Improving the Quality of Junior Commissioned Officers (Warrant Officers) in Combat Units

Here is a short post from an assignment that I recently submitted at MIT, looking at a real issue using System Dynamics. This post has been modified to cater to a diverse audience and is more of a statement of the problem. Hence JCOs are called Warrant Officers, and NCOs ranks have been given a more common nomenclature 

Background Indian Army units are organized so that soldiers and NCOs that join a combat unit on being recruited also retire from the same unit. That is, they serve most of their military career among the same 600 to 800 people. Senior NCOs (Sergeants) get promoted to a junior warrant officer rank, which has three levels that they can progressively achieve based on merit and seniority. Promotions that override seniority, based on merit alone are not popular, since relative standing is determined by seniority for the first half of a soldier’s career spanning almost ten years, upto the rank of Naik (Corporal). Officers commanding the soldiers are incentivized to train their soldiers well, and training levels are quantified by individual tests that soldiers and NCOs need to pass so they are eligible for promotion. Commanding Officers tend to play with testing standards, so that a higher percentage of soldiers and NCOs under their command quantitatively appear to be better trained, in turn improving their own ratings as leaders. Troops are in turn complacent and are not motivated enough to train well, and NCOs do not take initiative to train or lead their subordinates. This situation also results in promotion by seniority for soldiers and NCOs, since everyone is poorly trained but meets the criteria for promotions. As a result, there are no means to differentiate between the competent and incompetent.

Problem Definition Quality of Warrant Officers in Indian Army combat units is poor and needs to be improved to make them more effective in operations.

Qualitative Requirements for Warrant Officers: High quality of technical knowledge (eg. technical gunnery in artillery; telecommunication skills in signals units), skills to lead 30-100 soldiers, physical fitness and highly motivated, ability to handle basic administrative work, and knowledge of regulations.

All NCOs are certified on training and testing requirements for promotion; difficult to differentiate other than on seniority. If all else is same, select the senior most: he has the most experience.Issues with pipeline that feeds current stock of Warrant Officers:

• Officers are incentivized to inflate NCOs test results and performance assessment.
• Long term cultural resistance: Soldiers and NCOs accept promotion by seniority as the norm. 
• NCOs look at merit based promotion as ‘jumping the line’.
• Gaming the system leads to lack of motivation for pipeline: Since vacancies are limited, only some who are senior most in line for the next higher rank will get it. The next few in line will retire after some time in the same rank (because of an up or out with delay policy). As a result soldiers are able to project their own career prospects into the future and lose motivation (If they are senior in their group, they will get promoted and if not, they will retire, whether they work or not).
• As a result, NCOs are promoted on seniority, not merit.
• Short tenures of Commanding Officers of max 3 years - means they try to improve metrics that benefit them: maximize testing and promotion results, even if it is by compromising training standards and appraisals, with an aim to keep the pipeline populated. Any vacant Warrant Officer position at the top of the pipeline is seen as a reflection of poor management skills of the commanding officer, even if it is because of lack of suitable talent to fill up that position.

Here is a causal loop diagram of the situation made using Vensim PLE software:

Causal Loop Diagram: Factors Affecting Quality of Warrant Officers

Red curves indicate an inverse relationship, also shown by the - sign at the arrow head.

From experience, delays are on average 2 to 4 years.

Many other factors could be added to this model, but aim was to keep it simple and address most important factors.

From the diagram it appears that most factors that result in promotion of motivated NCOs include a delay of 2 to 4 years built into the process. This period is beyond the normal tenure of a commanding officer. 

Here is how the process plays out: 

• A CO initiates multiple processes to improve the quality of NCOs. Delays in Objective ACRs that lead to Promotions on Merit mean that motivated NCOs actually start getting promoted around 2 years after he takes over command of the unit, that is towards the end of his command tenure.
• A few good NCOs get promoted, also resulting in a few others getting superseded. This leads to a disturbance in the overall equilibrium in the system. Complaints against promotion policies, problems in functioning in the unit start, since status quo has been disturbed. 
• At the same time, positive effects on Admin and Training will take another two years after the number of motivated Warrant Officers crosses a threshold, when they actually start influencing processes. The overall effectiveness of the unit appears to have reduced. 
• The CO, who is heading towards his last few months of command of the unit has to now justify perceived drop in performance, and disturbance in functioning because of the disgruntled NCOs. Since organization is not geared to this change, the CO's superior officers attribute this situation to poor leadership.
• In most cases, the CO would complete his tenure at this stage, which would not influence his career positively. As a result, most COs would like to play it safe: do not change status quo and continue promoting by seniority or based on subjective parameters; continue to play with testing standards and produce good results in the short term: Everyone is qualified for promotion and meets all requirements.
• What would happen if the next CO continues with the process of objective promotions? The reinforcing loops of training and admin come into play (after a delay). As admin and training standards improve, so does the motivation level of NCOs. Over a 2 to 3 year period of the next COs tenure, the situation will improve and it becomes easier to sustain.

There are many other factors that influence the quality of Warrant Officers, but they are exogenous to this system, so I've not discussed them here. 

The Armed Forces get a bad deal from the Pay Commission. Again. Now What?

Everyone in the armed forces is talking about how they've been cheated again in the pay commission and lowered in parity versus the bureaucracy and police forces. Why does this happen again and again in India?

Here's my take on it. Some may find it irreverent (especially to those who see the armed forces as an organization that is way above everything else in the country - almost perfect!), but then, some others may not.

There are conspiracy theories about how the bureaucrats poison the minds of politicians that the Indian Army can stage a coup anytime and so, must always be kept under check. Others say that the armed forces are an epitome of honesty, courage and sacrifice and so bureaucrats are scared because of their own corrupt ways. 

Politicians and ministers (including the prime minister) mouth platitudes about how the armed forces are a pillar of strength to the nation and how much they care about them. That's during election time only. Yet, their money is not where their mouth is. When it comes to compensation, a lower equation with bureaucrats and policemen is considered justifiable.

What does it really mean? Probably that the country does not value the services rendered by the armed forces more than that rendered by its bureaucrats and police forces. I say 'country' because politicians and bureaucrats are a reflection of people's opinions in a democracy. So anyone blaming politicians for the unfair compensation package is indirectly acknowledging that people of the country do not really value their soldiers - they do not really think that soldiers need to be paid as much as policemen or government officials. I say this without any reference to their loyalty and patriotism, (and how people are 'ungrateful' and 'disloyal' to the country if they treat soldiers 'badly') while talking about this whole issue.

Lets try and see this from the economic point of view of supply demand in the market:

Demand. India has not seen a war since 1971. Kargil was more of a blunder and happened because the army was not  doing its job on the LoC well enough (a fact we're not yet ready to accept), in addition to many other factors. The army is huge (1.3 million+ troops and counting) and our generals want even more troops and headquarters every year. Most of the army is involved in quelling discontent (created due to poor governance by the bureaucrats and politicians) or helping the government do its job - essentially standing in for the police or public works and municipal corporations (and recently, for private companies) . No one in the armed forces hierarchy has the courage of conviction to stand up and say that if you use something for a task that it was not meant for, it depreciates in value (more than it would if it was just allowed to exist and do what its supposed to do). But apparently, if there are no wars, you either create wars (an option that India is not capable of) or you use armed forces for whatever else they can be made to do - after all, they're being paid, and for what? (a few of my friends actually asked me this question, betraying their lack of comprehension about how an insurance policy works). 

So reality is, there's  not much (visible) use for the armed forces (and their raison d'être) in India today, like any other country that wants economic development (through low risk of conflict and high political stability, which will positively influence increased investment). Deterrence cannot be measured and therefore does not count towards improving the image of the armed forces (much). Counter Insurgency does not require the army to be deployed, if the police and government were effective. No brownie points for that in the collective conscience of the people (only negative points because some people will definitely identify the army as a repressive arm of the government).  

So overall, medium to low Demand for the armed forces. No one needs them desperately.

Supply. The armed forces want people with low skill sets. Most soldiers are 10th class graduates, who are selected based on physical fitness, more than anything else, and are available in millions across the country. And they're paid more than their counterparts who have equivalent capabilities. I've worked in a recruitment rally where upwards of 40,000 hopefuls landed up for less than a hundred vacancies. 

What about officers? In 2014, more than 240,000 applied for the NDA exam where there are 300 odd vacancies. These applicants are aware of pay and compensation that an armed forces officer is entitled to. And that its not as good an opportunity as the civil and police services. 

People still want to join the armed forces in large numbers, in-spite of knowing the compensation and prospects involved, and the fact that its no longer even close to the status they enjoyed 20, 30 or 40 years ago. But why is there no shortage of applicants? Because the people who would have otherwise wanted to join the forces have moved on (they'll find something better that meets their aspirations and capabilities), and those who still find the armed forces an attractive choice (in relation to their own economic and social conditions) have moved up the line. They will get recruited,because the selection process will adjust itself to ensure a pipeline that replaces those who leave. Either by lowering standards, or better still by creating a new set of standards that caters to the applicant pool (Can you imagine no recruitment because they couldn't find skilled people with the right attributes?!). In any case, there is no shortage of unemployed youth in the country who can be fed into the armed forces really cheaply, whether as officers or soldiers.

So there still is, and will be excess Supply, in-spite of claims that the armed forces are no longer an attractive profession and they're losing their sheen vis a vis other services in the country.

Who is most agitated by the changes in parity with bureaucrats and police forces? Serving and retired officers. Do we hear of a movement among serving or veteran soldiers (who are not officers)? Not really.  Soldiers are participating in the OROP (One Rank One Pension) movement, but its low, compared with the larger population of soldiers and veterans below officer rank in the country. Why?
I would like to imagine that when they compare change in status relative to peers in their society, they're still better placed (compare a retired Naik with his friend who may be working in a small town at a 15,000 salary with no perks or pension), and they look at how their families benefited because they got access to healthcare, canteen facilities and other small benefits that cannot be measured.

Officers who've served twenty years or more (and those who have retired) are most affected, because its their status that's been eroded, in terms of pay and pensions, as well as parity in functioning with their civilian counterparts. The issues are genuine, but the question is,  are they large enough to shake up the system? Maybe not, because those who're serving cannot influence matters effectively, and those retired do not matter either in numbers (mostly officers) or in their capability to influence decisions. Junior officers do not understand the issues completely, and even if they did, their aspirations are already being mostly met.

So what's likely to happen? Status Quo will likely be maintained.

Unless a disruptive change takes place. Like a war. Or veterans joining politics as a homogeneous group and influencing policy in the parliament. Or the government deciding to cut down the armed forces, making it justifiable to pay them well.

Otherwise...

Those serving will continue to do so, those who've retired will continue to agitate and yet accept what they're getting. Because the supply and demand cycle is not likely to be disrupted. There will be a long line of people wanting to join the armed forces- after all they want employment. And the probability of war? Very low as India becomes deeply tied into the world economy and heads towards being a developed country.

Politicians will continue to give lip service to the armed forces. Bureaucrats will continue to rule the country and the armed forces will continue to be eroded in the pecking order (like that hammer you bought when you moved into a new house to drive in the nails, but have no use for anymore. but don't throw away. It just moves from the toolbox to the closet and then into the basement)

This may sound simplistic, but do we need such a huge standing army? Is it possible to pare it down to a realistic size that's manned by well paid, highly motivated officers and men, well equipped and trained to handle conflicts effectively without moving from one bungled(and covered up) operation to another? Maybe. Fact is, this is part of the process of transforming into a developed country that does not have hegemonic aspirations, and by extension, does not need a huge standing army.

But that would mean politicians would have to look at national interest for once, and not their own. Take hard decisions and implement rule of law and good governance by really bringing in good legislation (do we really have to go through new insurgencies that pop up every 5 years and last 20?). Cut down the size of the armed forces, man and train them with the best people (acquired from the 'open market' by paying them at par with any other service in the country, or better - and its possible, if its a smaller, more effective organization), and decide not to use the armed forces to cover up for poor governance and bad diplomacy.

So its a long road to equality for the soldiers....

Indian Army and the National Flag

 

Are there regulations in the Indian army on flying the national flag? In my 20 years, I didn't come across one that required hoisting the national flag.
       In the recent past, social media has been hijacked by people who feel that universities that do not fly the flag are anti national.

    Does flying the flag or hoisting it on special occasions directly correlate with greater loyalty to the country?
      As a corollary, does it mean that if the flag is not hoisted by some people, they are disloyal and 'anti-national'? 

     Why is it that the Indian Army does not fly the national flag at the quarter guards (armory, as some others might call it) of units and its formation headquarters? Is the Indian Army anti national by the new definition that's being bandied about by proponents of this new brand of nationalism?
     
    I have tried to delve deeper into it, but have not been able to find any documents on the subject among Indian Army's rules and regulations. But here's my theory (I may be wrong, but anyone with better inputs can add to this):

All armies needed a rallying point in battle, which used to be their commander (king) in the past, who would be visible in the battlefield to motivate soldiers fighting for him. Later, as battles became bigger and bigger in time and space, the king could not be everywhere, so a flag representing him (or country) would do.

     Lets turn to the Indian army, which was created by the British East India Company to protect its interests. How could they rally their men in the numerous battles they fought? Their soldiers were  natives, led by Englishmen (from an alien land with alien customs and ideas). How could they motivate these soldiers to be loyal to foreigners and fight against their own people? Later, during the first and second world wars, how could they motivate their men to fight and die for their cause (which most soldiers in the Indian army would not identify with)? The rallying point could not be the English flag! Imagine telling an Indian soldier in the East India Company or the British Indian army "You must be prepared to fight and die for the glory of the King (or Queen, who lives thousands of miles away, and will never come to this land) and country (England!)" in another alien land thousands of miles away from home! Would he identify with this cause? No.

    Therefore, the regimental flag. "Fight for your clan, fight for your regiment, fight for your unit"
Because if they tried to tell this soldier to fight for country, a day would come when he could turn around and question the idea of country (India being part of England) itself, because the flag would be alien. And then he would not fight for England at all!
   
    Even today, the Indian Army flies the regimental flag in units and formations, and holds regimental and unit 'Colours' in greatest esteem. But does the national flag figure anywhere? Not really. Nor is it disrespected, or disrespect implied in any action. It just does not figure in the soldier's consciousness. Its issued by ordnance depots and mostly kept in stores. And its hoisted on Independence day in some units (I hoisted it as CO). But the rallying point is still the regimental flag and Colours!
   
     When I was commanding my unit near Baramula in Kashmir, we were manning a company operating base with a few outposts along the line of control with Pakistan. During my first visit to these posts, one thing stood out: all our posts flew a  'mandir' pennant, a 'pir baba' pennant and a 'gurudwara' pennant. I have found this phenomenon in many operational areas throughout my service, and I guess that in times of stress and difficulty,you turn to God, in whatever form he (or she) may be! So every post has a small 'place of worship' bunker that is adorned with the flags of all religions that the soldiers in that unit belong to, and these are visible on the other side. But on the other side of the Line of Control, I saw Pakistani posts flying only their national flag. You may say that they are a Muslim country and thus will have only one flag, but a national flag is very different from a religious pennant, even in Pakistan! So I ordered my posts to remove all kinds of pennants and issued them with the national flag, to be hoisted and lowered as given in the Flag Code of India.

    Did I do this because I doubted my soldiers' loyalty to country? Did I think they were anti national? No.

I did this because:

They needed to know that whatever their religious orientation, when they faced the enemy, they were Indians.
Soldiers on the other side needed to know that they faced Indians, not Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians. And I wanted my soldiers to understand that this is what we want everyone to know, even our 'enemy'.

Suggested Strategies for Negotiation on the Siachen Glacier Dispute

Also Read: Conflict Analysis: The Siachen Glacier Dispute

This is the second part of the paper on Negotiation and covers only some aspects of the strategy that India could adopt for negotiating the Siachen issue. It DOES NOT cover all aspects of the issue and possible options, mainly because it was limited by length of paper to be submitted...

Obstacles in the Negotiation

Indian Army’s deployment on the Saltoro Ridge.

Demarcation of the Line of Control beyond NJ9842. NJ 9842 (a map coordinate point) lies on the ‘Line of Control’ or LoC between India and Pakistan as per the Simla Agreement in 1972. This point is mentioned in this agreement as the ‘northernmost demarcated point’ beyond which there was no demarcation. For the area north of this coordinate point, the agreement refers to the area as ‘from this point thence north’ without drawing any clear cut line. The segment beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated on ground by mutual agreement. No movement of any armies was traced during three wars (1947, 1965, 1971) between India and Pakistan, highlighting the fact that no strategic or tactical significance could be ascribed to this area. The basic reason was in-hospitability of terrain and the lack of any means for human beings to live in the area without additional administrative support at great cost and was frequented only by mountaineers and adventurers. The demarcation of the LoC beyond NJ9842 is possible by creating an Uninhabited Zone (UZ) in the area covering Siachen Glacier and the Saltoro Ridge (after vacation by Indian Army). This could include the disputed territory encompassed by the Indian and Pakistani interpretation of the line of Control beyond NJ9842.

Indian Military Withdrawal from the Saltoro Ridge.  An Indian army brigade has been deployed on the Saltoro ridge since the conflict began in 1984. It has secured its positions on the ridgeline at great cost, now called the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), and does not want to pull back from these positions unless they are physically demarcated jointly on ground and map by both armies, similar to what was done in previous agreements establishing the CFL and LOC. The army’s view is that future violations must have a reference point. The reason for insisting on demarcation is that once done, the locations of the vacated posts cannot be disputed. The deployment is in inhospitable terrain with high costs to India since 1984. Between 1984 and 2007, 884 Indian soldiers were killed and 13,022 wounded, making for an average of 38 dead and 550 plus wounded every year. India has spent over Rs 8,000 crores ($1,330 million) in the conflict and even though the costs have reduced significantly since the cease fire of 2003, India still spends upwards of Rs 365 crores ($60 million) every year on military operations at Siachen. The primary cause of disconnect with Pakistan on the issue of demilitarization is the sequence of the process. We insist on authentication of the current position of troops as a baseline, while Pakistan insists that Indian army withdraw to pre-1972 positions before talks can begin. Redeployment would imply relocation of troops and equipment to lower heights and withdrawal from the Saltoro Ridge itself, with the sanctity of this redeployment being guaranteed by a suitable mechanism. In addition, army deployment in terms of resources, manpower and expenditure would decrease, permitting this infantry brigade to be deployed elsewhere.

Strategic Importance of Withdrawal and Cost of reoccupying Siachen Glacier. 

i.  The Indian strategic perspective is built on the Sino Pak agreement of 1963 where Pakistan ceded 5000 sq km of Kashmiri territory illegally to China. This led to the belief that Pakistan could potentially collude with China, and control of the Siachen area might provide Pakistan with a route to capture the city of Leh and the Ladakh region  with a flanking offensive. Conventional wisdom of the time included scenarios in which China might have joined this offensive. However, this idea was generated in the early 1980s, almost twenty years after Pakistan signed the agreement, indicating that the changing international political and diplomatic equation might have prompted this belief, leading to the Indian occupation of Saltoro Ridge in 1984. The Government of India did not feel the need to occupy Siachen Glacier immediately after the Sino Pak agreement was signed in 1963, as this threat was not felt at the time. It appears that evidence of ‘cartographic aggression’ by Pakistan forced India’s military response in the 1980s. In the present international environment, a ‘joint’ war by Pakistan and China is an unlikely event, and so is a war initiated by Pakistan alone against India in the mountainous Himalayan region. 

ii. However, a ‘Kargil (1999)’ like limited attack by Pakistan cannot be ruled out, especially with the inherent instability of their civilian government and Pakistani army’s dominance of diplomacy and international strategy. If such an event should occur, India would be forced to launch military operations to retake these positions at great cost. To prevent this kind of a misadventure by Pakistan, India would be well advised to consider withdrawal only if sanctity of the demilitarized zone is guaranteed by a neutral agency that can impose its will on Pakistan.

Pakistan’s aim to achieve military parity with India. It is in Pakistan’s interest to keep the Indian army deployed in counter insurgency and other localized conflicts. Siachen is one such conflict where uncertainty in the situation has resulted in India catering for deployment and maintenance of military reserves. This helps Pakistan achieve ‘local’ military parity in a theater of war by tying down Indian Army in penny packets, should a large scale conflict take place. It would be in the Indian government’s interest to deny this advantage to Pakistan by overcoming the Siachen dispute so that no military deployment is necessary to guard our interest. India should also negotiate demilitarization to free up military resources for application elsewhere, should the need arise. Ideally, overcoming all disputes that result in peace time military deployment would afford India an advantage that Pakistan seeks to undermine strategically.

Third party mediation. 

India has traditionally been against third party mediation on any issue with Pakistan. This is a result of the Simla Agreement of 1972, which states “..That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them...”. In view of the changed international and regional political balance where US and USSR are no longer supporting either side, India could consider mediation by a neutral agency that is acceptable to both sides. Third party mediation has multiple advantages for the Siachen conflict:

Break the Stalemate. India and Pakistan have had thirteen rounds of talks from 1986 till 2010 with no real progress on a solution. These talks have been bilateral and India has not agreed to third party mediation on any aspect of its relations with Pakistan since 1972. Since no progress on addressing issues including Siachen Glacier conflict has taken place, it would be worthwhile to invite neutral parties to mediate and come to a workable solution that considers both parties’ interests.

Face Saving. Both India and Pakistan have invested time money, resources and political capital in the Siachen issue. Giving up any of the stated positions on Siachen could be seen as a loss of face by the people of India and may affect the prospects of the political party in power in India. A third party mediator can bring in new ideas and address difficult positions on either side, making it easier for them to transfer the ‘blame’ for a seemingly generous concession on any aspect. 

Resources. Third party mediation may bring in additional resources available to such agencies. International organizations can also deploy resources available to them as part of actions to enforce a solution. Since this is a conflict involving demarcation of boundary, deployment of the United Nations Observer teams, for instance would assist in monitoring a brokered peace. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has been deployed in Kashmir since 1948, and such a task could ideally be extended to the UN.

Power Asymmetry between India and Pakistan. 

Differential between India and Pakistan in terms of aggregate indicators are approximately: population: 6:1; size: 4:1; GDP: 8.5:1; defense expenditures: 6:1; and total number of active forces: 2:1. Only in per capita income is the ratio closer. Since the mid-1950s Pakistan has enjoyed intermittent alliance support from the United States, and since the 1960s there has been a de facto alliance between Pakistan and China. These alliance relationships have offered “borrowed power” to Islamabad and enabled it to reduce the power asymmetry with India. While United States has given aid during its war on terror with the intention of using Pakistan for its larger strategic goals, Pakistan’s main goal has been to increase its capabilities in relation to India and reduce the power disparity with India. Although in the South Asian context India is larger in physical size, GDP and overall military capability, it is not overwhelmingly preponderant in the conflict’s key theater or on the international border. The near parity in troop disposition, especially in the Kashmir theater, gives Pakistan several advantages in limited, asymmetric wars. Partly due to its status-quo orientation, and partly due to constraints in terms of capability and terrain, the Indian strategy in Kashmir has been in general, defensive and reactive, while the Pakistani strategy has been one of offensive-defensive. The basic tenet of Pakistan’s strategy throughout the conflict has been to take the military initiative at crucial junctures, especially by relying on surprise. Since India-Pakistan rivalry encompasses both territorial conflict and geopolitical positioning, a further widening of the gap in capabilities between the defender and the challenger may be essential for a full rapprochement to occur. This may take at least two decades of sustained economic and military growth on India's part, as well as the significant re-positioning of the great powers (China and the United States) with regard to the rivals.

India’s Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement. 

i. Our main contention is the alignment of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842 under present conditions, even if the larger Kashmir issue is not resolved. India would not like to agree to an arrangement where we are seen as giving up our position on Siachen Glacier. There are issues of public perception about loss of territory which will dominate any negotiated settlement. Overall, India has a very strong BATNA due to our dominant military and economic position, in-spite of Pakistan’s attempts to balance the power asymmetry. India should continue to hold entrenched positions (which are militarily stronger) on the Saltoro range in the absence of a negotiated settlement. Due to the ceasefire in effect since 2003, combat related casualties have become minimal. Over a period of time, India has advanced its medical support resources deployed in the area, and weather and terrain related casualties have dropped. The advantage of India’s BATNA is that it does not involve any specific and incremental military, diplomatic or strategic action on its part. India’s present position is justifiable in international forums. 

ii. Pakistan does not have a BATNA that is as effective or viable. It can continue to hold its positions on the lower slopes of the Saltoro Ridge; alternatively, it can launch military offensives in other areas to force India to divert its military resources there. But these tactics can only achieve a stalemate that does not lead to settlement of issues. In addition, Pakistan is not in a position to attempt such military endeavors at present due to preoccupation with operations in support of American military operations in Afghanistan, as well as economic and military weakness due to prolonged internal turmoil. 

Strategy for Negotiation

Engagement with Pakistani Army, the Pakistani political establishment and China as stakeholders.

Engagement with the Pakistani Army and political establishment. Historically, Pakistani army as had a dominant role in shaping Pakistan’s strategic and political thinking and has a strong hold on diplomatic and security machinery. The position of the NSA in Pakistan has been held by the military for long, except during 2007-08 and 2012. The military in Pakistan is once again in the process of strengthening its grip on the civilian control, as reports in the media suggest. It is a well-known fact that the army in Pakistan is an extra-constitutional authority and power center that has the capability to intervene and dislodge the civilian government, as well as overrule policy positions of the civilian government. In the past, a military coup by the army in Pakistan has led to long periods of military rule. The military also has a major say in framing Pakistani policies with regard to India. Many democratic countries have engaged with military dictators and unelected governments to achieve their national interests, including the United States. In the case of Siachen Glacier, which is a strategic issue being played out by both militaries, it is in India’s interest to acknowledge the role played by Pakistani army in their foreign and defense policies. Engagement with the Pakistani army has the advantage of being able to incorporate a demilitarization plan that the army in Pakistan agrees to and is compelled to honor, if it were to be part of the negotiations. Unlike the Indian army, which is under the firm control of, and will act on any settlement that is negotiated by the Indian government, there is a possibility that the Pakistani army does not follow through with the commitments expected of such a settlement by the civilian government. What is of greater concern to us is that at some point in the near future, another military government in Pakistan could negate an agreement on Siachen and revert to hostilities and unilateral military action. An additional advantage of engaging with the army in Pakistan is that the civilian government would be able to work towards a conclusive agreement where all Pakistani power players are represented. It could lead to a solution where the civilian government would not be subject to a ‘blame game’ by the military with accusations of having ‘sold out’ to India and assist the civilian government in managing domestic politics

Engagement with China. Demarcation of Pakistan occupied territory with China in 1963 was negotiated with a view to resolve border issues between the two countries. A similar problem existed on the Indian side of Kashmir where the borders of Kashmir with China had not been demarcated on ground. Consequent to Kashmir’s accession to India, we feel that Pakistan, which is illegally occupying Kashmir since 1947 does not have the right to give away territory that does not belong to it. However, this action was an incident of realpolitik by Pakistan to resolve issues with China as well as gain their support against India. China on its part has signed a conditional agreement that depends on the outcome of the larger Kashmir issue. India has a border dispute with China that also involves the eastern areas of Arunachal Pradesh. India lays claims to Arunachal Pradesh and is controlling the region, while China has occupied Aksai Chin (the area adjoining Siachen Glacier) and has built a highway connecting with Sinkiang Province. Although China is not a direct party to the Siachen conflict, it is a stakeholder in the larger border issue in the region and must be incorporated in the negotiations, since demarcation of territories is based on historic perceptions held by the erstwhile kingdom of Kashmir vis a vis Chinese authority in the region at the time. The Chinese government must be engaged with a view to gain a convergence of differing interests on the Siachen Glacier resolution. This would subsequently help India in resolving its larger border disputes with China, namely in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions through tradeoffs across these issues of differing priorities.

Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the Siachen Glacier and Interpretation of the Line of Control. 

Establishment of a DMZ would be preceded by delimitation of the LoC beyond NJ9842. Both India and Pakistan have proposed delimitation of the Line of Control beyond NJ9842. Past talks have been deadlocked over India’s insistence that the AGPL be demarcated on the ground as well as on maps, and Pakistan’s insistence that Indian troops must withdraw to pre-1972 positions before any meaningful discussions could take place. “India’s approach towards a final settlement should be based on demilitarization of limited well defined, mutually agreed prescribed area”. 

India is in a far stronger economic and military position than earlier and can propose a unilateral declaration of its positions through a note verbale or a non-paper rather than insisting on physical verification of its positions as a prerequisite to demilitarization. Effort and resources required to reoccupy defensive positions held currently will be magnified, should withdrawal be followed by a need to redeploy. We are concerned about recognition of our ‘fall back’ positions, should talks or the process of demilitarization fail. This could be achieved by unilaterally publishing maps showing our dispositions and making them available to international organizations and the public. India could utilize multiple techniques to drive negotiations forward in a favorable direction on acceptance of these maps through joint demarcation exercises.

Following a declaration of positions physically occupied by India, a move to sequentially withdraw from Saltoro Ridge in a time bound manner in conjunction with Pakistani withdrawal would ensure that both sides take confidence building measures, which are visible on ground and can be verified. This could be combined with a caveat in the demilitarization agreement that India would retain the right to use military force at a point of its own choosing in the case of any future occupation of these positions by Pakistan[8]. Such a clause would caution Pakistan to reassess the cost of unilaterally attempting to occupy the areas vacated by the Indian Army. Anchoring options around declaration of Indian positions along with a concrete plan for withdrawal would help in guiding negotiations towards a conclusive solution. However, all withdrawals need to be part of a demilitarization plan that is agreed to jointly by both countries. 

The defining aspect of DMZs is the establishment of a physical area (a “zone”) that separates opposing military forces. Exact demarcation of the DMZ should be carried out by a joint working group that can consider the interests of both sides. Involving a neutral third party mediator like a UN organization (independent of the larger Kashmir issue) to assist in the management of the DMZ may be considered. Advantages of third party mediation have already been discussed earlier in this paper. Agreeing to mediation would also provide India the leverage to extract concessions during negotiations over the larger Kashmir issue. 

Demilitarization could proceed in two phases: Monitoring and Verification. Cooperative monitoring of the demilitarization process between the two countries would help to negate trust issues regarding the process. The disengagement process must be monitored to ensure that troops on both sides have withdrawn to mutually agreed positions; their logistics and operational bases have been dismantled and removed in such a way that they cannot be reoccupied in a short time frame. Bilateral monitoring implies that both countries can monitor the area through their own national technical means, within internationally established norms. Verification of the process as well as long term verification by onsite inspections and remote monitoring to prevent redeployment also needs to be established, preferably through neutral international organizations like UNMOGIP. Sharing of information at various levels between Indian and Pakistani armies deployed in the area would be essential for monitoring and verification process. Given the past history of Pakistani army acting independent of the government, it would be advisable to maintain alternate means of information gathering about possible reoccupation of the demilitarized zone. This is all the more important, since logistic buildup for military operations in mountains is time consuming and the party that takes the initiative will gain.

_______________________________________

[1] ‘Why Siachen Matters to India’, Nitin A Gokhale (accessed  December4, 2015) available from http://mujournal.mewaruniversity.in/JIR%202-2/8.pdf

[2] The Simla Agreement, (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6771~v~Agreement_Between_the_Government_of_India_and_the_Government_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Pakistan_on_Bilateral_Relations__Simla_Agreement_.pdf

[3] Paul, T. V. 2006. “Why has the India-Pakistan rivalry been so enduring? Power asymmetry and an intractable conflict.”  Security Studies 15 (4): 600-30.

[4] ‘Pakistan Army now has seat at negotiating table with India’  (Accessed December 13, 2015), available from

http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/pakistan-army-now-has-seat-at-negotiating-table-with-india/story-BvUjzZXfR6H2ttcP2uqHRO.html

[5] “Demilitarization of the Siachen Conflict Zone: Concepts for Implementation and Monitoring”, Sandia Report SAND2007-5670, (September 2007): 19.