US Army greatcoat from the Korean war in the Indian Army

While watching a movie on the Korean war today, I found an unlikely connection between the US Army Korean war greatcoat and the Indian Army.

 
The story of this greatcoat, possibly from the Korean war goes like this: 
During the 1962 conflict with China, India asked for military aid from the US to equip its mountain divisions. We did not have adequate equipment to fight the Chinese at that time. 
A few excerpts from articles and documents on the events are given below.

"By November 1, US military supplies were arriving in India by air. At New Delhi’s behest, the first shipment was modest: military advisors, ammunition, rifles, mortars and airlift support. But by November 14 the two had established the “formal basis for military assistance” and Washington was preparing a $50 million package to equip five Indian divisions."  from here.

"Both the United States and the Soviet Union stepped in to fill the breach in Indian defenses. Moscow supplied MiG-21 fighters and also built a number of factories in India to assemble advanced weapons.10 The U.S. equipped eight new infantry divisions for mountain defense against the Chinese and rebuilt some defense production facilities. The United States stopped the aid program during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, embittering Indian security managers who marked the United States as an unreliable military supplier." from here, and an interesting tidbit from the CIA archives here.

 But the interesting part is this:
Americans probably had surplus clothing and equipment leftover from the Korean war of 1950 to '53, which they shipped to India. 

I think that by the time this equipment could arrive, a ceasefire was declared by China. The US Army greatcoat reached an Ordnance depot in Kanpur, where it was dumped and forgotten for 40 years. It was never issued to any unit or formation because the next two wars were fought with Pakistan and probably, the need for this kind of winter clothing was never felt. After 1971, there never was a general mobilization till 2001, which was for Operation Parakram after the terrorist attack on Parliament. This was when the entire Indian Army was mobilized and I was attached to a light regiment in Northern Command, deployed on the Line of Control from School of Artillery, where I was an instructor. 
     A few days after reaching there, we got a mail from the ordnance depot in Kanpur(addressed generally to the whole army) that they had some surplus coats available on sale at Rs 440. This probably happened because the ordnance depot must have dusted their cobwebs while preparing for a possible war with Pakistan, and discovered these  coats(and didn't know what to do with them)! Since I was at the regiment HQ that day and my CO asked me if I was interested, I said yes. When a colonel wants to get a coat, he sends a man to get it, and a captain who's hanging around gets collateral benefits! Since we sent a man, we received greatcoats that were not moth eaten.
     This was the US Army greatcoat manufactured during the Korean war, with a wool inner lining. The only time I used it was 9 years later when I was commanding my unit near Srinagar in Kashmir.

COVID-19 Sunday activity led me back to this coat, now lying in a box, but still very much wearable after 70 years!

Of regimental reunions...

A short one on unit reunions.

I recently attended my unit's honour title day, 'Sanjoi Mirpur', and was visiting six years  after handing over command. I was in the company of eight other COs, who'd commanded my unit, starting from the late 70s onwards, as well as other officers who had served during various periods of time. It was a great event, successful, because it got so many of us together across time, and we could all relive our experiences in the unit. Present also, were a large number of JCOs and NCOs who had served in the unit and had retired at various points in time, to act as  reference points in our memories.

What struck me was that while you may personally remember most of your 'achievements' during command, be it doing your field tenure and an operation done well, winning a trophy, doing well in an exercise, competition, or in sports, others remember you only for your personal and leadership qualities, and your values. Once you are no longer their commanding officer, the quality and duration of your interaction with the men you commanded depends entirely on these qualities and values that you displayed earlier.

Units have reunions only to remember their raising days (their day of creation!) or battle honours. No one ever gets together to remember winning a trophy, a sports event, getting a 'well done' from a boss, or any administrative victories that we claim for ourselves. Everybody wants to hear of the minutest detail when someone is recounting his experience of battle, however small and insignificant it may be. Inflated and artificial achievements are forgotten quickly, once the person who tries to create and propagate it is no longer at the helm of affairs.

Tough times are remembered more often than good times. People who have been through operations and field tenures together develop a stronger bond than those who've been together in peace stations.

The most important thing for the current officers and men is to maintain a true record of what happens, because stories get distorted as they get recounted over years. Therefore, only a true record of what really happened should be captured in the regiment history book without any embellishments or modifications to the truth.

Its important to return for a reunion, "..if you are present there, then you are one of us". The feeling of belonging to a team is priceless!

And the last... the older generation must share their experiences and thoughts with the young officers to help them grow as leaders. More on that later.

Indian Army and the National Flag

 

Are there regulations in the Indian army on flying the national flag? In my 20 years, I didn't come across one that required hoisting the national flag.
       In the recent past, social media has been hijacked by people who feel that universities that do not fly the flag are anti national.

    Does flying the flag or hoisting it on special occasions directly correlate with greater loyalty to the country?
      As a corollary, does it mean that if the flag is not hoisted by some people, they are disloyal and 'anti-national'? 

     Why is it that the Indian Army does not fly the national flag at the quarter guards (armory, as some others might call it) of units and its formation headquarters? Is the Indian Army anti national by the new definition that's being bandied about by proponents of this new brand of nationalism?
     
    I have tried to delve deeper into it, but have not been able to find any documents on the subject among Indian Army's rules and regulations. But here's my theory (I may be wrong, but anyone with better inputs can add to this):

All armies needed a rallying point in battle, which used to be their commander (king) in the past, who would be visible in the battlefield to motivate soldiers fighting for him. Later, as battles became bigger and bigger in time and space, the king could not be everywhere, so a flag representing him (or country) would do.

     Lets turn to the Indian army, which was created by the British East India Company to protect its interests. How could they rally their men in the numerous battles they fought? Their soldiers were  natives, led by Englishmen (from an alien land with alien customs and ideas). How could they motivate these soldiers to be loyal to foreigners and fight against their own people? Later, during the first and second world wars, how could they motivate their men to fight and die for their cause (which most soldiers in the Indian army would not identify with)? The rallying point could not be the English flag! Imagine telling an Indian soldier in the East India Company or the British Indian army "You must be prepared to fight and die for the glory of the King (or Queen, who lives thousands of miles away, and will never come to this land) and country (England!)" in another alien land thousands of miles away from home! Would he identify with this cause? No.

    Therefore, the regimental flag. "Fight for your clan, fight for your regiment, fight for your unit"
Because if they tried to tell this soldier to fight for country, a day would come when he could turn around and question the idea of country (India being part of England) itself, because the flag would be alien. And then he would not fight for England at all!
   
    Even today, the Indian Army flies the regimental flag in units and formations, and holds regimental and unit 'Colours' in greatest esteem. But does the national flag figure anywhere? Not really. Nor is it disrespected, or disrespect implied in any action. It just does not figure in the soldier's consciousness. Its issued by ordnance depots and mostly kept in stores. And its hoisted on Independence day in some units (I hoisted it as CO). But the rallying point is still the regimental flag and Colours!
   
     When I was commanding my unit near Baramula in Kashmir, we were manning a company operating base with a few outposts along the line of control with Pakistan. During my first visit to these posts, one thing stood out: all our posts flew a  'mandir' pennant, a 'pir baba' pennant and a 'gurudwara' pennant. I have found this phenomenon in many operational areas throughout my service, and I guess that in times of stress and difficulty,you turn to God, in whatever form he (or she) may be! So every post has a small 'place of worship' bunker that is adorned with the flags of all religions that the soldiers in that unit belong to, and these are visible on the other side. But on the other side of the Line of Control, I saw Pakistani posts flying only their national flag. You may say that they are a Muslim country and thus will have only one flag, but a national flag is very different from a religious pennant, even in Pakistan! So I ordered my posts to remove all kinds of pennants and issued them with the national flag, to be hoisted and lowered as given in the Flag Code of India.

    Did I do this because I doubted my soldiers' loyalty to country? Did I think they were anti national? No.

I did this because:

They needed to know that whatever their religious orientation, when they faced the enemy, they were Indians.
Soldiers on the other side needed to know that they faced Indians, not Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians. And I wanted my soldiers to understand that this is what we want everyone to know, even our 'enemy'.

Conflict Analysis: The Siachen Glacier Dispute

Also read: The Story of My Family

Here is a modified version of a paper written by me recently for a course on the 'Process of International Negotiations'

Conflict Definition

Siachen Glacier lies at the Northern extremities of Kashmir and its borders with China. Due to extreme climatic and terrain conditions in the Himalayan Mountains, this area was unexplored and not demarcated until recent times. Consequent to the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, the existing Cease Fire Line (CFL) of 1949 was converted to a ‘Line of Control’ through signing of the ‘Simla Agreement' between India and Pakistan; however, it was demarcated only up to NJ 9842, a boundary pillar beyond which the terrain was considered too harsh to be of any relevance at the time. Both sides agreed on the Line of Control upto NJ 9842, and “thence north to the glaciers.” Since the line is not specified beyond NJ 9842, both countries have interpreted it differently.

SIACHEN GLACIER SHOWING THE PHYSICAL TERRAIN, OVERLAPPING BOUNDARY CLAIMS,
AND DE FACTO BORDERS OF INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

                                              
                                                        

Pakistan draws a straight line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 up to the Karakoram pass on its boundary with China. India instead draws a north-northwest line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the Saltoro range, a southern offshoot of the Karakoram range.

The present conflict has its genesis in Pakistan allowing mountaineering expeditions into the area in the 1970s and 80s. India felt this to be a form of ‘Cartographic Aggression’. To stake its claim over the territory, India launched a military operation in April 1984 to occupy the western ridges of the Siachen Glacier valley. In response, Pakistan launched a number of repeated offensives on Indian positions of the ridgeline. Both both armies continue to be deployed facing each other at heights of 4,000 to 6,000 meters above sea level. Both sides have suffered a large number of casualties among their soldiers, more so on the Indian side due to their positions being higher in altitude and on more difficult terrain.

The territorial situation as it presently stands is that Pakistan considers the Siachen Glacier Complex to be at the eastern extremity of Baltistan—a Northern Area that is unambiguously under its control. India, by contrast, maintains that the Siachen Glacier is the western boundary of the Nubra Sub-Division of the Ladakh District of Jammu and Kashmir—a territory which has been part of India's administrative jurisdiction since the accession of that state to the Union of India in 1947.

Significant Parties To The Conflict

The main parties to the conflict (who are or may be “at the negotiation table”);
a. India
b. Pakistan

Major factions or players within each party;

India

a. Government of India.

b. Indian Army. Though Indian army is a stakeholder in the conflict, it is under control of the Govt of India and may have a minor role to play in the negotiations.

Pakistan
a. Government of Pakistan.

b. Pakistan Army. Within Pakistan, the army is an extra constitutional authority and has a say in political and diplomatic issues. Strategic interests of Pakistan are controlled by the army and it has the ability to disrupt negotiations.

China is an additional party with a stake in the conflict. It is affected due to its 1963 agreement with Pakistan where territories that previously belonged to Kashmir were exchanged. It can be a potential spoiler because of the influence it has over Pakistan. 

Third parties who may be attempting to facilitate resolution of the conflict are:

a. United Nations. It has limited influence over the conflict since it has not been able to enforce its resolution of 1949 with either party.

b. United States. Though the US has attempted to mediate a peace and withdrawal of both forces, it has not been successful, and both India as well as Pakistan have criticized the role US attempted to play.

c. Track II negotiators from India and Pakistan. A recent development where track II negotiators from both countries attempted to find a neutral solution to the problem.

Perspectives Of The Parties

Issues in the conflict

India

a. Mutual distrust between India and Pakistan has risen to new heights after the nuclear test of May, 1998. Both India and Pakistan face what the superpowers have faced since the early fifties: the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to a nuclear one.

b. Consequent to the 1949 cease fire with Pakistan and the Line of Control being established between the two countries, India is sensitive to further loss of what it considers its own territory. The perceived loss of areas to the North of NJ 9842, though not defined at the beginning of the conflict as Indian territory are nevertheless considered Indian. On the contrary, Pakistan stakes a claim to this area because it was undefined even after the wars of 1947 and 1971.

c. Interpretation of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) consequent to the 1949 war and the Line of Control after the 1971 war with Pakistan.

d. Admission of international mountaineering expeditions into the area by Pakistan is considered an act of covert extension of territorial claims. India regarded Pakistani encouragement of mountaineers into the non-demarcated area as a calculated ploy to gain control of Siachen.

e. Pakistan’s claim to Siachen received support from prestigious international mapping agencies who had endorsed it as being Pakistani territory on their maps. India called this ‘cartographic aggression’ by Pakistan.

Pakistan

a. The geo-strategic nature of Pakistani aims at securing control of the Siachen Glacier complex to secure for themselves a common border with China, with a view to seek reassurance of Chinese support against India in the event of general hostilities.

b. Siachen Glacier area falls under the Pakistan administered sector of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, called Federally Administered Northern Areas and must be restored to its control till an internationally supervised plebiscite is concluded in the state, as decided after the ceasefire agreement of 1949.

c. Based on the interpretation of the Line of Control as described in the 1972 Simla Agreement and its clauses on maintaining status quo, Pakistan considers Indian occupation of the Saltoro range illegal. 

d. Pakistan is willing to bilaterally negotiate with India as it considers Siachen Glacier disputed territory, especially since it falls outside the demarcated Line of Control. It was willing to accept Siachen as a no man’s land, till India unilaterally occupied the Saltoro range.

Positions

India has taken the position that all talks related to Siachen Glacier and other issues concerned with boundary be held under the 1972 Simla Agreement, signed after the 1971 war. Pakistan has in the past, opted for airing the matter in international fora, such as the UN and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and not limit resolution to the bilateral level.

Consequent to Pakistan’s border agreement with China in 1963 and construction of the Karakoram highway, India was concerned that a collusive Pakistan and China could jointly plan to annex Indian held territory in Kashmir. India does not recognize this agreement because it believes that Kashmir has been illegally occupied by Pakistan. 

India’s stand is that delineation of boundaries be carried out along the watershed in accordance with the accepted international watershed principle. India insists that it should extend along the Saltoro ridge-line connecting point NJ 9842 with the Sia La, Sherpa Kangri, and on to K2, merging with the international boundary agreed in the 1963 Sino-Pak Border Agreement. By stating its stand based on the watershed principle, India hopes to apply this position to its territorial dispute with China as well. 

India has outlined its six proposals on the Siachen Glacier dispute during multiple talks with Pakistan:

i. A cessation of 'cartographic aggression' by Pakistan (that is, of its unilateral attempts to extend the LOC from its agreed terminus at map reference point NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass of the border with China);

ii. Establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the Siachen Glacier;

iii. Exchange between India and Pakistan of authenticated maps showing present military dispositions on the ground;

iv. Delimitation by India and Pakistan of a line from map reference point NJ 9842 northwards to the border with China 'based on ground realities' [AGPL];

v. Formulation of ground rules to govern future military operations in the area;

vi. Redeployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions.

Though Pakistan supports Kashmiri self-determination through a UN-sponsored plebiscite, it has effectively annexed the Northern Areas, which are contiguous to the Siachen Glacier. It now considers these areas disputed territories that India does not have a right to occupy. The Pakistani team, led by Foreign Secretary Syed Ijlai Zaidi, claimed during the first round of talks in 1986 that India's induction of its forces on the Glacier was a violation of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan's formal terms have been twofold during many rounds of talks with India:

i. Deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions held at the time the ceasefire was declared in 1971.

ii. Delimitation of an extension of the LOC beyond map reference point NJ 9842.

Interests

India considers Jammu and Kashmir to be an integral part of the country by the accession instrument, and Pakistan as an aggressor. Pakistan disregards the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, which it considers to be fraudulent and inappropriate to an area dominated by a majority Muslim population “It is not just military confrontations and threats of war that ensue—indeed, the fear and pride related to Kashmir and the subsequent ill will compels both countries to embark upon further programs of hate and adopt new inflammatory dimensions to an already troubled relationship”. Islamabad considers the Siachen Glacier and the Northern Areas absolutely vital to the security of Pakistan- “Indian occupation of the Siachen Glacier would gain desired proximity to the Karakoram Highway—the focus of a joint Soviet/Afghan and Indian pincer movement”.

Under the Sino-Pak border agreement, the government of Pakistan relinquished claims to over 4,000 square kilometers of territory, in return for China’s cession to Pakistan of over 1,300 square kilometers of territory actually administered by China. Pakistan was not the sovereign authority empowered to make a final settlement with China, which is still pending the outcome of the Kashmir question. An Indian withdrawal from Siachen would validate the agreement between Pakistan and China. Gaining control of the Siachen Glacier from the geostrategic viewpoint is critical to allow Pakistan a common border with China, which could be used in the event of hostilities with India to seek Chinese military cooperation and support on ground. 

Pakistan's stated ambition has been to achieve military parity with India. By keeping the Indian army occupied in localized conflicts, it hoped to negate the advantage of superior strength, both quantitatively and qualitatively by India.

Application of the watershed principle to its disputed Himalayan borders with China is critical to Indian strategic interests. Loss of the Siachen Glacier would have placed India in a much weaker position vis-a-vis China regarding negotiations on outstanding border issues along the border with China as it would mean applying different yardsticks for similar boundary issues. 

India does not accept a third party intervention in the conflict and repeatedly asserts that all negotiations and problem solving be carried out under the Simla Agreement of 1972. However, Pakistan wants the issue of Kashmir and Siachen Glacier to be settled through international mediation or intervention, which is in contradiction with the Indian interest in a bilateral settlement.

Alternatives

India is likely to continue to hold its entrenched positions (which are militarily stronger) on the Saltoro range in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The region has seen a ceasefire in effect since 2003, as a result of which combat related casualties no longer occur. Over a period of time, India has advanced its medical support resources deployed in the area and weather and terrain related casualties have dropped. Though the costs in money terms of maintaining the army at such altitudes is prohibitively high, India is capable of continuing to do so. 

India’s main contention is the alignment of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842 under the present condition, even if the larger Kashmir issue is not resolved. Therefore it is likely to walk away from any negotiation that suggests realigning the AGPL based on Pakistan’s interpretation, as there are issues of public perception about loss of territory which will dominate any negotiated settlement. Overall, India has a very strong Best Alternative To Negotiated Settlement (BATNA) due to its dominant military and economic position. 

Pakistan could continue to hold its positions, as a ceasefire is in effect and its army is in any case subject to lesser casualties due to terrain and weather. This is an attractive BATNA for Pakistan as it does not involve any additional military, political or diplomatic commitments.

One option for Pakistan is to launch an offensive in the Siachen Glacier area to dislodge Indian Army from the Saltoro range. However, this is not a very attractive BATNA as the Indian armed forces are numerically and qualitatively superior and are occupying dominating positions. Pakistan will not be able to support the war economically, in addition to being subject to sanctions from international agencies for being the aggressor.

Pakistan could launch military operations elsewhere to capture Indian held territory and bargain for withdrawal of Indian forces from Siachen Glacier. This was attempted by Pakistan under General Parvez Musharraf in 1999, but India was able to divert its armed forces from elsewhere and evict Pakistani forces. This BATNA has been attempted and was unsuccessful, therefore is no longer a suitable option.

Pakistan and China could jointly launch military operations to capture Siachen. However, in the present international order, a joint war by two countries on India may draw in others and would in any case be viewed as unwarranted aggression, especially by China as it is not a direct party to the conflict. Overall, Pakistan has a set of weak BATNAs that limit the amount of influence that can be applied on India to negotiate a demilitarization of the Glacier. 

Communication And Relationship-Building

Historically, India and Pakistan have a hostile relationship since independence in 1947. Minor skirmishes on territorial issues have led to three full scale wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. India and Pakistan have had eight rounds of talks on the Siachen issue from 1986 to 1998. However, India’s insistence that the present deployment (the AGPL) be demarcated has been countered by Pakistan with the argument that India must withdraw to pre 1972 positions before any meaningful talks can commence. Pakistan holds the view that when the two armies withdraw their forces from the zone of conflict and agree to refrain from re-establishing any military presence in it, the original positions will become irrelevant.

Both countries successfully disengaged their forces from the Chumik Glacier, which is located quite close to Siachen, through negotiations at the field commander level. This indicates that it is possible to work out negotiated settlement at the local level without prejudice to the remaining issues. On 25 November 2003, Pakistan proposed an informal cease-fire along the LOC including the Siachen conflict zone, and India accepted the proposal.

A composite dialogue process was initiated between India and Pakistan in 2004 to address parallel, but separately eight issues that affect relations between the two countries, Siachen Glacier being one of them. The Siachen issue has been separated from the larger Kashmir issue, creating a hope that it may be resolved independent of the related issues. Pakistan sees agreements in trade and other areas as a springboard for resolution of the Kashmir issue, but India sees trade and other cooperation independent of Kashmir, since it believes that Kashmir is an inalienable part of India.

The joint statement of 12 June 2012 following the India-Pakistan defense secretary level Siachen talks as part of the composite dialogue process said: “Both sides reaffirmed their resolve to make serious, sustained and result oriented efforts for seeking an amicable resolution of Siachen. It was agreed to continue dialogue on Siachen in keeping with the desire of the leaders of both countries for early resolution of all outstanding issues.” However, no progress on ground has taken place beyond these talks.

Criteria Of Legitimacy

Since the Siachen issue is related to demarcation and interpretation of boundary, as well as ownership of territory, the following agreements and UN resolutions may be interpreted to arrive at a resolution:

a. The Simla Agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan.

b. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 13 August 1948.

c. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 5 January 1949.

The UN resolution of 13 August 1948 states at Part II A (1) that Pakistan agrees to withdraw from Kashmir before a plebiscite may be held. Therefore it may appear that Pakistan has to vacate its occupation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and has no claim to the Siachen Glacier. 

The Simla Agreement states that “Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.” India would be a violator since it unilaterally deployed its troops on the Siachen Glacier in April 1984 in contradiction to this agreement. 

_________________________________________________________________________________

References:

[1] The Simla Agreement, (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6771~v~Agreement_Between_the_Government_of_India_and_the_Government_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Pakistan_on_Bilateral_Relations__Simla_Agreement_.pdf.

[2] Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Siachen, “A By-Product of the Kashmir Dispute and a Catalyst for its Resolution,” Pakistan Journal of History & Culture, Vol.XXVII/2, 2006.

[3] Raspal S. Khosa, The Siachen Glacier dispute: Imbroglio on the roof of the world, Contemporary South Asia, 8:2, 1999, 187-209.

[4] Gulshan Majeed, South Asian Security Compulsions: A Historical Analysis of India-Pakistan Relations, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 20, Issue - 2, 2013, 219:232

[5] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949 (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/19490105ResolutionforCeasefire.pdf.

[6] Siachen: A By-Product of the Kashmir Dispute and a Catalyst for its Resolution fight (Accessed October 23, 2015), available from http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/latest_english_journal/siachen_a_bi-product_of_kashmir_dr_ishtiaq.pdf .

[7] Ashraf, Sajjad. "India-Pakistan Relations: Common Ground and Points of Discord." ECSSR (Abu Dhabi).Emirates Lecture Series.88, 2011: 0_1,1,35,37-58.

[8] “Demilitarization of the Siachen Conflict Zone: Concepts for Implementation and Monitoring”, Sandia Report SAND2007-5670, (September 2007): 19.

[9] Is there any hope for India and Pakistan? (accessed on 28 October 2015), available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/is-there-any-hope-for-india-pakistan-relations/

[10]Sumona Dasgupta, “ Kashmir and the India Pakistan Dialogue process”, RSIS working paper No 29 (21 May 2015): 11.

[11] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/uncom1.htm.

[12] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949.

[13]Ravi Baghel, Marcus Nüsser, “Securing the heights: The vertical dimension of the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan in the Eastern Karakoram,” Political Geography, Volume 48, September 2015, Pages 24-36

[14] Siachen dispute: India and Pakistan’s glacial fight (Accessed October 23, 2015), available from http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-dispute-india-and-pakistan%E2%80%99s-glacial-fight.309100/