People Management and End to End Leadership

 

Yesterday, news channels and social media were covering the untimely and unfortunate death of a young woman intern at a large global consulting firm due to overwork and work-related stress. Apparently, the company did not do enough even after the event, and the woman's mother had to send out an open letter to the company's India head to get a response from them.

I am reminded of the time when I served in the army - stress induced deaths and suicides were worrying the Army, more so than the Navy or the Air Force, probably because of larger number of people. Managing stress among the men was an organizational focus area throughout the time I was a subunit commander as a Major and Lt Col, and a commanding officer. Why did I leave out officers from the scope? Probably because officers were expected to be mentally tougher due to the focus on mental fitness standards established by the Service Selection Boards, and officer suicides were practically nonexistent (or not in enough numbers to warrant a response at the organization level).

When I took over command of my regiment in an intense CI operations environment on the Line of Control somewhere West of Srinagar in 2010, one of the first things I was told by my Subedar Major (SM) was "Sir, we will be sharing your mobile number with all the men in the regiment. There are orders that any soldier should be able to reach the CO directly in case he is mentally disturbed or stressed and be able to communicate his problems." 

This was in line with the orders and policy in the formation or even, across the Army and sounded good - everyone has a direct line to the boss, who can take instant decisions to solve their problems. Typically, the problems men faced included not getting leave to go back home on time for an event, land related issues in the extended family back home, wife and children's health issues, and for bachelors - some of them wanted to marry a particular girl and their families would not allow it for caste, religion or other reasons. It'll take time to change society in the villages and smaller towns, where most soldiers come from. 

There also were 'work' related stresses - the monotony and lack of sleep due to repeated deployments on the line of control (patrols and ambushes are mostly carried out in the night to stop infiltration - imagine being awake every second night for 3 to 4 months on end), without much contact with your family and knowing what was happening at home, eating the same food without much variation and sleeping in wet/ soggy vermin infested bunkers. On convoy protection duty, the men would man open army trucks with weapons ready to fire, whether snow or rain every day for 9 to 12 hours. The route was dotted with numerous villages, so there always was the risk of firing on civilians by mistake. This was usually for a couple of months or longer at a time, and they were constantly expected to be alert enough to ward off a terrorist attack from anywhere on the mountains along the route. Every day.

On top of this, if their immediate boss, the NCO or JCO did not rotate them out of that deployment in three months, they had the 'pleasure' of enjoying these facilities and the work even longer. The first level of officer leadership was a hit and a miss, because there simply were too few of them available to lead (the army suffers from shortage of officers in the units) - most majors (subunit commanders) would also be rotating through various duties, whether leading convoy protection or commanding the anti-infiltration post on the LC, or other duties.

In this situation, I decided to do the exact opposite of what my SM suggested - I did not share my mobile number with the men.

My reasoning was this:

The men would hesitate to tell me their problems frankly - the rank and status difference was simply too much between a Colonel and a Gunner or Naik(Corporal). In the regiment, a CO has absolute power over the officer and men and that also makes him a distant figure in the real sense - someone who cannot really be a confidant.

I did not have the bandwidth to patiently hear out and solve the problems of 600+ men, while filtering out the troublemakers (false allegations around work conditions etc). I also could not monitor the progress of the resolution that was decided.

This would also mean absolving the entire chain of my command of their leadership responsibilities - of the well-being of their teams. If the chain of command fulfils their command responsibilities, problem resolution or escalation at every level would be the norm. Therefore, either the soldier's detachment commander, a Havildar (Sergeant) would help him get a solution, or escalate it to the JCO, and then to the battery commander and so on. The commanding officer would need to come in only if 4 to 5 layers of leadership could not address the problem. This of course meant having faith in the NCOs, JCOs and officers to manage this. What better way to start this than telling them about my expectations regarding their leadership abilities!

I was short and to the point with them in my first Sainik Sammelan (open house): "I expect the NCOs to take ownership of your detachments and take care of your men. If it is beyond your resources to solve the problem, escalate it. The biggest crime an NCO, JCO or officer can commit is not knowing his men's abilities, achievements and problems, or not trying to solve them. If a soldier's problem comes to me without a clearly discernible attempt by his NCO, JCO and subunit commander to solve it, or without they being aware of it, I will hold each person in that chain of command responsible for failure of leadership."

To ensure that this worked, problems needed to be informed and documented. We modified the system of interviews - every man going out of or coming in to a unit is interviewed by the CO. In most units, it is a formal parade in the morning, where the interviewees are lined up and each man speaks about himself - whether coming back from leave, going on leave, or something else. Not a very comfortable place for a man to tell the CO that his neighbour is trying to take away his land, or that his wife is not able to conceive a child and needs treatment!

We changed the process to an interview inside the CO's office, in confidence. It meant that I had to spend the good part of an hour or more to speak to all the men on interview parade, usually about 10, sometimes 30 to 40. To maintain continuity, we also instituted an interview document with a dedicated page for each man - this would be updated by his NCO, JCO and subunit commander after they spoke to him every time he came to me for an interview - and note a solution there. Soon enough, we had a confidential history of everyone's life and we all could refer back to what happened earlier while talking to him. To reach this stage, it took the best part of two years of sustained effort, a few punishments to NCOs who did not take their leadership duties seriously, and a very thick interview register! We usually went along with the solution suggested by the NCOs.

To manage the problem of NCOs and JCOs not rotating people out of tough deployment duties like anti infiltration post and convoy protection, we used technology. I had been an MS Access enthusiast for a long time (MS Access has disappeared from the Microsoft stack now!). I built an Access based application to manage deployments, leave, promotions, equipment management etc. I had the time, because my NCOs, JCOs and officers were doing their job of leading men well. It would automatically highlight anyone who had completed more than 45 days at these deployments, which gave his team leaders enough time to plan a rotation and replacement.

Of course, the men had managed to get my number, and a few tried to call me to get leave. I found that most were cases of men trying to game the 'stress management system'. I sent them back to their NCOs who resolved their issues via their chain of command - this of course instilled a sense of confidence in the NCOs and JCOs, that their CO trusted them to lead. We also awarded NCOs and JCOs who took the initiative to solve their men's problems and kept the chain in the loop - the award was not a typical piece of Chinese plastic with platitudes on it, but usually a pre-paid mobile recharge card, which was most sought after among the men in that age of feature phones and expensive talk times.

The next year, there was a suicide case in every regiment in the brigade. Except mine. Was it just luck, or something that we did right? 

We moved out of the field posting the year afterwards, without any stress related injuries or deaths, or operational casualties. 

Most of the writings and workshops being held on leading and managing people in the corporate world may be missing the woods for the trees. Leadership is always end to end - it cannot be restricted to getting results on the business targets and objectives alone. Leadership cannot be reduced to a series of events run by learning and development teams - it needs to be practiced by every line manager, encouraged and instilled in everyone who has the potential to grow within any organization.

'Irreparable loss for all of us,' says EY India on death of 26-year-old CA | Company News - Business Standard (business-standard.com)

Pushups at Hunter Squadron

The CNS at Hunter Squadron(pic thanks to squadron network)

 

The Naval chief, Admiral Karambir Singh is at National Defence Academy today to review the Passing Out Parade (POP). Last evening he visited his own squadron (and mine - Hunter Squadron) where he trained as a cadet 40+ years ago. Somebody posted pictures of him doing push ups with the cadets, and there has been armchair analysis of whether the chief should be doing pushups in ceremonial uniform instead of leading the Navy and doing bigger things that are worthy of his rank and stature.

Yours truly, Col Abraham Cherian with course mates during our 25th reunion

Tradition and Camaraderie Any ex NDA visiting the squadron and meeting the cadets in a 'fall in'(a gathering of cadets) at the Squadron parade ground gets down and leads push ups. That is a Hunter Squadron tradition. I'm sure other squadrons have similar traditions, its just that we Headhunters are possibly more religious about it. So, too bad the chief was in ceremonials, too bad he was the chief; he was and is a head hunter first - something that doesn't go away anytime. 

That spirit is what got me on an airforce flight from Bangalore to Delhi in 1995. My coursemates' helicopter pilot training was getting over when I landed up there on leave, as a 2nd Lieutenant. At the end of the ceremonies, those headed north were travelling by an AN32 flight and my buddy, Wing Commander Shantanu Basu, Shaurya Chakra, posthumous, told me, there's no space in the aircraft, but the pilot is a Headhunter. At 0630H, I was standing in front of the aircraft with its propellers running, all loaded and ramp shut, in my uniform(which I was carrying with me while on leave, for some reason!). The pilot opened the window and said, Pongo(slang for army cadet at NDA), get out of the way, you idiot! I said, sir, I'm a Head Hunter and need to get to Delhi. The ramp opened up, and I was on the aircraft, saving me a two day train journey. As simple as that.

That spirit got me free introductory flying lessons on a flight back from Siachen. I was at a post on the Siachen Glacier when I was told that my pilot's aptitude test and medical test (I had applied for army aviation before heading to Siachen) were to be held at Dehradun. When I reached Thoise airfield and lined up to board the transport plane, the copilot recognized me - he was another Headhunter, a term senior to me. When he came to know that I was going for my pilot's test, he made sure that I travelled in the cockpit and he explained all the instruments - attitude indicator, rate of climb, altimeter and a host of others to me. Needless to say, I passed the pilot's exam; its another matter that months of being at the target end during heavy shelling had degraded my hearing and I couldn't become a pilot.

I have done exactly the same pushups when I visited the squadron as a 2nd Lieutenant in 1995 while attending the Physical Training (PT) course and later as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2012. I still remember that a Colonel who was with us on that visit refused to get down from the car at his Squadron parade ground because we were in uniform, and he did not have his beret with him at that time - I forget the reason why. His reasoning - he was not properly dressed to go to his squadron, although he was 25 years out of the academy. 

Then we did it again during our 25th reunion in 2018, when there were no cadets around, just a bunch of middle aged guys, with their wives and teenaged children giving part embarrassed / part 'I didn't know you were like this, daddy!' looks. And a year later, when my daughter was in college in Pune and a cadet sidled up, asking her to the term end NDA ball, she scared him off by asking, 'which squadron?'. When he said 'Charlie' (no offense to Charlie squadron), she dismissed him saying, 'my daddy is a Headhunter'! It seems this spirit percolates to the next generation as well!

The point is, these traditions, that some would call immature and childish, build that common thread of camaraderie and loyalty among generations of squadron mates - the chief must be nearing 60, and the oldest of the cadets would be all of 20. 

The Naval Chief has nothing to take from the cadets, only give them a sense of belonging to a cult like team of buddies that spans generations. For Life.

Its not for nothing that NDA is called the 'Cradle of Leadership'.

Would you prefer to sleep...and leave a few buddies behind, or do you want to undergo sleepless nights ...but go back together?

     My unit was near Baramula when I took over command - they had been deployed there for about a year. The regiment was deployed in gun positions, a company operating base on the Line of Control(LC), convoy protection duties from Srinagar to Uri and road opening. The regiment HQ normally had the RHQ staff and troops rotating in and out of other duties or leave.

     I was very concerned about security and safety of the RHQ. This location had more clerks, cooks, washermen, barbers and drivers (not that they were less effective, but their nature of work did not allow me to deploy them on core operations roles frequently, because that would be at the cost of cooking, office work or haircuts!) In addition, a couple of porters used to work here - essentially locally hired working hands, who could potentially inform terrorists about the deployment and state of alertness. We were also part of the local garrison under the infantry brigade, and since I was the only CO in location(the infantry COs were deployed with their battalions on the LC - artillery works one up in relation to the infantry - the battery commander works with the infantry CO, the regiment commander works with the infantry brigade commander etc), I was commander of the garrison for local security.

     I knew that there had been attacks on garrisons in the recent past, and they would happen again. The enemy is always watching and keeping track of which garrison is lax and which one is active, and is likely to respond effectively(porters and locals are potential informants). I figured that prevention is better than cure, therefore deterring potential terrorist attacks on my garrison was the best bet. The strategy I chose to follow was - make a lot of noise, use technology and train my unit.

     Every unit is authorised a huge quantity of small arms( that is rifle, automatics etc) ammunition every year, even if they are in CI operations. Usually, this is not used up for training as everyone is busy with deployment on actual operations. Luckily for us, we had an improvised firing range on the hillside within our unit, which I activated - no approvals, clearances etc. We organized firing twice a week with whatever we had-  all ranks in HQ who could be spared were required to fire their weapons at the range. There were no elaborate arrangements - just the targets, a weapons technician from the Light Repair Workshop(LRW) that was part of my unit, and a collection of available troops on that day- sometimes as few as 20, and sometimes almost 50. We only worked out the number of rounds(bullets) to be fired every week to use up all the ammunition by the end of the year. I used to make it a point to fire my weapon whenever possible - something that I have always enjoyed!

     I also stipulated  a condition that the waiting details (people waiting in queue to fire, since only 8 could fire at a time) would not wait, but continuously do their weapons training exercises - no sitting around etc. The first week was a little difficult, since everyone takes it that this is another one of those projects that won't last long. I landed up the first day and had to dress down a couple of JCOs and officers to get it going. Soon, our unit (and the nearby units and villages) was reverberating to the sweet sound of small arms fire every week - sending the message that this unit trains continuously, and hard. The porters would be working nearby and they also carried this message home(and elsewhere).

    

     Usually, the security detail is worked out by JCOs and deployment of guards is done by them. Afterwards, they complain that there are too many guard posts, due to which troops are able to sleep only one in 4 nights etc. I did  a review and found that a few of the guard posts were simply facing a neighboring units guard post a few metres away. Cameras and sensors had been around for some time, so I authorised my second in command to buy and deploy thermal cameras and improvise trip sensors in low threat areas. Remember, this was an area where the temperatures could go down to -15 celsius in winter with mist, so we had to be careful about what we bought. we put a large portion of the Annual Contingency Grant(public funds allocated to every unit on an annual basis) to good use doing this. In the end, we reduced guards and sentries by 30%. However, I was conscious of the need to cover these areas with people, so we created two quick reaction teams(QRTs), who were expected to be at the scene in under 1 minute. I used to walk around and pull the trip sensor and wait to see how long the QRT took, including retakes whenever they wouldn't. and this would happen round the clock. While all this was happening, the porters were watching and telling others too...

     We also started sending out patrols to nearby villages to dominate them - staying in touch with what is happening around you is very critical for operational awareness. I also insisted on perimeter patrols during day and night - from outside the fence for the entire garrison. People have a tendency to stay within their comfort zone, in this case, within the fence. The need was to dominate the 'outside', talk to the herdsmen who seemed to always be loitering outside the fence and keep them at arms length. They had to get the message that we could get to them at any time of the day or night, and they could not sneak in close. (Now that I'm in business management, I carry this lesson with me - always stay in touch with your customers and know what the competition is about to do).

     An incident comes to my mind - one of the first patrols that went to a village got chatting with the headman about how it was almost time for Eid and how he(the JCO who pretended to be a devout muslim) would celebrate it. They were offered food by the villagers, and the JCO blurted out "but we have a fast for Santoshi maa today"! So much for getting close to locals!

     Once I was woken up in the middle of the night by my 2iC, saying that a guard post had seen movement, and had opened fire. I told him to get the regiment on 'stand to'(everyone occupies battle stations) and rushed to the post. It appeared that the soldier had seen someone in the shadows and fired. However, there was no one to be seen outside the fence. Sentries deploy in pairs (to keep fear at bay and also ensure adequate response in case of an incident). In this case, it was obvious that the second sentry had been sleeping (it was obvious from the small space that had been created within the post for the second sentry to sit, and sleep), and the person on guard had got scared and opened fire  -fear can make you see things where there is nothing. This was tricky - if the sentry was punished for opening fire when there was no threat, guards would think twice before opening fire  while on duty, even when there was a genuine threat. and if he was not punished, sentries could potentially become trigger happy. I decided to address the unit(town hall or 'sainik sammelan') to explain why I was not punishing the sentry, even though there was no intruder. It was important to communicate the thought process behind the (in)action, especially the importance of both sentries staying awake while on guard duty!

     One incident stands out on considered inaction. In 2012, a protest against the National Hydel Power Corp nearby spiraled out of control. People protesting against a power shortage gathered outside the NHPC premises, which was next door and just outside the garrison. I was responsible for the convoy, which was to pass this area at around 10 am, which we managed by deploying my troops and clearing  the way. My men also captured this on video. Around afternoon, the situation started going out of hand - the crowd grew restive. I ordered the garrison on 'stand to' but told them all to stay away from the crowd, since they were demonstrating against NHPC, its security was not my responsibility. I decided not to intervene in the protest, since my garrison was not affected directly - although I did get a couple of calls insinuating that I was not doing my job by not acting. I was clear that managing a civilian protest of that type was not in my charter of duties! Soon we heard shots - the CISF(central industrial security force) troopers had fired on some protestors trying to climb the walls and killed a man. This got on TV very fast, and CISF soon became 'security forces' and 'army'. I soon started getting calls from the brigade and division - I told them that we were not involved and sent them the video that we had captured. Very quickly, the division rebutted the media claims and the army was saved an unfair embarrassment. 

      This was a hot location and within a year of us being replaced after we moved out to a peace station, they were attacked by terrorists. It was probably luck that protected my regiment, or maybe it was a combination of various actions that we took while we were there. We opted to give up on our sleep and comfort to ensure security - I addressed the unit to give them this option right at the beginning "Would you prefer to sleep, be comfortable, switch off and leave a few buddies behind, or do you want to undergo sleepless nights and fatigue, but go back together?"  Most opted for the second, and we pushed the others along in that direction.

    When we moved out of there, ours was one of the few units to complete a tenure without any casualties, and yet do more than expected in terms of the operational role. In any case, my wife learned to fire while we were there!

    

Siachen Story Part 4 - The army moves you by air only to induct in a hurry!

Continuing from my last post on Siachen, Siachen Story Part-3 Life at 20500 Feet, which I wrote in 2015. This one has photos!

I stayed overnight at Thoise airfield, thanks to my course mate from the airforce. It was good to be among friends and recount the ground level stories from Amar post with the flyboys, who would only land there for a couple of minutes. I also opened up the annual confidential report that I had received in mail - the air force officers were very curious about it and wanted to take a look. The armed forces confidential reports are on a scale of 1 to 9, and they were impressed with the number of 9s and 8s in my report for various parameters, till I told them that this was a typical report for a Captain with two years' service. Apparently, in the air force, officers with similar profiles would get 7s and 6s!

     The next morning, I was flown to the company HQ at 'Kiran' in a Cheetah helicopter. I found that the pilot detailed to fly me to my post was a senior from my squadron at NDA.

This post was held by a Parachute battalion. I landed there and met the company commander who was a para commando, and the doctor - he happened to be my squad mate during induction training and it was good that I was in the hands of someone I knew for medical cover! Little did I know that I would be needing his skills very soon! There was a field gun position just behind the company HQ, so I knew my tools were at hand. I spent an hour with them and started my trek up the mountain to my post on a narrow ridge, a two hour climb away. I was to man an artillery observation post(OP) on a cliff overlooking the Gyong Glacier at 19,000 ft. - just three of us in a bunker. Enroute was an infantry mortar position, where I met the mortar platoon commander who was a spirited man.

             

    The previous officer at that post had been evacuated some time ago due to frostbite, and only his OP party was left. They were hill troops and had abandoned the fiber glass hut(FGH), which was perched on the cliff (one half was hanging in the air and held up by ropes tied to the rocks on the cliff). Apparently, a few days earlier, they had been shelled and the FGH was damaged. Being superstitious, they refused to repair the hut and move back in, the idea being that the FGH is warmer and can be lived in, while the bunker is used to engage the enemy or whenever enemy shelling is on. They were also displaying classic low morale symptoms - not doing their military duties, not keeping a watch on the enemy, eating just one meal a day etc, probably because they were feeling abandoned after their officer was evacuated.

    The bunker itself was extremely cold and drafty(being an understatement - imagine a -70 degree wind through your 7ftx5ft room made of piled up rocks!) since one wall was a cliff whose other side was a 3000ft drop(!), using the toilet meant hanging onto a rope to do your job, and the food was tinned and cold. Unfortunately for me, the helicopter ride was not made available to my regiment's OP party, which was now trekking up from base camp, and would take another 15 days to reach.

Two days in that freezing bunker, and I told the men that we needed to repair the FGH and move in. They were hesitant, so I called up the company commander and asked for some help. That arrived in the form of  a working party from the mortar position with two used parachutes(these are left over after the Mi17 helicopter drops supplies; they are collected to provide insulation and cover gaps between FGH panels). In no time they had repaired the hut, and by evening, I moved in. After a couple of days one of them came in(apparently enamored by the princely standard of living that I had achieved for myself!) and asked if he could move in too. I said of course, and he joined me in the warm comforts of the FGH. This was in January, when the outside temperature at that altitude was in the -50 to -60 degree range. Soon the other NCO also joined us, and in a few days my unit team arrived and these two were sent off to base camp.

There was a lull in shelling during this time, since it was 'Ramzan' season for our friends across the line. All was quiet and we got busy improving our defences - I needed sandbags to rebuild the entrance to the fighting bunker which had disintegrated over time. We included this in our daily situation reports (sitrep), but the sandbags did not turn up. So we did the next best thing - plugged the gaps between rocks in the bunker walls with packets of frozen Cadbury's Eclairs toffee and whatever else we could find! There were also routine line(to check the telephone line) patrols and link patrols(to restock rations and kerosene), which we all did regularly. There is no distinction between officer and soldier - I also went on these patrols, since there were only three of us and one had to always be manning the observation post and radio. We also prepared hot water for when we got back from these patrols to warm up our feet, which would be near frozen - this was SOP, and many a soldier who had not followed it had to be evacuated with frostbite.

One day (I think Ramzan ended that day, 16 February 1997), we were on top of our bunker repairing it, when the first shells of our tenure started landing. This was around 4 pm and we quickly got into the bunker in combat mode - binoculars, compass, target list, field telephone and radio. The radio was a backup, all communication was via telephone. I started the procedure to engage the enemy post across the valley in front of us. We started engaging the enemy positions - orders were that I could fire ten shells if I saw enemy movement or was fired upon. While I was passing corrections on line, a shell exploded outside and the splinters entered our bunker through the door(the one that could not be repaired due to shortage of sandbags). One hit me in the head and ricocheted off the steel plates in the ceiling. I fell down and the line went dead.

My operator, Dharamvir tried to get the phone working but couldn't. I was wearing a balaclava, which was now torn and there was blood all over it. The Technical Assistant(TA), Gyanender tried to stop the bleeding while Dharamvir got the radio going and passed "OP officer is casualty". This is a very open ended message and people at the company base and mortar platoon started imagining the worst, since an officer casualty is a big event - and is reported all the way up to army HQ. I was concerned that the enemy could probably hear these messages(ANPRC radio set was used without encryption due to reduced ranges in mountains). The company commander came on radio and said that he was sending a stretcher party to evacuate me. The shelling just got worse and now it was continuous. By this time, I checked myself and found that my head was still screwed tight to my neck, and passed a message that I was okay and did not want a stretcher party, as they would get caught in the shelling too. I also ordered fire to continue on the enemy post. Then I told the operator not to pass anything else on radio without asking me. Around 1830h, the shelling stopped, and when we checked up, we found that the cables had been ripped off the telephone when I fell. We patched it up and called the company HQ, reported that we were okay.  The doc wanted to examine and patch me up, so I decided to trek down to company headquarters. Mortar platoon sent me a link patrol, with whom I went down, leaving my operator and TA holding fort. It took me two hours in the dark to reach through 2 feet of snow.

    The doctor checked me up - it was a superficial wound, which needed to be stitched up. He didn't have anasthesia so I told him to just sew it up. I spent the next day under medical observation at company HQ, while my post was shelled. I got frantic calls from my team and I managed to get them a couple of shoots(engaging targets using artillery) from the gun position nearby. The doctor wanted to call for a helicopter to evacuate me for further medical treatment, but I refused, since I had seen what happened to the previous team when the officer was evacuated. So I decided to go back to my post.

By evening, I reached the post and my men were truly happy to see me. We decided to teach our friends across a lesson. The next morning, I passed orders to the gun position to engage a target. The Gun Position Officer (GPO), a JCO was hesitant, as firing was not common in the sector at the time, but he fired. The orders were that if the OP officer saw a target or was fired upon, he could engage with 10 field gun rounds. I decided to engage a second target, and the GPO now wanted clearance from his regimental command post. I talked to the company commander, who had become friends with me by then, and since the telephone exchange was controled by him, I 'asked' him to 'cut' the line to the rear. The GPO now said that he could not fire since he did not have clearance from his command post or communication(radios were not the primary means of communication). I ordered him to commence firing on my orders, since I was his superior officer in location, else I would have him shot for disobedience! I had a little more than 2 years service when I did this, but that was the need of the hour in my mind. We fired almost 70 field artillery shells that day, in addition to countless infantry mortar bombs on a number of targets. In the evening, the field regiment CO called me on telephone(we had 'restored' line comunicaction with the rear by then) and threatened me with a court martial, saying the ammunition was brought up and dumped via helicopters and I did not have permission to fire so much. I replied that I saw enemy movement 7 times and did what I had to, and he could do what he wanted to. That was the end of the matter.

We spent the next few days engaging various enemy posts. Since I had not yet done my Advance Gunnery course, I improvised some shooting methods in the mountains. For those who understand ballistics and gunnery, distance from OP to target was between 1500 to 2000m, height of target was about 5000 to 5500m, temperatures were -40 to -50 degrees below zero. We spent almost every day rushing into the bunker on hearing the whistling sound from the shells headed over us(if you can hear the sound, those shells will miss you and fall beyond you).

An interesting anecdote on the Yeti - we used to sleep in the FGH and most nights there would be fresh snow all around us. When we woke up and came outside, we could see undisturbed snow on all the slopes around us. One day, we saw footprints on the snow, which were too big to be that of humans but too similar to a human footprint going cross country on the slopes from near our post. Was it the enemy or the abominable snowman, we don't know. My camera did not have the resolution to capture it in the glare of sunlight on snow, so I let it go.

The infantry battalion came to know of our actions and they started sending me requests for fire on enemy posts that they were unhappy with, alongwith gifts of sweets(made on their posts, wrapped in newspaper with half the print mixed with the food). Once, the company commander and the doctor trekked up to us with a supply of tinned milk and sweets. Since doc had never seen an artillery shoot, I did one live for him on the enemy. Its very difficult to see the fall of shot in mountains and to help him see, I must thave fired the only 'smoke, orange'  ammunition in the sector, ever! He managed to see a couple of shells falling on target and also sat through a heavy counter bombardment that day.

     I was nearing the end of my tenure there when I got a call from the base, saying I was being relieved in a couple of days as I had to go to Dehradun for my Pilots Aptitude test. I had applied for this before coming to Siachen and had forgotten about it. This was to become an army aviation pilot. My reliever landed up in the next two days and after a short handing over program, I started my journey back. Since I had three days to reach Dehradun, I and my party had to complete the three day trek back to base in two days, and then I had to take an air force transport plane to Chandigarh, and a bus to Dehradun to appear in the test.

     Like everything else, the trek back was eventful - I had to carry a secrecy device as big as a suitcase on my head since the Yak earmarked for the load misbehaved and ran away(apparently, my rucksack with a short wave radio was loaded on the it. The radio switched on and the sound of static scared the yak)! The porter was very apologetic, but since I was the only one without a load, I had to carry this one. The good part of the story is that the air force plane was piloted by my course and squadron mate from NDA. He insisted that I travel in the cockpit and pointed out all the instruments during the hour long flight, to help me pass the pilot's test. Thanks to him, I did pass the test, but couldn't join army aviation. That's another story.

A couple of years later in the deserts, wearing all the medals collected during my Siachen tenure:

Sometimes, tough leadership is essential!

Signing a document in the quarter guard

This one is about discipline and managing your team's expectations of a fair deal and establishing a good professional environment.

     I go back to an incident when I was commanding my unit in Kashmir. Our advance party had moved to a peace location, and I got a report from them that a NCO on guard duty had assaulted the duty JCO(junior commissioned officer) who was checking the guard at night. This incident was about a year after a mutiny incident in an artillery regiment in Ladakh, and army chain of command was hyper sensitive to this aspect of disgruntled soldiers and poor leadership at that point.

This post is about managing various stakeholders and yet fulfilling duties as a leader.
     Various stakeholders had different interests at this point in time. My immediate boss (who was heading the next higher formation, the brigade) did not want this incident to be highlighted as he was about to complete his command tenure. The local military administration wanted to highlight this incident as a 'mutiny' and show proactive intervention as a reflection of their initiative and leadership. They did not have jurisdiction over the matter, since I was not under their command. The JCO (and other JCOs) wanted action to be taken against the NCO. The NCO wanted to get out of it, so he as trying to project this incident as a scuffle (two way), not a case of insubordination. I, as commanding officer wanted to get to the bottom of the incident and make sure this didn't happen again. I wanted to convey a clear message to the unit of 600 soldiers by setting the right example. The army was sensitive to such incidents and chain of command would react based on information being reported. In most cases, formal reporting lags informal inputs, and people have already formed their opinions by the time actual reports go up the chain. In this case, most people who heard about it assumed that this was a case of mutiny.

     I instructed the officer in charge to get both NCO and JCO medically checked up at the military hospital. It turned out that only the JCO had injuries; this was recorded in medical documents.
I ordered a court of inquiry to find out what happened. The local formation also ordered a court of inquiry and wanted a copy of the proceedings to be submitted to them. However, I wrote back saying they did not have jurisdiction, and that a commanding officer is the sole authority to order a court of inquiry in a case of possible insubordination. They did not like it! All this while I was still 2000km away in an operational deployment. The formation commander of the division visited my advance party and called them a poor unit etc(we were not under his command, and this was before the court of inquiry had come out with its findings, so this was totally uncalled for), and this probably became a topic of discussion in army channels in that command. This implied pressure building up on the commanding officer - accused and probably pronounced guilty of poor leadership leading to a mutiny, etc.
     In the meantime, we moved and reached the new location. The court of inquiry determined that this was a case of insubordination and assault against a superior, and not mutiny, since only one soldier was involved - a mutiny requires more than one co-accused. I conveyed my intent to hold a Summary Court Martial to try this NCO(a very nice article on SCM here). A commanding officer has the authority to award upto 1 year of rigorous imprisonment(RI) to the guilty NCO via SCM, based on a trial. By this time, the winds had changed and my boss wanted me to basically let the accused go with a slap on the wrist - apparently, now the concerns were that if this NCO was punished, other NCOs and soldiers could mutiny!! My concern as a commanding officer remained the same - to ensure that such cases of insubordination are not repeated in my unit, and a tough message needed to be sent. Perhaps I considered this since I knew of lenient handling of such cases in the past, due to which the unit was taking this lightly.
     The NCO kept insisting that he did not assault the JCO, while all evidence pointed otherwise. I held the Summary Court Martial against the advice of my boss. It was established that he was guilty of assaulting a superior.
     I could have sentenced him to a maximum of one year of rigorous imprisonment, which meant he would be dismissed from service and the sentence carried out in a central jail. Anything less than 90 days was to be carried out in the regiment quarter guard as per law. I decided to award him 89 days RI, since he did not have a past disciplinary record, and did not really deserve to be dismissed from service. It also provided maximum visibility of his punishment to others in the regiment - they saw this NCO going through the consequences of insubordination in front of them  - RI involves being held in a cell, pack drill punishment every morning and evening etc, all while rest of the regiment was going about its daily routine right there. In contrast, a jail sentence would have taken this incident out of conversations among the soldiers very soon - out of sight, out of mind. Since he would not be paid his salary during this period, I asked the Subedar Major (Sergeant Major in other armies) to facilitate a collection from his battery so he could send money home.
    As a leader, its important to do what is right for your team, and to reaffirm yourselves as a leader - even though some of them may not see it that way, and your hierarchy may have other interests. In this case, it was important to make sure that insubordination did not recur, and everyone in the unit understood it, although people outside were not keen to send this message across.
    Sometimes, tough measures need to be taken, but leaders need to be compassionate while doing so, and set examples in balancing effectiveness with care for your team members. As long as these measures are seen to be fair, your team will accept them, no matter how tough they are!
     

Ribbons and Motivation

"A man wouldn't sell his life to you, but he will give it to you for a piece of colored ribbon" William Manchester wrote of his days as a marine in the South Pacific. This is the one of the reasons why men and women go beyond expectations, even risk their lives to achieve glory in the military. I volunteered to go to Siachen Glacier in 1996 just for the medal, along with the 'High Altitude' (you get the 'Siachen Glacier' for serving one month in the area, and the 'High Altitude' medal for serving six months above 9,000 feet altitude) - because as a 23 year old 2nd Lieutenant in a peace time army in 1996, there were not many opportunities for glory, and wearing an active combat ribbon on your chest was certain to get you respect. I did not bargain for the Battle Casualty medal(which I was awarded for getting wounded in action) as a bonus. Because medals cannot be worn all the time, ribbons indicate which medals you have been awarded, and these are routinely worn on the uniform.

Unlike what people on social media would have you believe, most people do not join the army or serve for lofty ideas of serving the country - most do it for the adventure, that smart uniform and colorful ribbons that you could potentially wear on your chest for the rest of your lives!
Research shows that non monetary incentives work better than money - and its reinforced by the fact that people join the army and volunteer for a difficult mission for below average pay by corporate standards. While many officer candidates are graded 'just below average' or 'average' by psychiatrists during their selection interview, most end up doing things that are 'above and beyond' and that their friends outside the military would not imagine doing. This is about positive reinforcement of your team, which may consist of ordinary people, but who have the capability to outperform the best of talent from the most sought after B schools and tech schools.

Non monetary rewards focus on emotional and psychological benefits. As a commanding officer, I used to reward soldiers in my unit every month for all kinds of behaviors (not just results) in mobile talk time coupons during the monthly town hall. Their money value was minimal, but it connected a soldier coming from a small village in India and serving in an operational area to his family back home, and set behavioral standards among his peer group. Now, as head of department in the corporate world, I highlight my team members' skill development efforts by appreciating them via a mail marked to the entire team and the senior leadership - it is not enough to just tell the guy that you appreciate him, you have to tell everyone that you appreciate him!

Medals and ribbons are non monetary rewards that are always visible to everyone, because the person receiving it wears it on his chest. This is very different from business and other organizations where such rewards need to be announced - not just to the person receiving it, but also everyone else - because the true value of this reward is when everyone knows about it. In contrast, monetary rewards are usually confidential and only the recipient knows what she's got. As a business leader, we have lots of medals and ribbons to give away. Its these medals that will motivate our teams to 'go above and beyond' - not only that bonus or increment.

10 Things About the Indian Army That Helped me Grow

This is not a definitive list, and I'm sure many others can be added. But when I wrote about the AVSC and man management, my wife told me that I come across as a disgruntled and grumpy officer to those who don't know me.

So let me start with what I count as my achievements:

• OP Officer at Siachen Glacier in 1996. Wounded in the head but still alive and kicking!
• Instructor at School of Artillery.
• Nominated to the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington in competitive vacancy among top 5, shortlisted for Staff College in UK.
• Brigade Major of an Armoured Brigade
• UN mission in Congo as Military Observer.
• Tenure in Military Secretary's Branch (where it mattered)!
• Commanded my regiment in Kashmir for two years without casualties, suicides, or operational failures during the mass agitation period of 2010 -12 and implemented my ideas without worrying about norms or rocking the boat.
• Colonel General Staff of a RAPID straight out from command of unit.
• Nominated for Higher Defence Management Course in 2014 (but refused it and opted for release from the Army)

So what are those 10 things?

I met my wife thanks to the Army. What were my chances of being in Nasirabad on 27 September 1998 if I was not in the Army? And it gave me the courage to marry her even though all norms of society were against it.

A great set of friends that's still growing. I have friends who are in their 70s and some in their 20s. The Indian Army is a great social equalizer. 

Ability to interact freely with a doorman and the CEO of a company without feeling uncomfortable.

The confidence to address a gathering of people and take charge if required.

Discern between right and wrong, a sense of duty towards country and society. And not towards my friends,relatives, religion, or 'clan'. (I don't have a caste, otherwise I'd have included that as well)

The right way to drink in a social gathering without making a fool of myself !

Understanding people from all kinds of backgrounds, cultures, religions and places.

The opportunity to read hundreds of books. Which other job pays you to sit in a bunker for months on end, and read all the books you want?!

A series of great bosses who tolerated my ideas, heard what I had to say, and permitted me to do what I wanted, even if it was untried and they didn't agree with me. And never being forced to do wrong.

And lastly (for the purpose of this blog only, otherwise the list is long, really long) Real life skills to transition seamlessly from the armed forces to the civvy street. But more on that later.

Man Management in the Indian Army: A Colonel's views

    This is an article that I'd written while commanding my unit sometime back. Views are entirely personal, and references are not made to any person within or outside the Indian Army. Views and comments are welcome!

Future articles will not be in this military format!

Introduction

Command of troops has probably become even more challenging than ever before due to various intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, many that are beyond the control of the Army. Yet, there are many other issues that are waiting to be addressed, once they are acknowledged as challenges. Command of a unit is essentially leading a body of men to do what is difficult by any standards, and impossible by many. The achievement of the operational aim and completing operational tasks must be the ultimate aim of all units. This requires good leadership, well-trained and motivated soldiers and well maintained and adequate equipment. For soldiers to be well trained and motivated, a large number of factors have to be addressed wherein training is only a part. Setting a good example, maintaining iron discipline, providing equal opportunities to all ranks for progress, genuine care for the soldiers and their families’ problems is a certain road to victory in war. There is a need to identify and address peculiar issues of man management to ensure that all units are effective in the event of war, or in ‘less than war’ conditions.

Man Management Environment

All military units have two human elements, officers and JCO (warrant officers)/ Other Ranks, who in the past were clearly differentiated by the background and status that they belonged to. In the changing environment in the country and society, the difference in background and social status of men and officers is blurring. More and more troops have better economic standing and, relatively, a greater number of officers are from the middle and lower middle strata of society.  All of them are subject to the social environment prevalent in the country. A few of the influences that affect both officers and soldiers are:-

       

Indifferent Civil Society And Government. 

The army, though respected by the common man, does not have a very high status in the overall government  organisation that is dominated by the Indian Administrative Service. The relative   standing of the army in the ‘pecking order’ has been degraded since independence. As a result, the respect and response that an ordinary soldier used to experience earlier has been degraded. Many other civilian jobs that are mundane and routine are considered more ‘useful’ with the added perk of being able to ‘pull strings’ in petty matters. The government, on its part has over a period of time neglected and lowered the status of military officers and the service due to various reasons. Civil administration in the states, which used to respond to the soldiers’ problems efficiently and quickly, not does not effectively do so.
      

Corruption And Nepotism. 

All pervasive corruption in matters related to the government and daily life for ordinary citizens does not spare even soldiers. In addition, corruption has crept into the military as well. Corruption in terms of professional honesty towards operational responsibility and training cannot be quantified in the classic sense, but affects the operational readiness of units and  formations, with the ultimate responsibility resting on commanders.

Effectiveness of System of Education. 

The existing education system does not enable capabilities and skills among high school/matriculation graduates that are employable. Most recruits are not able to meet standards of reading, writing or comprehension on reaching the units. As a result, in spite of meeting educational requirements on paper, soldiers are not able to cope up with their responsibilities of maintaining documents, clerical work and training. This leads to lowering of minimum passing standards during training and testing within the army.

Culture Of ‘Making It’ Through Shortcuts And Using Illegitimate Means.  

Society in general has deteriorated values where cheating in exams, producing fake  certificates and qualifications are common during recruitment and among the soldiers' peer group. There are numerous cases of petty ‘success’ being achieved in civil society by resorting to such means. These influences leave a mark on officers and soldiers who tend to be enamoured by such a value system, especially when reinforced by seniors who ‘gold plate’ their achievements and reports.

      

Increasing Religious Intolerance And The Tendency To Impose Own Beliefs On Others. With increasing religious intolerance in society, religious intolerance is slowly creeping into military organisation as well, though it has manifested itself in different forms. The concept of religion not being a consideration in military matters is slowly eroding, especially among officers. Official sanction for an increasing number of events with religious/superstitious bases and imposing religion of the majority/seniors are showing an rising trend. Religious events are on the increase in official / semi-official calendars and officers’ messes.

      

Exposure To Technology And Better Worldview. 

In the age of media and technology awareness among officers and soldiers is at an all-time high. They are comfortable with technology and new ideas. Many are breaking stereotypes and traditions and questioning existing norms and social traditions. Awareness of happenings around the world creates grounds for inquisitiveness and questioning the absolute authority of those in power. The officer class has to make itself accountable to its subordinates in areas which were otherwise considered inviolable.

With these widespread influences in society, the value system is eroding. A certain level of dishonesty is considered ‘acceptable’ and ‘fooling the system’ is considered the path to success by many. Many recruits and officers are joining the service for employment and not soldiering. Military service is considered by many as ‘just another government job’ with an attempt to superimpose alien values on military culture from within. Under the circumstances, it is essential that the military value system be implemented ruthlessly in the day to day functioning of units.

Poor value system prevalent in society is manifested in the following ways among officers and men:

    There is a tendency to avoid training in favour of more ‘glamorous’ pursuits like organising numerous events that give immediate returns in the form of appreciation from superiors. Flawless conduct of these social and administrative events is given undue importance at the cost of training and maintaining military routine. Due to short command tenures of brigade, divisional and corps commanders, there is perpetual pressure on units and formations to repeatedly perform, usually in conduct of events thought up to highlight and project commanders.

    Due to increased commitments in military stations on account of events, training is neglected. Officers resort to reflecting inflated results for tests related to professional competence and physical fitness, weapon handling, and technical capability. As an example, most units will not be able to match up to their own stated physical fitness standards, should they be audited impartially. The chain of command tends to turn a blind eye to inflated reports of training, as improvements are not prominently visible and pale in comparison to conduct of high profile events. Under the circumstances, the certificate of ‘fitness for war’ being issued to units may not be a true reflection of the state of things.

    Culture of promoting seniority over merit among Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO)/ other ranks (OR) to avoid complaints has long been the cause of poor standards of the troops. As a large number of ‘grey’ activities are being carried out under orders of ambitious officers, usually to please their superiors or for their own comfort, these officers find it morally difficult to assess their juniors without bias and in a fair manner. As NCOs and JCOs work on ground and are privy to mismanagement, they are ‘bought off’ by being awarded inflated CRs and being allowed to skip training standards. These actions are then justified as man management tools to keep men motivated! Selecting good men for higher ranks among NCOs and JCOs would imply that some will get superseded, but that is more than balanced by the fact that effective personnel will supervise the troops, not those who’ve merely put in more time.

    Avoidance of accountability and shirking of responsibility by JCOs and NCOs is on the increase. As a direct fallout of the culture of promoting seniority, soldiers are quick to calculate their future prospects of promotion purely on their date of enrolment and seniority, since their Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) are inflated and place everyone on the same plane of eligibility for promotion, irrespective of their motivation or capability. Once it is established that promotion is assured (or otherwise), these NCOs and JCOs display absolute lack of interest and shirk responsibility. This void in supervisors is therefore filled up by officers who are under pressure to complete tasks in a zero error environment, and resort to micro management. As the task is now supervised by officers, the NCOs and JCOs are not accountable to anyone; this vicious cycle continues in most units and formations.

    Selective/false reporting of activities and standards achieved to present a ‘good image’ has become the norm and needs to be curbed ruthlessly. Repeated and extended rehearsals prior to the visit by a senior officer to present perfectly coordinated operational activity has resulted in officers and men  willing to undergo only ‘rehearsals’, not realistic training. As a result, no time is allotted to actual training and a ‘Well Done’ by a commander is taken as authentication of operational readiness.

    Encouraging sycophancy and playing favourites by promoting those ‘closer’ to the commander irrespective of capability and suitability.

    There is lack of interest and sincerity among officers and unwillingness to stand up for what is right. Facilitating improper ‘requirements’ of the seniors is taken as a positive trait and such an officer is called ‘resourceful’. An officer who does not agree to bend rules, whether it is use of transport, manpower, generators, or funds being ‘adjusted’, often blatantly violating rules and policies, is side-lined.

    The fast pace of events in field formations due to short tenures of formation commanders is taking a toll on the routine functioning of units, and, indirectly on the human resource available. Events, both training and administrative are planned and executed for short term gains and reflecting achievement of ‘aim plus’. Less glamorous command and staff functions like individual training, administration and documentation, staff work, and investing in efforts to improve the quality of human resource is given short shrift. These are side-lined in favour of numerous high visibility events that promise ‘instant’ solutions and gratify seniors, often at the cost of basic requirements.

    Junior officers are impressionable and are looking to their seniors for cues on day to day functioning. A combination of societal influences and poor functional ethos in the units demotivates them and at times forces them to ‘flow with the tide’. In turn, JCOs/OR, who are looking at officers as role models feel encouraged to follow an unprofessional career path where military culture and ethos takes a backseat. The shortage of officers with 5-10 years’ service has led to a shortage of ‘working hands’ at subunit level and gaps in grooming of young officers. Without hands on oversight, maintenance of standards and completion of tasks are largely left to the wisdom of JCOs and NCOs.

    All units are faced with man management problems related to training, administration and operations on a daily basis. Choosing the ‘best man for the job’ (that is, the same man, over and over) for routine tasks has to be weighed against the need for rotation of personnel and for all ranks to be trained for additional responsibilities. A few man management challenges in units are:-

• Selection of competent and efficient NCOs for promotion to JCOs and management of superseded NCOs till retirement.
• Conduct of training to ensure maximum participation, keeping in mind administrative   commitments.
• Instilling a sense of accountability in all ranks by a system of rewards a punishment.
• Motivating all ranks to train and work sincerely.
• Correct reporting/ feedback from appointments, especially in an operational environment.
• Following military culture and ethos by all ranks.
• Curbing the tendency of favoritism and partiality among JCOs/NCOs.

Effect of the Environment on Functioning of Units

    The man behind the machine is the key to excellence in any unit. A compromise in the management of this ‘resource’ directly affects functional efficiency, morale, equipment management and overall operational readiness. A dispassionate and unbiased audit of any unit in training standards in relation to the operational role, administrative effectiveness, and morale of all ranks including officers would indicate that much ground needs to be covered in terms of man management. 

A few effects of the environment are given below:-

• Actual training standards are much lower than that desired and reported.
• Instances of interpersonal friction based on perceived or actual grievances.
• Tendency to cover up flaws and limitations in day to day functioning among all ranks. Truthful reporting is not encouraged.
• Attempts to challenge the authority of superior officers through civilian courts/ without following correct channels.
• Large number of personnel deployed on non-essential administrative duties without dedicated time or effort for training and good administration. Additional administrative responsibilities are created to achieve short term goals resulting in diversion of manpower from training and basic unit administration.
• Cosmetic welfare being implemented without adequate consideration for the genuine well-being of all ranks and the unit.
• Officers are encouraged not to ‘rock the boat’ and follow orders without application of mind.

    With a transparent society due to the advent of electronic media, mobile telephones and the internet, all ranks are constantly being exposed to a ‘fast and successful’ civil society that is based on questionable morals and a skewed relationship between effort and result. The myth of achieving results through ‘shortcuts, or by any means’ as being the route to success percolates to officers and soldiers adversely affecting day to day functioning of units.

    Presently, the idea of empowering JCOs is being considered to overcome the shortage of officers in units. However, as JCOs are not promoted on merit alone, they are ineffective in ‘standing in’ for officers. Grooming of young officers is seriously affected due to the shortage of middle level officers. In the absence of any guidance from peer group/immediate seniors, they are left to gain knowledge and experience on their own.

Bringing in the Change

    The basic prerequisite for bringing in a change is to acknowledge that ‘CHANGE IS REQUIRED’. Since the army is officer driven at all levels, a conscious effort at all levels of command to address the root causes and environmental factors is essential. Setting examples needs to be the norm for all officers in command of troops, from Lieutenant to General. Double standards in military values and ethics need to be acknowledged as such and ruthlessly weeded out. A concerted effort in transforming the value system of the Army needs to be the focus. Some of the aspects that need transformation are given below.

Environmental Changes.  As all ranks are exposed to a society with a blurring value system during leave and interaction with civilians/government agencies for personal requirements, they must be sensitized of the need to follow the military way of life at all times. This may involve motivating them to be honest and leading the life of a ‘good citizen’ irrespective of contrary influences. A few changes in the military environment to improve quality of man management are given below.

    

• Commanders at all levels must set and maintain the highest standards of personal example, probity and fairness. Petty regimental or other affiliations, questionable financial dealings and employment of resources for personal gains must be curbed with the aim of avoiding cynicism and restoring subordinates’ faith in the chain of command. 
• Absolute fairness and transparency in all dealings are essential for all ranks to accept other tough measures to reclaim military ethos in man management.
• Unauthorized ‘perks and privileges’ are seen as a manifestation of double standards. These weaknesses interfere with effective command and need to be curbed so that troops accept tough measures in training and functioning.
• The need for extraneous activities at formation level couched as welfare and training essentials must be revisited and reduced.
• The trend of formation headquarters attaching manpower and vehicles from units for administrative requirements must be curbed as these are then not available for training. A cap of attaching not more than 10% additional strength of manpower and vehicles could be workable. of course, commanders and staff officers will have to lower their expectations.
• Demanding contributions from regimental funds for various ‘high visibility' projects must be stopped. Regimental funds in the units are meant for the welfare of troops and other unit commitments like raising days, improving day to day functioning etc. These should be left to the CO’s discretion.    

Man Management Changes in the Units. Functional ethos in units needs changes in keeping with the times. ‘How we do things’ must be more important than ‘what we need to do’. A message needs to be sent to all ranks that maintaining military ethos and culture is of paramount importance. A CO’s word is still largely followed without question. Therefore, all change in units must flow downwards from the CO. A few changes that can be implemented are given below.

• At the unit level, personal standards need to be set by the CO that withstands any level of scrutiny. No cooks and personal staff, no vehicles for family members. Under any pretext.
• Accountability of all appointments in the chain of command including NCOs and JCOs should be fixed. NCOs and JCOs must be held accountable for problems/lauded for good performance quantitatively, ie through CRs, honours, disciplinary and administrative action.
• Conduct individual training cadres focussed on training and testing, not on passing those affected for promotion. Those not meeting the standards must fail. This will ensure that only those meeting standards are fit for promotion.
• Promotion and CRs should be purely merit based and not only on seniority. Objective CRs will go a long way in ensuring that only deserving NCOs are promoted to JCOs. A fair and impartial promotion policy in all units is essential. There is nothing more demoralizing than seeing an incompetent sycophant getting promoted or rewarded!
• Physical training, weapons training and small arms firing must focus on maximum inclusion rather than on attaining KRAs in terms of percentage results. The aim should be to make everyone go through his basic training requirements every year.
• Increasing trend of low medical categories can be addressed by permitting only fit personnel to attend individual training cadres. This will discourage all ranks from shirking work and yet getting promoted. In addition, inefficient low medical categories who have reached pensionable service must be compulsorily retired, but with benefits due.
• Grievances and complaints must be treated with compassion and fairness, and strict action initiated on legitimate complaints irrespective of the rank of the accused. False complaints must also result in disciplinary action to set examples.
• The powers of a CO to dismiss a JCO/NCO for inefficiency or discipline with review by the next higher formation commander should be streamlined.
• Training and leave should not be reduced/ compromised. Good planning is essential for fulfilling station and formation responsibilities. Priority of activities must remain biased towards training without any compromise
• Focus on reducing non-essential administrative requirements and commitments. Family welfare activities that require diversion of combatants from training must be stopped. These could be conducted at station level with permanent staff hired for the purpose. Simultaneously there is a need to de-link welfare of families’ lifestyle and mental health issues, overall living standards of troops’ families and social development from the responsibilities of commanders of combat units and formations. A commander cannot be held responsible for poor social development and governance! The army needs to develop procedures and institutions to look after these needs without active involvement of the combat units and their commanders. Increasingly, the welfare of veterans, addressing problems related to pensions and issues with the civil administration are also being handled by field formations. The need of the hour is to make the organisations meant for veterans welfare such as the ‘Zilla Sainik Boards’ more effective and accountable instead of diverting the field army from their training in peace stations to such tasks.
• Identification of potential JCOs among junior NCOs and mentoring/grooming them discreetly is suggested. A system of informal  monthly/quarterly appraisal of performance for JCOs/NCOs at subunit level could also be considered.
• Taking up the cause of soldiers with civil administration to solve personal problems will help in gaining confidence of the soldiers.
• Grooming young/middle level officers to understand that following correct military culture and ethos is non-negotiable and should not be adapted according to convenience. They should also be formally trained on man management issues during courses like JC and orientation capsules for potential COs.
• Increase the strength of middle level officers (5-10 years’ service) in units. 
• User friendly automation of manpower functions, maintenance of databases for quick retrieval of information is essential to manage a large body of men. 
• All ranks need to be educated on the value system that has been the bedrock of Indian Army. This could be achieved through lectures, informal interaction, inclusion in training cadres etc, and last but not the least, in practice. There is a need to talk to officers and troops about the ethos and military culture that they are expected to follow.

Conclusion

It is necessary to integrate the tangible and intangible elements of man management and apply corrective measures at all levels. These changes are likely to be met with resistance due to human and cultural barriers within the organisation, as changes need to be implemented by those ‘in power’ and will involve a shift in work culture. Care must also be taken to ensure that time tested methods that are genuinely effective and contribute to the well-being of the organisation are not negated and changes are inclusive.