duties, whether leading convoy protection or commanding the anti-infiltration post on the LC, or other duties.

In this situation, I decided to do the exact opposite of what my SM suggested - I did not share my mobile number with the men.

My reasoning was this:

The men would hesitate to tell me their problems frankly - the rank and status difference was simply too much between a Colonel and a Gunner or Naik(Corporal). In the regiment, a CO has absolute power over the officer and men and that also makes him a distant figure in the real sense - someone who cannot really be a confidant.

I did not have the bandwidth to patiently hear out and solve the problems of 600+ men, while filtering out the troublemakers (false allegations around work conditions etc). I also could not monitor the progress of the resolution that was decided.

This would also mean absolving the entire chain of my command of their leadership responsibilities - of the well-being of their teams. If the chain of command fulfils their command responsibilities, problem resolution or escalation at every level would be the norm. Therefore, either the soldier's detachment commander, a Havildar (Sergeant) would help him get a solution, or escalate it to the JCO, and then to the battery commander and so on. The commanding officer would need to come in only if 4 to 5 layers of leadership could not address the problem. This of course meant having faith in the NCOs, JCOs and officers to manage this. What better way to start this than telling them about my expectations regarding their leadership abilities!

I was short and to the point with them in my first Sainik Sammelan (open house): "I expect the NCOs to take ownership of your detachments and take care of your men. If it is beyond your resources to solve the problem, escalate it. The biggest crime an NCO, JCO or officer can commit is not knowing his men's abilities, achievements and problems, or not trying to solve them. If a soldier's problem comes to me without a clearly discernible attempt by his NCO, JCO and subunit commander to solve it, or without they being aware of it, I will hold each person in that chain of command responsible for failure of leadership."

To ensure that this worked, problems needed to be informed and documented. We modified the system of interviews - every man going out of or coming in to a unit is interviewed by the CO. In most units, it is a formal parade in the morning, where the interviewees are lined up and each man speaks about himself - whether coming back from leave, going on leave, or something else. Not a very comfortable place for a man to tell the CO that his neighbour is trying to take away his land, or that his wife is not able to conceive a child and needs treatment!

We changed the process to an interview inside the CO's office, in confidence. It meant that I had to spend the good part of an hour or more to speak to all the men on interview parade, usually about 10, sometimes 30 to 40. To maintain continuity, we also instituted an interview document with a dedicated page for each man - this would be updated by his NCO, JCO and subunit commander after they spoke to him every time he came to me for an interview - and note a solution there. Soon enough, we had a confidential history of everyone's life and we all could refer back to what happened earlier while talking to him. To reach this stage, it took the best part of two years of sustained effort, a few punishments to NCOs who did not take their leadership duties seriously, and a very thick interview register! We usually went along with the solution suggested by the NCOs.

To manage the problem of NCOs and JCOs not rotating people out of tough deployment duties like anti infiltration post and convoy protection, we used technology. I had been an MS Access enthusiast for a long time (MS Access has disappeared from the Microsoft stack now!). I built an Access based application to manage deployments, leave, promotions, equipment management etc. I had the time, because my NCOs, JCOs and officers were doing their job of leading men well. It would automatically highlight anyone who had completed more than 45 days at these deployments, which gave his team leaders enough time to plan a rotation and replacement.

Of course, the men had managed to get my number, and a few tried to call me to get leave. I found that most were cases of men trying to game the 'stress management system'. I sent them back to their NCOs who resolved their issues via their chain of command - this of course instilled a sense of confidence in the NCOs and JCOs, that their CO trusted them to lead. We also awarded NCOs and JCOs who took the initiative to solve their men's problems and kept the chain in the loop - the award was not a typical piece of Chinese plastic with platitudes on it, but usually a pre-paid mobile recharge card, which was most sought after among the men in that age of feature phones and expensive talk times.

The next year, there was a suicide case in every regiment in the brigade. Except mine. Was it just luck, or something that we did right? 

We moved out of the field posting the year afterwards, without any stress related injuries or deaths, or operational casualties. 

Most of the writings and workshops being held on leading and managing people in the corporate world may be missing the woods for the trees. Leadership is always end to end - it cannot be restricted to getting results on the business targets and objectives alone. Leadership cannot be reduced to a series of events run by learning and development teams - it needs to be practiced by every line manager, encouraged and instilled in everyone who has the potential to grow within any organization.

'Irreparable loss for all of us,' says EY India on death of 26-year-old CA | Company News - Business Standard (business-standard.com)

Case of the Missing Meat

This is a short one about administration as a function of leadership.

     Everyone in the army has lamented about the quantity and quality of rations at some point in his military career. Early during the command of my regiment, the field officer for the week reported to me for taking special instructions for his duty. He was a young captain and probably doing it as a routine, being among the few officers available at regiment HQ that week. Fresh rations (milk eggs, meat vegetable etc) are collected by units twice a week under the system of replenishment of rations in peace time. I gave him the task of weighing meat rations at the regiment gate when the Junior Quarter Master(JQM) JCO brought it in after collecting it at the local ASC supply point. The officer wanted to check the demanded weight etc, but I told him to do all that after the surprise check, as otherwise people in the chain get alerted to a possible inspection and could play the system.

     As commanding officer, I wanted to make sure that my officers and men received good rations - during service we all have heard of how the system was incorrigible and did not ensure good food to the troops, how the quality of food had deteriorated over the years etc. My aim was to check if we were in fact drawing rations that were as stated in the regulations. Improving regulations was not my aim or job at that point.

     The officer reported back at the end of the day with 43 odd kg of meat weighed at the gate vs 70 kg in the transaction documents. I asked the quarter master and second in command(2iC) to find out why. There were no reasonable answers for the shortfall. These rations were meant for all officers and troops dispersed in gun positions, regimental HQ and our company operating base on the line of control. I had to set an example, and more importantly, it was my command responsibility to ensure good rations for my team. Therefore I decided to 'march up' the JCO on charges of neglect of duty. This is a very rare occurrence - JCOs can be marched up and disciplined by a commanding officer only with the consent of the division commander. I instructed the second in command to draw up a charge sheet and initiate disciplinary proceedings. This was enough to shake up the regiment. The subedar major(sergeant major in other armies) landed up and requested me to reconsider, as the JQM was a good JCO. I myself knew him from my captain days in the regiment to be a simpleton, who would not indulge in illegal activities. It was possible that he had been shortchanged by the supply point. However, there was a shortfall in quantity of rations under his charge and there was a doubt about what had actually happened. My aim was not to get entangled in finding the truth at that point - it was to ensure good rations for my command.

     Letting the JCO go without any action would not help me achieve my aim - checking every ration issued from supply point was not feasible. So we decided to play some mind games. I ordered the head clerk to draft a letter to the GOC stating my intention to hold court martial proceeding against the JCO. The news spread quickly through the regiment, and most JCOs were soon in shock, it seemed(although we actually didn't send the letter!). Next, I and the 2iC(who was also the JCO's superior in the chain) arranged to march up the JCO. The idea was to go through the procedure, but not punish the man, only drive home the message that if rations were not accounted for, drastic steps would be taken. We agreed that during the process, I would give the 2iC a signal on which he would request me to let the JCO go, and I would do so with a warning. This would send the message that the CO is large hearted, the 2iC knows his men and cares for them, but rations cannot be played around with, since even a JCO could be marched up for it and this time one got away by the skin of his teeth!

     In the meantime, the officer commanding supply point, a young captain landed up unannounced at my office to plead on behalf of the JCO. Apparently the message about disciplinary proceedings and letter to the division commander had reached him through the grapevine. I told him to worry about his own job, seeing that his unit was supplying less than documented rations instead of worrying about my JCO.

     We went through the process -  the JCO was marched up, he got a mouthful from me, adequate tension was built up in the orderly room, the 2iC intervened and the JCO 'managed' to escape punishment.

And for the rest of my command tenure, fear of God ensured that my officers and men collected good rations for themselves!

Improving the Quality of Junior Commissioned Officers (Warrant Officers) in Combat Units

Here is a short post from an assignment that I recently submitted at MIT, looking at a real issue using System Dynamics. This post has been modified to cater to a diverse audience and is more of a statement of the problem. Hence JCOs are called Warrant Officers, and NCOs ranks have been given a more common nomenclature 

Background Indian Army units are organized so that soldiers and NCOs that join a combat unit on being recruited also retire from the same unit. That is, they serve most of their military career among the same 600 to 800 people. Senior NCOs (Sergeants) get promoted to a junior warrant officer rank, which has three levels that they can progressively achieve based on merit and seniority. Promotions that override seniority, based on merit alone are not popular, since relative standing is determined by seniority for the first half of a soldier’s career spanning almost ten years, upto the rank of Naik (Corporal). Officers commanding the soldiers are incentivized to train their soldiers well, and training levels are quantified by individual tests that soldiers and NCOs need to pass so they are eligible for promotion. Commanding Officers tend to play with testing standards, so that a higher percentage of soldiers and NCOs under their command quantitatively appear to be better trained, in turn improving their own ratings as leaders. Troops are in turn complacent and are not motivated enough to train well, and NCOs do not take initiative to train or lead their subordinates. This situation also results in promotion by seniority for soldiers and NCOs, since everyone is poorly trained but meets the criteria for promotions. As a result, there are no means to differentiate between the competent and incompetent.

Problem Definition Quality of Warrant Officers in Indian Army combat units is poor and needs to be improved to make them more effective in operations.

Qualitative Requirements for Warrant Officers: High quality of technical knowledge (eg. technical gunnery in artillery; telecommunication skills in signals units), skills to lead 30-100 soldiers, physical fitness and highly motivated, ability to handle basic administrative work, and knowledge of regulations.

All NCOs are certified on training and testing requirements for promotion; difficult to differentiate other than on seniority. If all else is same, select the senior most: he has the most experience.Issues with pipeline that feeds current stock of Warrant Officers:

• Officers are incentivized to inflate NCOs test results and performance assessment.
• Long term cultural resistance: Soldiers and NCOs accept promotion by seniority as the norm. 
• NCOs look at merit based promotion as ‘jumping the line’.
• Gaming the system leads to lack of motivation for pipeline: Since vacancies are limited, only some who are senior most in line for the next higher rank will get it. The next few in line will retire after some time in the same rank (because of an up or out with delay policy). As a result soldiers are able to project their own career prospects into the future and lose motivation (If they are senior in their group, they will get promoted and if not, they will retire, whether they work or not).
• As a result, NCOs are promoted on seniority, not merit.
• Short tenures of Commanding Officers of max 3 years - means they try to improve metrics that benefit them: maximize testing and promotion results, even if it is by compromising training standards and appraisals, with an aim to keep the pipeline populated. Any vacant Warrant Officer position at the top of the pipeline is seen as a reflection of poor management skills of the commanding officer, even if it is because of lack of suitable talent to fill up that position.

Here is a causal loop diagram of the situation made using Vensim PLE software:

Causal Loop Diagram: Factors Affecting Quality of Warrant Officers

Red curves indicate an inverse relationship, also shown by the - sign at the arrow head.

From experience, delays are on average 2 to 4 years.

Many other factors could be added to this model, but aim was to keep it simple and address most important factors.

From the diagram it appears that most factors that result in promotion of motivated NCOs include a delay of 2 to 4 years built into the process. This period is beyond the normal tenure of a commanding officer. 

Here is how the process plays out: 

• A CO initiates multiple processes to improve the quality of NCOs. Delays in Objective ACRs that lead to Promotions on Merit mean that motivated NCOs actually start getting promoted around 2 years after he takes over command of the unit, that is towards the end of his command tenure.
• A few good NCOs get promoted, also resulting in a few others getting superseded. This leads to a disturbance in the overall equilibrium in the system. Complaints against promotion policies, problems in functioning in the unit start, since status quo has been disturbed. 
• At the same time, positive effects on Admin and Training will take another two years after the number of motivated Warrant Officers crosses a threshold, when they actually start influencing processes. The overall effectiveness of the unit appears to have reduced. 
• The CO, who is heading towards his last few months of command of the unit has to now justify perceived drop in performance, and disturbance in functioning because of the disgruntled NCOs. Since organization is not geared to this change, the CO's superior officers attribute this situation to poor leadership.
• In most cases, the CO would complete his tenure at this stage, which would not influence his career positively. As a result, most COs would like to play it safe: do not change status quo and continue promoting by seniority or based on subjective parameters; continue to play with testing standards and produce good results in the short term: Everyone is qualified for promotion and meets all requirements.
• What would happen if the next CO continues with the process of objective promotions? The reinforcing loops of training and admin come into play (after a delay). As admin and training standards improve, so does the motivation level of NCOs. Over a 2 to 3 year period of the next COs tenure, the situation will improve and it becomes easier to sustain.

There are many other factors that influence the quality of Warrant Officers, but they are exogenous to this system, so I've not discussed them here. 

Regimental Funds and Canteens

This is just an idea with the aim of providing equitable benefit of canteen profits to all units in a station and a method to run canteens without involving combatants in peace stations    

All units and formation headquarters in the army have regimental funds for the welfare of troops and other expenses required for running units. The major source for regimental funds in most units and formations is canteen profits.
       Every unit, big or small therefore sets up a small(or large) unit run canteen wherever they are located, whether peace or field.  In field stations, it is accepted that sale will be limited to the soldiers serving in the unit during the tenure, and a few ex servicemen in the area, while in peace stations, everyone tries to maximise sale. This is because in peace stations, there are more mess parties, regimental 'barakhanas' and other events that involve expenditure. Add to this the long term trend of subsidizing the CO's or formation commander's existence through regimental funds (after all, they're institutions, and therefore, must live in luxury paid for by the unit or formation), and many a canteen officer is on the lookout to increase sales.
     One of the factors affecting canteen sales is location of a canteen. A unit located on a main road, near a shopping complex etc hits the jackpot and rings in the money on the canteen cash register. However, a unit located in the interiors of the military station or even a smaller unit often has to deal with poor sales(as even their own soldiers and their families patronize the better stocked canteens) and by extension, low incomes in their regimental funds. Many formation headquarters(often those with commanders or deputies whose personal 'requirements' are high) identify units which have well run, profitable canteens and force them to part with a share of the canteen profit through convenient 'policy' letters. In addition, large station canteens in most stations hog premium locations, special privileges and most of the profits, a share of which is not given to other units in the station. Most ex-servicemen are also 'allotted' to these station canteens, increasing the profits of these canteens.
      If each unit runs a canteen, each staffed with 2 to 3 soldiers, a big military station can easily have 150 to 200 men (thats two companies!) just running these ventures. This also leads to a CSD canteen existing in every corner of military stations, most selling the same limited inventory.
       Combat units and their commanders should preferably not get involved in running canteens and generating profits for their regimental funds. Its a facility provided to all military personnel and, if possible, it should be done without the involvement of combat unit personnel. At the same time, since these personnel patronize the canteens resulting in profits, a share of these profits should rightfully be shared with all these units. Due to the environment in operational areas, it is essential to run a unit canteen to provide basic items to soldiers, since military units are deployed in far flung areas and a station canteen as in peace stations is not practical.
 
     A different model of running canteens in peace stations could change the dynamics of handling and spending of canteen profits, and probably even overcome the restrictions placed by CAG recently.
All unit run canteens in peace stations should be amalgamated into station canteens (may be with multiple outlets in a military station spread over a large area). The size / turnover could be based n the number of dependant personnel in the station. These canteens could be manned and run by re-employed officers and staff under station headquarters / sub area. However, the profit generated by the canteen should be distributed among all units in the station, proportional to their authorised strength. No diversion of profits outside the station(to sub areas etc, other than a small fixed percentage from each station canteen) should be permitted. The success of this concept will  depend on equitable and fair distribution of profits between formation headquarters and units, preferably based on an army wide policy. The concept of unit run canteens in peace stations should then be done away with.
   
Advantages:
Combatant manpower in units is not tied down in canteen related duties.
Optimisation of effort in transporting stores and stocking canteens from the depots.
All units in the station will get a share of the station canteens profits based on their manpower. COs do not have to worry about generating funds for their units. If a certain canteen located in the station has high sales volumes, all units in the station will benefit from it.
A percentage of profits can be used to support welfare projects in the station. This fund can be diverted before dividing the profits among dependant units, and welfare centres can be set up in military stations with permanent staff, instead of expecting units and formation headquarters to provide funds and resources.
Formation headquarters will obviously receive a very small share of the profit unlike in the other system since their strength is smaller than a subunit's. This can be enhanced by a small percentage depending on the level of headquarters.
Misuse of canteen profits to fund unethical projects like furnishing appointment houses etc can be curbed through transparent accounting.
There will be no need to maintain canteen accounts in units in peace stations.
Station amenities like movie halls can be directly funded by adopting this method instead of asking units for subscription.
        and many more....
 
I'm sure there will be problems in adopting this system, but it could be developed into a viable model for managing canteens. Modifications could result in  good workable model that is also acceptable to all. So reply with your ideas!
 

Man Management in the Indian Army: A Colonel's views

    This is an article that I'd written while commanding my unit sometime back. Views are entirely personal, and references are not made to any person within or outside the Indian Army. Views and comments are welcome!

Future articles will not be in this military format!

Introduction

Command of troops has probably become even more challenging than ever before due to various intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, many that are beyond the control of the Army. Yet, there are many other issues that are waiting to be addressed, once they are acknowledged as challenges. Command of a unit is essentially leading a body of men to do what is difficult by any standards, and impossible by many. The achievement of the operational aim and completing operational tasks must be the ultimate aim of all units. This requires good leadership, well-trained and motivated soldiers and well maintained and adequate equipment. For soldiers to be well trained and motivated, a large number of factors have to be addressed wherein training is only a part. Setting a good example, maintaining iron discipline, providing equal opportunities to all ranks for progress, genuine care for the soldiers and their families’ problems is a certain road to victory in war. There is a need to identify and address peculiar issues of man management to ensure that all units are effective in the event of war, or in ‘less than war’ conditions.

Man Management Environment

All military units have two human elements, officers and JCO (warrant officers)/ Other Ranks, who in the past were clearly differentiated by the background and status that they belonged to. In the changing environment in the country and society, the difference in background and social status of men and officers is blurring. More and more troops have better economic standing and, relatively, a greater number of officers are from the middle and lower middle strata of society.  All of them are subject to the social environment prevalent in the country. A few of the influences that affect both officers and soldiers are:-

       

Indifferent Civil Society And Government. 

The army, though respected by the common man, does not have a very high status in the overall government  organisation that is dominated by the Indian Administrative Service. The relative   standing of the army in the ‘pecking order’ has been degraded since independence. As a result, the respect and response that an ordinary soldier used to experience earlier has been degraded. Many other civilian jobs that are mundane and routine are considered more ‘useful’ with the added perk of being able to ‘pull strings’ in petty matters. The government, on its part has over a period of time neglected and lowered the status of military officers and the service due to various reasons. Civil administration in the states, which used to respond to the soldiers’ problems efficiently and quickly, not does not effectively do so.
      

Corruption And Nepotism. 

All pervasive corruption in matters related to the government and daily life for ordinary citizens does not spare even soldiers. In addition, corruption has crept into the military as well. Corruption in terms of professional honesty towards operational responsibility and training cannot be quantified in the classic sense, but affects the operational readiness of units and  formations, with the ultimate responsibility resting on commanders.

Effectiveness of System of Education. 

The existing education system does not enable capabilities and skills among high school/matriculation graduates that are employable. Most recruits are not able to meet standards of reading, writing or comprehension on reaching the units. As a result, in spite of meeting educational requirements on paper, soldiers are not able to cope up with their responsibilities of maintaining documents, clerical work and training. This leads to lowering of minimum passing standards during training and testing within the army.

Culture Of ‘Making It’ Through Shortcuts And Using Illegitimate Means.  

Society in general has deteriorated values where cheating in exams, producing fake  certificates and qualifications are common during recruitment and among the soldiers' peer group. There are numerous cases of petty ‘success’ being achieved in civil society by resorting to such means. These influences leave a mark on officers and soldiers who tend to be enamoured by such a value system, especially when reinforced by seniors who ‘gold plate’ their achievements and reports.

      

Increasing Religious Intolerance And The Tendency To Impose Own Beliefs On Others. With increasing religious intolerance in society, religious intolerance is slowly creeping into military organisation as well, though it has manifested itself in different forms. The concept of religion not being a consideration in military matters is slowly eroding, especially among officers. Official sanction for an increasing number of events with religious/superstitious bases and imposing religion of the majority/seniors are showing an rising trend. Religious events are on the increase in official / semi-official calendars and officers’ messes.

      

Exposure To Technology And Better Worldview. 

In the age of media and technology awareness among officers and soldiers is at an all-time high. They are comfortable with technology and new ideas. Many are breaking stereotypes and traditions and questioning existing norms and social traditions. Awareness of happenings around the world creates grounds for inquisitiveness and questioning the absolute authority of those in power. The officer class has to make itself accountable to its subordinates in areas which were otherwise considered inviolable.

With these widespread influences in society, the value system is eroding. A certain level of dishonesty is considered ‘acceptable’ and ‘fooling the system’ is considered the path to success by many. Many recruits and officers are joining the service for employment and not soldiering. Military service is considered by many as ‘just another government job’ with an attempt to superimpose alien values on military culture from within. Under the circumstances, it is essential that the military value system be implemented ruthlessly in the day to day functioning of units.

Poor value system prevalent in society is manifested in the following ways among officers and men:

    There is a tendency to avoid training in favour of more ‘glamorous’ pursuits like organising numerous events that give immediate returns in the form of appreciation from superiors. Flawless conduct of these social and administrative events is given undue importance at the cost of training and maintaining military routine. Due to short command tenures of brigade, divisional and corps commanders, there is perpetual pressure on units and formations to repeatedly perform, usually in conduct of events thought up to highlight and project commanders.

    Due to increased commitments in military stations on account of events, training is neglected. Officers resort to reflecting inflated results for tests related to professional competence and physical fitness, weapon handling, and technical capability. As an example, most units will not be able to match up to their own stated physical fitness standards, should they be audited impartially. The chain of command tends to turn a blind eye to inflated reports of training, as improvements are not prominently visible and pale in comparison to conduct of high profile events. Under the circumstances, the certificate of ‘fitness for war’ being issued to units may not be a true reflection of the state of things.

    Culture of promoting seniority over merit among Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO)/ other ranks (OR) to avoid complaints has long been the cause of poor standards of the troops. As a large number of ‘grey’ activities are being carried out under orders of ambitious officers, usually to please their superiors or for their own comfort, these officers find it morally difficult to assess their juniors without bias and in a fair manner. As NCOs and JCOs work on ground and are privy to mismanagement, they are ‘bought off’ by being awarded inflated CRs and being allowed to skip training standards. These actions are then justified as man management tools to keep men motivated! Selecting good men for higher ranks among NCOs and JCOs would imply that some will get superseded, but that is more than balanced by the fact that effective personnel will supervise the troops, not those who’ve merely put in more time.

    Avoidance of accountability and shirking of responsibility by JCOs and NCOs is on the increase. As a direct fallout of the culture of promoting seniority, soldiers are quick to calculate their future prospects of promotion purely on their date of enrolment and seniority, since their Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) are inflated and place everyone on the same plane of eligibility for promotion, irrespective of their motivation or capability. Once it is established that promotion is assured (or otherwise), these NCOs and JCOs display absolute lack of interest and shirk responsibility. This void in supervisors is therefore filled up by officers who are under pressure to complete tasks in a zero error environment, and resort to micro management. As the task is now supervised by officers, the NCOs and JCOs are not accountable to anyone; this vicious cycle continues in most units and formations.

    Selective/false reporting of activities and standards achieved to present a ‘good image’ has become the norm and needs to be curbed ruthlessly. Repeated and extended rehearsals prior to the visit by a senior officer to present perfectly coordinated operational activity has resulted in officers and men  willing to undergo only ‘rehearsals’, not realistic training. As a result, no time is allotted to actual training and a ‘Well Done’ by a commander is taken as authentication of operational readiness.

    Encouraging sycophancy and playing favourites by promoting those ‘closer’ to the commander irrespective of capability and suitability.

    There is lack of interest and sincerity among officers and unwillingness to stand up for what is right. Facilitating improper ‘requirements’ of the seniors is taken as a positive trait and such an officer is called ‘resourceful’. An officer who does not agree to bend rules, whether it is use of transport, manpower, generators, or funds being ‘adjusted’, often blatantly violating rules and policies, is side-lined.

    The fast pace of events in field formations due to short tenures of formation commanders is taking a toll on the routine functioning of units, and, indirectly on the human resource available. Events, both training and administrative are planned and executed for short term gains and reflecting achievement of ‘aim plus’. Less glamorous command and staff functions like individual training, administration and documentation, staff work, and investing in efforts to improve the quality of human resource is given short shrift. These are side-lined in favour of numerous high visibility events that promise ‘instant’ solutions and gratify seniors, often at the cost of basic requirements.

    Junior officers are impressionable and are looking to their seniors for cues on day to day functioning. A combination of societal influences and poor functional ethos in the units demotivates them and at times forces them to ‘flow with the tide’. In turn, JCOs/OR, who are looking at officers as role models feel encouraged to follow an unprofessional career path where military culture and ethos takes a backseat. The shortage of officers with 5-10 years’ service has led to a shortage of ‘working hands’ at subunit level and gaps in grooming of young officers. Without hands on oversight, maintenance of standards and completion of tasks are largely left to the wisdom of JCOs and NCOs.

    All units are faced with man management problems related to training, administration and operations on a daily basis. Choosing the ‘best man for the job’ (that is, the same man, over and over) for routine tasks has to be weighed against the need for rotation of personnel and for all ranks to be trained for additional responsibilities. A few man management challenges in units are:-

• Selection of competent and efficient NCOs for promotion to JCOs and management of superseded NCOs till retirement.
• Conduct of training to ensure maximum participation, keeping in mind administrative   commitments.
• Instilling a sense of accountability in all ranks by a system of rewards a punishment.
• Motivating all ranks to train and work sincerely.
• Correct reporting/ feedback from appointments, especially in an operational environment.
• Following military culture and ethos by all ranks.
• Curbing the tendency of favoritism and partiality among JCOs/NCOs.

Effect of the Environment on Functioning of Units

    The man behind the machine is the key to excellence in any unit. A compromise in the management of this ‘resource’ directly affects functional efficiency, morale, equipment management and overall operational readiness. A dispassionate and unbiased audit of any unit in training standards in relation to the operational role, administrative effectiveness, and morale of all ranks including officers would indicate that much ground needs to be covered in terms of man management. 

A few effects of the environment are given below:-

• Actual training standards are much lower than that desired and reported.
• Instances of interpersonal friction based on perceived or actual grievances.
• Tendency to cover up flaws and limitations in day to day functioning among all ranks. Truthful reporting is not encouraged.
• Attempts to challenge the authority of superior officers through civilian courts/ without following correct channels.
• Large number of personnel deployed on non-essential administrative duties without dedicated time or effort for training and good administration. Additional administrative responsibilities are created to achieve short term goals resulting in diversion of manpower from training and basic unit administration.
• Cosmetic welfare being implemented without adequate consideration for the genuine well-being of all ranks and the unit.
• Officers are encouraged not to ‘rock the boat’ and follow orders without application of mind.

    With a transparent society due to the advent of electronic media, mobile telephones and the internet, all ranks are constantly being exposed to a ‘fast and successful’ civil society that is based on questionable morals and a skewed relationship between effort and result. The myth of achieving results through ‘shortcuts, or by any means’ as being the route to success percolates to officers and soldiers adversely affecting day to day functioning of units.

    Presently, the idea of empowering JCOs is being considered to overcome the shortage of officers in units. However, as JCOs are not promoted on merit alone, they are ineffective in ‘standing in’ for officers. Grooming of young officers is seriously affected due to the shortage of middle level officers. In the absence of any guidance from peer group/immediate seniors, they are left to gain knowledge and experience on their own.

Bringing in the Change

    The basic prerequisite for bringing in a change is to acknowledge that ‘CHANGE IS REQUIRED’. Since the army is officer driven at all levels, a conscious effort at all levels of command to address the root causes and environmental factors is essential. Setting examples needs to be the norm for all officers in command of troops, from Lieutenant to General. Double standards in military values and ethics need to be acknowledged as such and ruthlessly weeded out. A concerted effort in transforming the value system of the Army needs to be the focus. Some of the aspects that need transformation are given below.

Environmental Changes.  As all ranks are exposed to a society with a blurring value system during leave and interaction with civilians/government agencies for personal requirements, they must be sensitized of the need to follow the military way of life at all times. This may involve motivating them to be honest and leading the life of a ‘good citizen’ irrespective of contrary influences. A few changes in the military environment to improve quality of man management are given below.

    

• Commanders at all levels must set and maintain the highest standards of personal example, probity and fairness. Petty regimental or other affiliations, questionable financial dealings and employment of resources for personal gains must be curbed with the aim of avoiding cynicism and restoring subordinates’ faith in the chain of command. 
• Absolute fairness and transparency in all dealings are essential for all ranks to accept other tough measures to reclaim military ethos in man management.
• Unauthorized ‘perks and privileges’ are seen as a manifestation of double standards. These weaknesses interfere with effective command and need to be curbed so that troops accept tough measures in training and functioning.
• The need for extraneous activities at formation level couched as welfare and training essentials must be revisited and reduced.
• The trend of formation headquarters attaching manpower and vehicles from units for administrative requirements must be curbed as these are then not available for training. A cap of attaching not more than 10% additional strength of manpower and vehicles could be workable. of course, commanders and staff officers will have to lower their expectations.
• Demanding contributions from regimental funds for various ‘high visibility' projects must be stopped. Regimental funds in the units are meant for the welfare of troops and other unit commitments like raising days, improving day to day functioning etc. These should be left to the CO’s discretion.    

Man Management Changes in the Units. Functional ethos in units needs changes in keeping with the times. ‘How we do things’ must be more important than ‘what we need to do’. A message needs to be sent to all ranks that maintaining military ethos and culture is of paramount importance. A CO’s word is still largely followed without question. Therefore, all change in units must flow downwards from the CO. A few changes that can be implemented are given below.

• At the unit level, personal standards need to be set by the CO that withstands any level of scrutiny. No cooks and personal staff, no vehicles for family members. Under any pretext.
• Accountability of all appointments in the chain of command including NCOs and JCOs should be fixed. NCOs and JCOs must be held accountable for problems/lauded for good performance quantitatively, ie through CRs, honours, disciplinary and administrative action.
• Conduct individual training cadres focussed on training and testing, not on passing those affected for promotion. Those not meeting the standards must fail. This will ensure that only those meeting standards are fit for promotion.
• Promotion and CRs should be purely merit based and not only on seniority. Objective CRs will go a long way in ensuring that only deserving NCOs are promoted to JCOs. A fair and impartial promotion policy in all units is essential. There is nothing more demoralizing than seeing an incompetent sycophant getting promoted or rewarded!
• Physical training, weapons training and small arms firing must focus on maximum inclusion rather than on attaining KRAs in terms of percentage results. The aim should be to make everyone go through his basic training requirements every year.
• Increasing trend of low medical categories can be addressed by permitting only fit personnel to attend individual training cadres. This will discourage all ranks from shirking work and yet getting promoted. In addition, inefficient low medical categories who have reached pensionable service must be compulsorily retired, but with benefits due.
• Grievances and complaints must be treated with compassion and fairness, and strict action initiated on legitimate complaints irrespective of the rank of the accused. False complaints must also result in disciplinary action to set examples.
• The powers of a CO to dismiss a JCO/NCO for inefficiency or discipline with review by the next higher formation commander should be streamlined.
• Training and leave should not be reduced/ compromised. Good planning is essential for fulfilling station and formation responsibilities. Priority of activities must remain biased towards training without any compromise
• Focus on reducing non-essential administrative requirements and commitments. Family welfare activities that require diversion of combatants from training must be stopped. These could be conducted at station level with permanent staff hired for the purpose. Simultaneously there is a need to de-link welfare of families’ lifestyle and mental health issues, overall living standards of troops’ families and social development from the responsibilities of commanders of combat units and formations. A commander cannot be held responsible for poor social development and governance! The army needs to develop procedures and institutions to look after these needs without active involvement of the combat units and their commanders. Increasingly, the welfare of veterans, addressing problems related to pensions and issues with the civil administration are also being handled by field formations. The need of the hour is to make the organisations meant for veterans welfare such as the ‘Zilla Sainik Boards’ more effective and accountable instead of diverting the field army from their training in peace stations to such tasks.
• Identification of potential JCOs among junior NCOs and mentoring/grooming them discreetly is suggested. A system of informal  monthly/quarterly appraisal of performance for JCOs/NCOs at subunit level could also be considered.
• Taking up the cause of soldiers with civil administration to solve personal problems will help in gaining confidence of the soldiers.
• Grooming young/middle level officers to understand that following correct military culture and ethos is non-negotiable and should not be adapted according to convenience. They should also be formally trained on man management issues during courses like JC and orientation capsules for potential COs.
• Increase the strength of middle level officers (5-10 years’ service) in units. 
• User friendly automation of manpower functions, maintenance of databases for quick retrieval of information is essential to manage a large body of men. 
• All ranks need to be educated on the value system that has been the bedrock of Indian Army. This could be achieved through lectures, informal interaction, inclusion in training cadres etc, and last but not the least, in practice. There is a need to talk to officers and troops about the ethos and military culture that they are expected to follow.

Conclusion

It is necessary to integrate the tangible and intangible elements of man management and apply corrective measures at all levels. These changes are likely to be met with resistance due to human and cultural barriers within the organisation, as changes need to be implemented by those ‘in power’ and will involve a shift in work culture. Care must also be taken to ensure that time tested methods that are genuinely effective and contribute to the well-being of the organisation are not negated and changes are inclusive.