Sunday 17 September 2023

To Lead from the Front: Sacrifices by Commanding Officers in the Indian Army


Read an earlier post on the death of a CO here.

Over the past decade, the Indian Army has conducted several operations where the commanding officer (CO) was killed in action. The most recent incident occurred on September 14, 2023, which has raised concerns about the sacrifices made by COs in the line of duty. Is ‘sacrifice’ the defining badge of honor for soldiers and the army? Should it be the key measure of contribution and success in the Army, especially for COs? I have compiled a few incidents to examine my thoughts and to articulate questions that come to my mind.

A terrorist has no regard for his own life. His indoctrination is such that he values the outcome of his actions more than his own survival. He aims to create maximum impact, and assassinating a high-ranking officer would boost the prestige of his militant group and damage the army’s image and reputation.

I have been wounded in operations at the Siachen Glacier as a Captain and commanded my regiment on the Line of Control and intense counter insurgency operations in Kashmir. One of my command responsibilities was to deploy a subunit to man a company operating base(COB) and operate a convoy on one of the main arterial roads in North Kashmir, though I did not actively participate in an operation similar to the ones listed above.

Is it necessary for COs to be at the scene of every operation, irrespective of scale? Except for the Galwan incident, the opponent casualties indicate that these were small operations. At this scale, a platoon or subunit commander should be leading the operations. The CO remains in overall command, of course. Does he need to be present to execute the operation?

What if the CO was not available during an operation? Would that have significantly changed the outcome and result? Did the CO's presence enhance the outcome of these operations in any way? If it did, does it mean that only 1 odd terrorist would have been killed instead of 2 after a 3-day operation, in such an eventuality? Would the absence of the CO have significantly degraded operations of this scale?

Does the active participation of the CO significantly enhance the outcome of these kind of operations?
Let's scale this question up a bit. If there were multiple such operations ongoing at a time, would the CO be expected to personally lead each one of them - is it practically possible?

Is the loss of a commanding officer worth the outcome at the end of each of these operations?

In war, the question is - should the CO lead from so far in front (the leading companies or squadrons) with such a high probability of getting entangled in a platoon level battle, that he cannot extricate himself mentally and physically to be able to lead his battalion or regiment to their objective?

What about in situations listed above, that are not 'war like'?

By the same logic, shouldn't a brigade commander also lead from the front? If not, at what level does 'lead from the front' switch over to commanding the unit an officer is assigned to lead?

Why is it that commanding officers land up right in front at a very early stage in such operations - is it because they want to ensure effective execution(lack of trust? lack of faith in capabilities of his own command?), pressure from the next higher level to be at the scene(organisational?), the need to prove themselves (personal insecurities?), or a genuine operational need to supervise execution?
Does being too focussed on leading their units from the front result in neglect of other important aspects of leadership, such as planning and coordination?

What is the relevance of sacrifice when it doesn't lead to achievement of a stated objective in the immediate term, and the result is not measurable in the long term?

These and more questions come to my mind, and I'm looking for answers among the usual "this sacrifice will not be forgotten" statement by all and sundry.

I'll not forget these sacrifices, and neither will any other citizen of this country. 

But as an organization and country, should we measure our victories by the disproportionate quantum of the sacrifices of our soldiers, or by the efficiency and effectiveness of our armed forces and its operations?


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