I thought that I must write down my thoughts on the whole issue, especially having been at the right time and place when the controversy was being created. I do not intend to give the juicy details of who said and did what, but focus on the issues. Let me keep it short and simple.
The Issue
750 odd Colonel's vacancies were released by the government sometime in 2008(or was it 2006?). In 2004/05, the selection board for promotion from Major to Lt Col was done away with. Everyone would become Lt Col on completion of 13 years service. But the vacancies for Colonels did not increase much in 2004, making the pyramid steeper at that level.
Here is an illustration:
Majors Lt Col's Vacs Colonel's Vacs
(No change)
2003 100 (50% promoted) 50 (50% promoted) 25
So 25 out of 50 Lt Cols would become Colonel.
2007 100 (timescale promotion) 100 (25% promoted) 25
All figures are illustrative only. Don't get emotional about them.Please!
A similar number of officers were becoming Colonel, but dissatisfaction perceived was much higher. (Only 25 out of 100!What is this Army coming to!)
Now, additional vacancies were released to ease the pain. It could have been divided proportionally among all arms and services or pro rata vacancies (All of them have gone through the same kind of shit, only in different settings). So giving everyone a 50% chance to become Colonel and to command a unit seemed fair.
Well, the powers that be decided that only some should get this windfall; field allowance for serving in difficult areas is not enough, it must be enhanced with liberal promotions. Irrespective of contribution (or lack of it..) to the organisation during these 'difficult' tenures.
So what are the advantages of keeping promotion approvals at or below 50%:
We don't dilute standards. If you're not in the top half of your batch, do you really deserve to command your unit? Even if you're in Infantry or Artillery or Armoured Corps? And still call yourself a professional army?!!
There is no disparity between arms and services. And there shouldn't be. (At least upto Colonels. But more on that later.) Remember, we're all on the same side (On a serious note, all officers compete within their corps till Colonel, so we should not compare life in Infantry with life in ASC or EME) For instance, an EME Lt Col may be responsible for technical readiness of all guns in an arty brigade, while an artillery Lt Col may be a battery commander looking after only his 6 guns. So who deserves to get promoted more than the other? We don't know. But can they be compared? NO. So an EME or ASC (or Engineer / Mechanised Infantry) guy should have a similar chance of becoming a Colonel in competition with his batch mates. Lets say 50% for all arms, to keep it simple.
Everyone can't be given a 70% chance of promotion. If you do have a hundred vacancies, you can only divide them 50-50, or 70-30. Not 60-50. So if someone decides to take 70, it had better be you. Otherwise you end up at the wrong end of a promotion board result.
And we really don't want to be like the IPS or IAS where everyone has rank, but no one seems to be doing anything much.
Command of formations is for elites with relevant experience. Period. The key word is 'elite'. Command of formations is not for officers from 'the arm' or 'arms'. So why are we hellbent on giving it to 'wrong' officers from the 'right' arm / regiment/ battalion? Work the statistics. ( maybe someone at HDMC can work out the probability of an officer in the 50-60% bracket from the top making it to Major General as a project or thesis!)
So if we agree on the basics, we can move on. But when some enlightened souls bring in a 'Command Exit' model (whatever in the hell is that!!) without consulting those in the business of managing officers' promotions on a daily basis, all hell is bound to break loose. Even if the 'yes men' keep denying it to their bosses. By the way, if someone who remained awake during maths lectures at NDA went through that spreadsheet, it would probably take him 5 minutes to punch holes in it. That long if he was 'slow on the uptake'.
These are the questions that have been going around:
Which arm/service stood to gain by this tweak? Everyone seems to know.
Who were the power players? We don't know that openly. The concerned officers (and very senior ones, as well as those who've now become very senior) displayed lack of honesty and moral courage.
Was there no one who objected? Not many who gained from it all. And those who didn't object - they don't matter in any case.
So what happened due to this hijacking of 'good order and military discipline' in the army?
A large percentage of officers from certain arms became Colonel (and brigadier, and major general...). Full marks, AVSC aim has been met. We've improved the 'satisfaction level' (for some, but everyone cannot be satisfied)
A large percentage of officers from certain some arms became commanding officers at a young age.(Full marks, AVSC aim has been met for some, yet again)
And what about the incidents of failure of command among those very arms? Most incidents have not been recorded or even acknowledged as that.("After all, he's from that arm and done so well. This should not affect his Higher Command prospects..lets help him out..") Halo Effect. Is there a relation between lower age of command WITH lower standards of selection and these incidents? (CDM and HDMC student officers now have more ideas for studies)
"So what if some officers didn't become Colonel in spite of being in the top 40% of their batch? They had a 'ball' during the last twenty years, didn't they? All those guys who barely scraped through JC, command of their sub units, and were not even in the top 50% will make up for these disgruntled elements who're psc and outstanding subunit commanders (but in the wrong corps) .."
etc. etc.
So what is the issue?
Is it that vacancies need to be redistributed? Yes, in the immediate future, in the most practical way possible. And it'll take 5 years. Because this has been moving in a different direction for the last 5 years.
But more than that, our commanders must work towards regaining the faith of all officers. From all arms and services. Even if these officers can't do shit about all this.
Because they perceive a wrong doing by their commanders(including those who stood by and watched things happen).
How do we ensure that this doesn't happen again? We need to understand that right or wrong is more important than 'convenient or inconvenient'. Incidentally, what is right is more often than not, inconvenient. At all levels. The boss is not always right. We need to groom our officers to stand up for what is right, and not follow the superior, or 'regimental izzat' BLINDLY. .... the list is long (should the CO report and take action on an incident of attempted rape by one of his unit jawans? or sort it out internally?).
Units are not families, and officers are not to be 'taken care of' like a spoilt child. A military unit is a fighting machine ( even an ASC company (Tk tptr) Type C is, believe me) and so officers have to be held accountable. An officer must uphold the highest standards of leadership (including fairness towards his command and comrades, which seems to have been missing here) even when his peers and boss say that its okay to be otherwise.
"This is alright, we heard it all. But what practical things can you do?"
Put your dissent on file. Don't put up 'draft' notings.
Don't allow loopholes in policy letters and procedures. Make them well.
Do not implement a weak policy for 'flexibility'. Make someone high up sign a 'waiver' if he wants to favour someone - and watch his hands shake!
add your own....
The link for an article on the AFT judgement is here http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aft-quashes-armys-promotion-policy-for-colonels/
These are my opinions and not statement of facts. And I am open to changing them on seeing evidence indicating otherwise.
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