This is the second part of the paper on Negotiation and covers only some aspects of the strategy that India could adopt for negotiating the Siachen issue. It DOES NOT cover all aspects of the issue and possible options, mainly because it was limited by length of paper to be submitted...
Obstacles in the Negotiation
Indian Army’s deployment on the Saltoro Ridge.
Demarcation of the Line of Control beyond NJ9842. NJ
9842 (a map coordinate point) lies on the ‘Line of Control’ or LoC between
India and Pakistan as per the Simla Agreement in 1972. This point is mentioned
in this agreement as the ‘northernmost demarcated point’ beyond which there was
no demarcation. For the area north of this coordinate point, the agreement
refers to the area as ‘from this point thence north’ without drawing any clear
cut line. The segment beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated on ground by mutual
agreement. No movement of any armies was traced during three wars (1947, 1965,
1971) between India and Pakistan, highlighting the fact that no strategic or
tactical significance could be ascribed to this area. The basic reason was
in-hospitability of terrain and the lack of any means for human beings to live
in the area without additional administrative support at great cost and was
frequented only by mountaineers and adventurers. The demarcation of the LoC
beyond NJ9842 is possible by creating an Uninhabited Zone (UZ) in the area
covering Siachen Glacier and the Saltoro Ridge (after vacation by Indian Army).
This could include the disputed territory encompassed by the Indian and Pakistani
interpretation of the line of Control beyond NJ9842.
Indian Military Withdrawal from the Saltoro Ridge. An Indian army brigade has been deployed on the Saltoro ridge since the conflict began in 1984. It has secured its positions on the ridgeline at great cost, now called the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), and does not want to pull back from these positions unless they are physically demarcated jointly on ground and map by both armies, similar to what was done in previous agreements establishing the CFL and LOC. The army’s view is that future violations must have a reference point. The reason for insisting on demarcation is that once done, the locations of the vacated posts cannot be disputed. The deployment is in inhospitable terrain with high costs to India since 1984. Between 1984 and 2007, 884 Indian soldiers were killed and 13,022 wounded, making for an average of 38 dead and 550 plus wounded every year. India has spent over Rs 8,000 crores ($1,330 million) in the conflict and even though the costs have reduced significantly since the cease fire of 2003, India still spends upwards of Rs 365 crores ($60 million) every year on military operations at Siachen. The primary cause of disconnect with Pakistan on the issue of demilitarization is the sequence of the process. We insist on authentication of the current position of troops as a baseline, while Pakistan insists that Indian army withdraw to pre-1972 positions before talks can begin. Redeployment would imply relocation of troops and equipment to lower heights and withdrawal from the Saltoro Ridge itself, with the sanctity of this redeployment being guaranteed by a suitable mechanism. In addition, army deployment in terms of resources, manpower and expenditure would decrease, permitting this infantry brigade to be deployed elsewhere.
Strategic Importance of Withdrawal and Cost of reoccupying Siachen Glacier.
i. The Indian strategic perspective is built on the Sino Pak agreement of 1963 where Pakistan ceded 5000 sq km of Kashmiri territory illegally to China. This led to the belief that Pakistan could potentially collude with China, and control of the Siachen area might provide Pakistan with a route to capture the city of Leh and the Ladakh region with a flanking offensive. Conventional wisdom of the time included scenarios in which China might have joined this offensive. However, this idea was generated in the early 1980s, almost twenty years after Pakistan signed the agreement, indicating that the changing international political and diplomatic equation might have prompted this belief, leading to the Indian occupation of Saltoro Ridge in 1984. The Government of India did not feel the need to occupy Siachen Glacier immediately after the Sino Pak agreement was signed in 1963, as this threat was not felt at the time. It appears that evidence of ‘cartographic aggression’ by Pakistan forced India’s military response in the 1980s. In the present international environment, a ‘joint’ war by Pakistan and China is an unlikely event, and so is a war initiated by Pakistan alone against India in the mountainous Himalayan region.
ii. However, a ‘Kargil (1999)’ like limited attack by Pakistan cannot be ruled out, especially with the inherent instability of their civilian government and Pakistani army’s dominance of diplomacy and international strategy. If such an event should occur, India would be forced to launch military operations to retake these positions at great cost. To prevent this kind of a misadventure by Pakistan, India would be well advised to consider withdrawal only if sanctity of the demilitarized zone is guaranteed by a neutral agency that can impose its will on Pakistan.
Pakistan’s aim to achieve military parity with India. It is in Pakistan’s interest to keep the Indian army deployed in counter insurgency and other localized conflicts. Siachen is one such conflict where uncertainty in the situation has resulted in India catering for deployment and maintenance of military reserves. This helps Pakistan achieve ‘local’ military parity in a theater of war by tying down Indian Army in penny packets, should a large scale conflict take place. It would be in the Indian government’s interest to deny this advantage to Pakistan by overcoming the Siachen dispute so that no military deployment is necessary to guard our interest. India should also negotiate demilitarization to free up military resources for application elsewhere, should the need arise. Ideally, overcoming all disputes that result in peace time military deployment would afford India an advantage that Pakistan seeks to undermine strategically.
Third party mediation.
India has traditionally been against third party mediation on any issue with Pakistan. This is a result of the Simla Agreement of 1972, which states “..That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them...”. In view of the changed international and regional political balance where US and USSR are no longer supporting either side, India could consider mediation by a neutral agency that is acceptable to both sides. Third party mediation has multiple advantages for the Siachen conflict:
Break the Stalemate. India and Pakistan have had thirteen rounds of talks from 1986 till 2010 with no real progress on a solution. These talks have been bilateral and India has not agreed to third party mediation on any aspect of its relations with Pakistan since 1972. Since no progress on addressing issues including Siachen Glacier conflict has taken place, it would be worthwhile to invite neutral parties to mediate and come to a workable solution that considers both parties’ interests.
Face Saving. Both India and Pakistan have invested time money, resources and political capital in the Siachen issue. Giving up any of the stated positions on Siachen could be seen as a loss of face by the people of India and may affect the prospects of the political party in power in India. A third party mediator can bring in new ideas and address difficult positions on either side, making it easier for them to transfer the ‘blame’ for a seemingly generous concession on any aspect.
Resources. Third party mediation may bring in additional resources available to such agencies. International organizations can also deploy resources available to them as part of actions to enforce a solution. Since this is a conflict involving demarcation of boundary, deployment of the United Nations Observer teams, for instance would assist in monitoring a brokered peace. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has been deployed in Kashmir since 1948, and such a task could ideally be extended to the UN.
Power Asymmetry between India and Pakistan.
Differential between India and Pakistan in terms of aggregate indicators are approximately: population: 6:1; size: 4:1; GDP: 8.5:1; defense expenditures: 6:1; and total number of active forces: 2:1. Only in per capita income is the ratio closer. Since the mid-1950s Pakistan has enjoyed intermittent alliance support from the United States, and since the 1960s there has been a de facto alliance between Pakistan and China. These alliance relationships have offered “borrowed power” to Islamabad and enabled it to reduce the power asymmetry with India. While United States has given aid during its war on terror with the intention of using Pakistan for its larger strategic goals, Pakistan’s main goal has been to increase its capabilities in relation to India and reduce the power disparity with India. Although in the South Asian context India is larger in physical size, GDP and overall military capability, it is not overwhelmingly preponderant in the conflict’s key theater or on the international border. The near parity in troop disposition, especially in the Kashmir theater, gives Pakistan several advantages in limited, asymmetric wars. Partly due to its status-quo orientation, and partly due to constraints in terms of capability and terrain, the Indian strategy in Kashmir has been in general, defensive and reactive, while the Pakistani strategy has been one of offensive-defensive. The basic tenet of Pakistan’s strategy throughout the conflict has been to take the military initiative at crucial junctures, especially by relying on surprise. Since India-Pakistan rivalry encompasses both territorial conflict and geopolitical positioning, a further widening of the gap in capabilities between the defender and the challenger may be essential for a full rapprochement to occur. This may take at least two decades of sustained economic and military growth on India's part, as well as the significant re-positioning of the great powers (China and the United States) with regard to the rivals.
India’s Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement.
i. Our main contention is the alignment of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842 under present conditions, even if the larger Kashmir issue is not resolved. India would not like to agree to an arrangement where we are seen as giving up our position on Siachen Glacier. There are issues of public perception about loss of territory which will dominate any negotiated settlement. Overall, India has a very strong BATNA due to our dominant military and economic position, in-spite of Pakistan’s attempts to balance the power asymmetry. India should continue to hold entrenched positions (which are militarily stronger) on the Saltoro range in the absence of a negotiated settlement. Due to the ceasefire in effect since 2003, combat related casualties have become minimal. Over a period of time, India has advanced its medical support resources deployed in the area, and weather and terrain related casualties have dropped. The advantage of India’s BATNA is that it does not involve any specific and incremental military, diplomatic or strategic action on its part. India’s present position is justifiable in international forums.
ii. Pakistan does not have a BATNA that is as effective or viable. It can continue to hold its positions on the lower slopes of the Saltoro Ridge; alternatively, it can launch military offensives in other areas to force India to divert its military resources there. But these tactics can only achieve a stalemate that does not lead to settlement of issues. In addition, Pakistan is not in a position to attempt such military endeavors at present due to preoccupation with operations in support of American military operations in Afghanistan, as well as economic and military weakness due to prolonged internal turmoil.
Strategy for Negotiation
Engagement with Pakistani Army, the Pakistani political establishment and China as stakeholders.
Engagement with the Pakistani Army and political establishment. Historically, Pakistani army as had a dominant role in shaping Pakistan’s strategic and political thinking and has a strong hold on diplomatic and security machinery. The position of the NSA in Pakistan has been held by the military for long, except during 2007-08 and 2012. The military in Pakistan is once again in the process of strengthening its grip on the civilian control, as reports in the media suggest. It is a well-known fact that the army in Pakistan is an extra-constitutional authority and power center that has the capability to intervene and dislodge the civilian government, as well as overrule policy positions of the civilian government. In the past, a military coup by the army in Pakistan has led to long periods of military rule. The military also has a major say in framing Pakistani policies with regard to India. Many democratic countries have engaged with military dictators and unelected governments to achieve their national interests, including the United States. In the case of Siachen Glacier, which is a strategic issue being played out by both militaries, it is in India’s interest to acknowledge the role played by Pakistani army in their foreign and defense policies. Engagement with the Pakistani army has the advantage of being able to incorporate a demilitarization plan that the army in Pakistan agrees to and is compelled to honor, if it were to be part of the negotiations. Unlike the Indian army, which is under the firm control of, and will act on any settlement that is negotiated by the Indian government, there is a possibility that the Pakistani army does not follow through with the commitments expected of such a settlement by the civilian government. What is of greater concern to us is that at some point in the near future, another military government in Pakistan could negate an agreement on Siachen and revert to hostilities and unilateral military action. An additional advantage of engaging with the army in Pakistan is that the civilian government would be able to work towards a conclusive agreement where all Pakistani power players are represented. It could lead to a solution where the civilian government would not be subject to a ‘blame game’ by the military with accusations of having ‘sold out’ to India and assist the civilian government in managing domestic politics
Engagement with China. Demarcation of Pakistan occupied territory with China in 1963 was negotiated with a view to resolve border issues between the two countries. A similar problem existed on the Indian side of Kashmir where the borders of Kashmir with China had not been demarcated on ground. Consequent to Kashmir’s accession to India, we feel that Pakistan, which is illegally occupying Kashmir since 1947 does not have the right to give away territory that does not belong to it. However, this action was an incident of realpolitik by Pakistan to resolve issues with China as well as gain their support against India. China on its part has signed a conditional agreement that depends on the outcome of the larger Kashmir issue. India has a border dispute with China that also involves the eastern areas of Arunachal Pradesh. India lays claims to Arunachal Pradesh and is controlling the region, while China has occupied Aksai Chin (the area adjoining Siachen Glacier) and has built a highway connecting with Sinkiang Province. Although China is not a direct party to the Siachen conflict, it is a stakeholder in the larger border issue in the region and must be incorporated in the negotiations, since demarcation of territories is based on historic perceptions held by the erstwhile kingdom of Kashmir vis a vis Chinese authority in the region at the time. The Chinese government must be engaged with a view to gain a convergence of differing interests on the Siachen Glacier resolution. This would subsequently help India in resolving its larger border disputes with China, namely in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions through tradeoffs across these issues of differing priorities.
Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the Siachen Glacier and Interpretation of the Line of Control.
Establishment of a DMZ would be preceded by delimitation of the LoC beyond NJ9842. Both India and Pakistan have proposed delimitation of the Line of Control beyond NJ9842. Past talks have been deadlocked over India’s insistence that the AGPL be demarcated on the ground as well as on maps, and Pakistan’s insistence that Indian troops must withdraw to pre-1972 positions before any meaningful discussions could take place. “India’s approach towards a final settlement should be based on demilitarization of limited well defined, mutually agreed prescribed area”.
India is in a far stronger economic and military position than earlier and can propose a unilateral declaration of its positions through a note verbale or a non-paper rather than insisting on physical verification of its positions as a prerequisite to demilitarization. Effort and resources required to reoccupy defensive positions held currently will be magnified, should withdrawal be followed by a need to redeploy. We are concerned about recognition of our ‘fall back’ positions, should talks or the process of demilitarization fail. This could be achieved by unilaterally publishing maps showing our dispositions and making them available to international organizations and the public. India could utilize multiple techniques to drive negotiations forward in a favorable direction on acceptance of these maps through joint demarcation exercises.
Following a declaration of positions physically occupied by India, a move to sequentially withdraw from Saltoro Ridge in a time bound manner in conjunction with Pakistani withdrawal would ensure that both sides take confidence building measures, which are visible on ground and can be verified. This could be combined with a caveat in the demilitarization agreement that India would retain the right to use military force at a point of its own choosing in the case of any future occupation of these positions by Pakistan[8]. Such a clause would caution Pakistan to reassess the cost of unilaterally attempting to occupy the areas vacated by the Indian Army. Anchoring options around declaration of Indian positions along with a concrete plan for withdrawal would help in guiding negotiations towards a conclusive solution. However, all withdrawals need to be part of a demilitarization plan that is agreed to jointly by both countries.
The defining aspect of DMZs is the establishment of a physical area (a “zone”) that separates opposing military forces. Exact demarcation of the DMZ should be carried out by a joint working group that can consider the interests of both sides. Involving a neutral third party mediator like a UN organization (independent of the larger Kashmir issue) to assist in the management of the DMZ may be considered. Advantages of third party mediation have already been discussed earlier in this paper. Agreeing to mediation would also provide India the leverage to extract concessions during negotiations over the larger Kashmir issue.
Demilitarization could proceed in two phases: Monitoring and Verification. Cooperative monitoring of the demilitarization process between the two countries would help to negate trust issues regarding the process. The disengagement process must be monitored to ensure that troops on both sides have withdrawn to mutually agreed positions; their logistics and operational bases have been dismantled and removed in such a way that they cannot be reoccupied in a short time frame. Bilateral monitoring implies that both countries can monitor the area through their own national technical means, within internationally established norms. Verification of the process as well as long term verification by onsite inspections and remote monitoring to prevent redeployment also needs to be established, preferably through neutral international organizations like UNMOGIP. Sharing of information at various levels between Indian and Pakistani armies deployed in the area would be essential for monitoring and verification process. Given the past history of Pakistani army acting independent of the government, it would be advisable to maintain alternate means of information gathering about possible reoccupation of the demilitarized zone. This is all the more important, since logistic buildup for military operations in mountains is time consuming and the party that takes the initiative will gain.
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[1] ‘Why Siachen Matters to India’, Nitin A
Gokhale (accessed December4, 2015)
available from http://mujournal.mewaruniversity.in/JIR%202-2/8.pdf
[2] The Simla
Agreement, (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6771~v~Agreement_Between_the_Government_of_India_and_the_Government_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Pakistan_on_Bilateral_Relations__Simla_Agreement_.pdf
[3] Paul, T. V. 2006. “Why has the India-Pakistan rivalry
been so enduring? Power asymmetry and an intractable conflict.” Security Studies 15 (4): 600-30.
[4] ‘Pakistan Army now has seat at
negotiating table with India’ (Accessed
December 13, 2015), available from
[5] “Demilitarization of the Siachen Conflict
Zone: Concepts for Implementation and Monitoring”, Sandia Report SAND2007-5670,
(September 2007): 19.
