Conflict Analysis: The Siachen Glacier Dispute

Also read: The Story of My Family

Here is a modified version of a paper written by me recently for a course on the 'Process of International Negotiations'

Conflict Definition

Siachen Glacier lies at the Northern extremities of Kashmir and its borders with China. Due to extreme climatic and terrain conditions in the Himalayan Mountains, this area was unexplored and not demarcated until recent times. Consequent to the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, the existing Cease Fire Line (CFL) of 1949 was converted to a ‘Line of Control’ through signing of the ‘Simla Agreement' between India and Pakistan; however, it was demarcated only up to NJ 9842, a boundary pillar beyond which the terrain was considered too harsh to be of any relevance at the time. Both sides agreed on the Line of Control upto NJ 9842, and “thence north to the glaciers.” Since the line is not specified beyond NJ 9842, both countries have interpreted it differently.

SIACHEN GLACIER SHOWING THE PHYSICAL TERRAIN, OVERLAPPING BOUNDARY CLAIMS,
AND DE FACTO BORDERS OF INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

                                              
                                                        

Pakistan draws a straight line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 up to the Karakoram pass on its boundary with China. India instead draws a north-northwest line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the Saltoro range, a southern offshoot of the Karakoram range.

The present conflict has its genesis in Pakistan allowing mountaineering expeditions into the area in the 1970s and 80s. India felt this to be a form of ‘Cartographic Aggression’. To stake its claim over the territory, India launched a military operation in April 1984 to occupy the western ridges of the Siachen Glacier valley. In response, Pakistan launched a number of repeated offensives on Indian positions of the ridgeline. Both both armies continue to be deployed facing each other at heights of 4,000 to 6,000 meters above sea level. Both sides have suffered a large number of casualties among their soldiers, more so on the Indian side due to their positions being higher in altitude and on more difficult terrain.

The territorial situation as it presently stands is that Pakistan considers the Siachen Glacier Complex to be at the eastern extremity of Baltistan—a Northern Area that is unambiguously under its control. India, by contrast, maintains that the Siachen Glacier is the western boundary of the Nubra Sub-Division of the Ladakh District of Jammu and Kashmir—a territory which has been part of India's administrative jurisdiction since the accession of that state to the Union of India in 1947.

Significant Parties To The Conflict

The main parties to the conflict (who are or may be “at the negotiation table”);
a. India
b. Pakistan

Major factions or players within each party;

India

a. Government of India.

b. Indian Army. Though Indian army is a stakeholder in the conflict, it is under control of the Govt of India and may have a minor role to play in the negotiations.

Pakistan
a. Government of Pakistan.

b. Pakistan Army. Within Pakistan, the army is an extra constitutional authority and has a say in political and diplomatic issues. Strategic interests of Pakistan are controlled by the army and it has the ability to disrupt negotiations.

China is an additional party with a stake in the conflict. It is affected due to its 1963 agreement with Pakistan where territories that previously belonged to Kashmir were exchanged. It can be a potential spoiler because of the influence it has over Pakistan. 

Third parties who may be attempting to facilitate resolution of the conflict are:

a. United Nations. It has limited influence over the conflict since it has not been able to enforce its resolution of 1949 with either party.

b. United States. Though the US has attempted to mediate a peace and withdrawal of both forces, it has not been successful, and both India as well as Pakistan have criticized the role US attempted to play.

c. Track II negotiators from India and Pakistan. A recent development where track II negotiators from both countries attempted to find a neutral solution to the problem.

Perspectives Of The Parties

Issues in the conflict

India

a. Mutual distrust between India and Pakistan has risen to new heights after the nuclear test of May, 1998. Both India and Pakistan face what the superpowers have faced since the early fifties: the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to a nuclear one.

b. Consequent to the 1949 cease fire with Pakistan and the Line of Control being established between the two countries, India is sensitive to further loss of what it considers its own territory. The perceived loss of areas to the North of NJ 9842, though not defined at the beginning of the conflict as Indian territory are nevertheless considered Indian. On the contrary, Pakistan stakes a claim to this area because it was undefined even after the wars of 1947 and 1971.

c. Interpretation of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) consequent to the 1949 war and the Line of Control after the 1971 war with Pakistan.

d. Admission of international mountaineering expeditions into the area by Pakistan is considered an act of covert extension of territorial claims. India regarded Pakistani encouragement of mountaineers into the non-demarcated area as a calculated ploy to gain control of Siachen.

e. Pakistan’s claim to Siachen received support from prestigious international mapping agencies who had endorsed it as being Pakistani territory on their maps. India called this ‘cartographic aggression’ by Pakistan.

Pakistan

a. The geo-strategic nature of Pakistani aims at securing control of the Siachen Glacier complex to secure for themselves a common border with China, with a view to seek reassurance of Chinese support against India in the event of general hostilities.

b. Siachen Glacier area falls under the Pakistan administered sector of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, called Federally Administered Northern Areas and must be restored to its control till an internationally supervised plebiscite is concluded in the state, as decided after the ceasefire agreement of 1949.

c. Based on the interpretation of the Line of Control as described in the 1972 Simla Agreement and its clauses on maintaining status quo, Pakistan considers Indian occupation of the Saltoro range illegal. 

d. Pakistan is willing to bilaterally negotiate with India as it considers Siachen Glacier disputed territory, especially since it falls outside the demarcated Line of Control. It was willing to accept Siachen as a no man’s land, till India unilaterally occupied the Saltoro range.

Positions

India has taken the position that all talks related to Siachen Glacier and other issues concerned with boundary be held under the 1972 Simla Agreement, signed after the 1971 war. Pakistan has in the past, opted for airing the matter in international fora, such as the UN and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and not limit resolution to the bilateral level.

Consequent to Pakistan’s border agreement with China in 1963 and construction of the Karakoram highway, India was concerned that a collusive Pakistan and China could jointly plan to annex Indian held territory in Kashmir. India does not recognize this agreement because it believes that Kashmir has been illegally occupied by Pakistan. 

India’s stand is that delineation of boundaries be carried out along the watershed in accordance with the accepted international watershed principle. India insists that it should extend along the Saltoro ridge-line connecting point NJ 9842 with the Sia La, Sherpa Kangri, and on to K2, merging with the international boundary agreed in the 1963 Sino-Pak Border Agreement. By stating its stand based on the watershed principle, India hopes to apply this position to its territorial dispute with China as well. 

India has outlined its six proposals on the Siachen Glacier dispute during multiple talks with Pakistan:

i. A cessation of 'cartographic aggression' by Pakistan (that is, of its unilateral attempts to extend the LOC from its agreed terminus at map reference point NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass of the border with China);

ii. Establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the Siachen Glacier;

iii. Exchange between India and Pakistan of authenticated maps showing present military dispositions on the ground;

iv. Delimitation by India and Pakistan of a line from map reference point NJ 9842 northwards to the border with China 'based on ground realities' [AGPL];

v. Formulation of ground rules to govern future military operations in the area;

vi. Redeployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions.

Though Pakistan supports Kashmiri self-determination through a UN-sponsored plebiscite, it has effectively annexed the Northern Areas, which are contiguous to the Siachen Glacier. It now considers these areas disputed territories that India does not have a right to occupy. The Pakistani team, led by Foreign Secretary Syed Ijlai Zaidi, claimed during the first round of talks in 1986 that India's induction of its forces on the Glacier was a violation of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan's formal terms have been twofold during many rounds of talks with India:

i. Deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions held at the time the ceasefire was declared in 1971.

ii. Delimitation of an extension of the LOC beyond map reference point NJ 9842.

Interests

India considers Jammu and Kashmir to be an integral part of the country by the accession instrument, and Pakistan as an aggressor. Pakistan disregards the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, which it considers to be fraudulent and inappropriate to an area dominated by a majority Muslim population “It is not just military confrontations and threats of war that ensue—indeed, the fear and pride related to Kashmir and the subsequent ill will compels both countries to embark upon further programs of hate and adopt new inflammatory dimensions to an already troubled relationship”. Islamabad considers the Siachen Glacier and the Northern Areas absolutely vital to the security of Pakistan- “Indian occupation of the Siachen Glacier would gain desired proximity to the Karakoram Highway—the focus of a joint Soviet/Afghan and Indian pincer movement”.

Under the Sino-Pak border agreement, the government of Pakistan relinquished claims to over 4,000 square kilometers of territory, in return for China’s cession to Pakistan of over 1,300 square kilometers of territory actually administered by China. Pakistan was not the sovereign authority empowered to make a final settlement with China, which is still pending the outcome of the Kashmir question. An Indian withdrawal from Siachen would validate the agreement between Pakistan and China. Gaining control of the Siachen Glacier from the geostrategic viewpoint is critical to allow Pakistan a common border with China, which could be used in the event of hostilities with India to seek Chinese military cooperation and support on ground. 

Pakistan's stated ambition has been to achieve military parity with India. By keeping the Indian army occupied in localized conflicts, it hoped to negate the advantage of superior strength, both quantitatively and qualitatively by India.

Application of the watershed principle to its disputed Himalayan borders with China is critical to Indian strategic interests. Loss of the Siachen Glacier would have placed India in a much weaker position vis-a-vis China regarding negotiations on outstanding border issues along the border with China as it would mean applying different yardsticks for similar boundary issues. 

India does not accept a third party intervention in the conflict and repeatedly asserts that all negotiations and problem solving be carried out under the Simla Agreement of 1972. However, Pakistan wants the issue of Kashmir and Siachen Glacier to be settled through international mediation or intervention, which is in contradiction with the Indian interest in a bilateral settlement.

Alternatives

India is likely to continue to hold its entrenched positions (which are militarily stronger) on the Saltoro range in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The region has seen a ceasefire in effect since 2003, as a result of which combat related casualties no longer occur. Over a period of time, India has advanced its medical support resources deployed in the area and weather and terrain related casualties have dropped. Though the costs in money terms of maintaining the army at such altitudes is prohibitively high, India is capable of continuing to do so. 

India’s main contention is the alignment of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842 under the present condition, even if the larger Kashmir issue is not resolved. Therefore it is likely to walk away from any negotiation that suggests realigning the AGPL based on Pakistan’s interpretation, as there are issues of public perception about loss of territory which will dominate any negotiated settlement. Overall, India has a very strong Best Alternative To Negotiated Settlement (BATNA) due to its dominant military and economic position. 

Pakistan could continue to hold its positions, as a ceasefire is in effect and its army is in any case subject to lesser casualties due to terrain and weather. This is an attractive BATNA for Pakistan as it does not involve any additional military, political or diplomatic commitments.

One option for Pakistan is to launch an offensive in the Siachen Glacier area to dislodge Indian Army from the Saltoro range. However, this is not a very attractive BATNA as the Indian armed forces are numerically and qualitatively superior and are occupying dominating positions. Pakistan will not be able to support the war economically, in addition to being subject to sanctions from international agencies for being the aggressor.

Pakistan could launch military operations elsewhere to capture Indian held territory and bargain for withdrawal of Indian forces from Siachen Glacier. This was attempted by Pakistan under General Parvez Musharraf in 1999, but India was able to divert its armed forces from elsewhere and evict Pakistani forces. This BATNA has been attempted and was unsuccessful, therefore is no longer a suitable option.

Pakistan and China could jointly launch military operations to capture Siachen. However, in the present international order, a joint war by two countries on India may draw in others and would in any case be viewed as unwarranted aggression, especially by China as it is not a direct party to the conflict. Overall, Pakistan has a set of weak BATNAs that limit the amount of influence that can be applied on India to negotiate a demilitarization of the Glacier. 

Communication And Relationship-Building

Historically, India and Pakistan have a hostile relationship since independence in 1947. Minor skirmishes on territorial issues have led to three full scale wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. India and Pakistan have had eight rounds of talks on the Siachen issue from 1986 to 1998. However, India’s insistence that the present deployment (the AGPL) be demarcated has been countered by Pakistan with the argument that India must withdraw to pre 1972 positions before any meaningful talks can commence. Pakistan holds the view that when the two armies withdraw their forces from the zone of conflict and agree to refrain from re-establishing any military presence in it, the original positions will become irrelevant.

Both countries successfully disengaged their forces from the Chumik Glacier, which is located quite close to Siachen, through negotiations at the field commander level. This indicates that it is possible to work out negotiated settlement at the local level without prejudice to the remaining issues. On 25 November 2003, Pakistan proposed an informal cease-fire along the LOC including the Siachen conflict zone, and India accepted the proposal.

A composite dialogue process was initiated between India and Pakistan in 2004 to address parallel, but separately eight issues that affect relations between the two countries, Siachen Glacier being one of them. The Siachen issue has been separated from the larger Kashmir issue, creating a hope that it may be resolved independent of the related issues. Pakistan sees agreements in trade and other areas as a springboard for resolution of the Kashmir issue, but India sees trade and other cooperation independent of Kashmir, since it believes that Kashmir is an inalienable part of India.

The joint statement of 12 June 2012 following the India-Pakistan defense secretary level Siachen talks as part of the composite dialogue process said: “Both sides reaffirmed their resolve to make serious, sustained and result oriented efforts for seeking an amicable resolution of Siachen. It was agreed to continue dialogue on Siachen in keeping with the desire of the leaders of both countries for early resolution of all outstanding issues.” However, no progress on ground has taken place beyond these talks.

Criteria Of Legitimacy

Since the Siachen issue is related to demarcation and interpretation of boundary, as well as ownership of territory, the following agreements and UN resolutions may be interpreted to arrive at a resolution:

a. The Simla Agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan.

b. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 13 August 1948.

c. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 5 January 1949.

The UN resolution of 13 August 1948 states at Part II A (1) that Pakistan agrees to withdraw from Kashmir before a plebiscite may be held. Therefore it may appear that Pakistan has to vacate its occupation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and has no claim to the Siachen Glacier. 

The Simla Agreement states that “Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.” India would be a violator since it unilaterally deployed its troops on the Siachen Glacier in April 1984 in contradiction to this agreement. 

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References:

[1] The Simla Agreement, (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6771~v~Agreement_Between_the_Government_of_India_and_the_Government_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Pakistan_on_Bilateral_Relations__Simla_Agreement_.pdf.

[2] Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Siachen, “A By-Product of the Kashmir Dispute and a Catalyst for its Resolution,” Pakistan Journal of History & Culture, Vol.XXVII/2, 2006.

[3] Raspal S. Khosa, The Siachen Glacier dispute: Imbroglio on the roof of the world, Contemporary South Asia, 8:2, 1999, 187-209.

[4] Gulshan Majeed, South Asian Security Compulsions: A Historical Analysis of India-Pakistan Relations, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 20, Issue - 2, 2013, 219:232

[5] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949 (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/19490105ResolutionforCeasefire.pdf.

[6] Siachen: A By-Product of the Kashmir Dispute and a Catalyst for its Resolution fight (Accessed October 23, 2015), available from http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/latest_english_journal/siachen_a_bi-product_of_kashmir_dr_ishtiaq.pdf .

[7] Ashraf, Sajjad. "India-Pakistan Relations: Common Ground and Points of Discord." ECSSR (Abu Dhabi).Emirates Lecture Series.88, 2011: 0_1,1,35,37-58.

[8] “Demilitarization of the Siachen Conflict Zone: Concepts for Implementation and Monitoring”, Sandia Report SAND2007-5670, (September 2007): 19.

[9] Is there any hope for India and Pakistan? (accessed on 28 October 2015), available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/is-there-any-hope-for-india-pakistan-relations/

[10]Sumona Dasgupta, “ Kashmir and the India Pakistan Dialogue process”, RSIS working paper No 29 (21 May 2015): 11.

[11] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 (Accessed October 28, 2015), available from https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/uncom1.htm.

[12] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949.

[13]Ravi Baghel, Marcus Nüsser, “Securing the heights: The vertical dimension of the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan in the Eastern Karakoram,” Political Geography, Volume 48, September 2015, Pages 24-36

[14] Siachen dispute: India and Pakistan’s glacial fight (Accessed October 23, 2015), available from http://defence.pk/threads/siachen-dispute-india-and-pakistan%E2%80%99s-glacial-fight.309100/

Siachen Story Part 3 - Life at 20,500 Feet

    Also read: Siachen Story Part 2 - Deployment

    We stayed holed up in that bunker till about 6:30 pm, when it become dark and the shelling stopped. My first exposure to being under fire was for almost ten hours. I met the officer and his men who were in the OP bunker - all grinning from ear to ear on seeing their 'reliever', and were they relieved! Next few hours were spent trying to understand the layout of the post, all of 20 x 20 metres on a saddle formed between two peaks. I also had to understand the lay of the ground, enemy positions, gun locations and understand the map well. All at night.

       

     I was to live in an ice bunker or 'cave', 8ft x 10ft along with my OP team and a nursing assistant who had already spent some time on the post. Since the bunker was barely 4 feet high, we had to crawl in through a tunnel that was curved to keep out splinters and the snow, and I realized that the roof was supported by  the tail frame of a Cheetah helicopter! And the only officer in the bunker had the privilege of keeping his personal stuff on  the shelves patched up within the frame. We had central heating - four perpetually burning stoves kept in the centre of the bunker, belonging to each man, and individual lighting - those bulbs that we'd carried along from our unit. The interior was soot blackened because of the stoves and dark in spite of the small bulbs that were on throughout the day. One corner was dedicated to our food stores: cartons of condensed milk, nuts and chocolates, packaged juices, and a whole lot more. In fact, this was what Siachen was famous for - the unending supplies of expensive and high quality packaged food that was way beyond the reach of most soldiers and officers outside of Siachen. The stoves were used for heating as well as cooking. Thanks to kerosene, which does  not freeze even at -50C! Every trip in the open or in the OP bunker for observation duties was followed by hot water treatment - essentially putting your hands and feet in a container full of hot water to thaw them out. Since there were no buckets on the post, jerry cans cut along the cross section made a perfect flat water container.
 
    The next morning, I got into the daily routine of getting up at at least 0530 hours to crap. Reasons: you had to drop it in the open, so dark was prefered (no drainage or plumbing is possible in -50C, on top of which regular shelling destroys everything that's not inside a bunker), and you had to do it before the enemy started shelling after first light. The first day was very embarrassing - you had to sit in the open flanked by soldiers amidst small piles of shit that had frozen and could not be removed or buried. Thankfully, I didn't have to expose my 'officer-like' ass to the men - only because our clothes had a strategically located zipper system that allowed us to unzip, drop our load, wash and zip up before you could say 'Jack Robinson"! On heading back to my bunker, I saw the Nursing Assistant holding an intact mortar bomb and gleefully shouting "this will make a good souvenir". We had a tough time convincing him to throw it and hoped it wouldn't blow up in the process. Unexploded ordnance is very dangerous and can blow up even if its just touched!

     My team landed up over the next two days, amidst long shelling sessions. We got down to improving the OP bunker, essentially rebuilding it at night. During the process of digging up snow to fill the sand bags, we discovered a sack full of AK47 ammunition, which we used over the next few days for target practice on the condensed milk tins lying around the bunkers. Food was essentially some noodles in the morning, canned juice, nuts, tea and chocolates throughout the day and we would make some regular 'dinner' at night. There was chicken and tinned fish lying around in sacks that no one seemed interested in eating.  This was attributable purely to superstition that 'OP Baba' would get angry if someone on a post ate meat (this was extended to even chocolate, on some posts!). A few days on, decided that I would not go along with this and asked my men to prepare chicken for lunch for me. Initially, they refused to eat it themselves, but after a few days, the need for protein overcame their superstition; chicken and fish became a daily affair in our bunker. The infantry soldiers were a bit more conservative and they refused to eat it, as did the captain who was the post commander. They did tell me that I was testing the OP Baba's patience and some great misfortune would befall me, but here I am, twenty years later. So much for OP Baba! I think this was a very convenient belief for those who were in the  racket of siphoning off the expensive rations to be sold in the black market in Chandigarh. Only issue with fish was that most of the time it gave us the loosies and our only worry was using the (non existent) toilet during shelling. And chicken needed 25 'whistles' and two hours in the pressure cooker!

     Incessant shelling was a regular feature on most days. Bombs falling around you every day makes you immune to the shock and noise after some time. We actually learnt to sleep through shelling in the afternoon, for want of anything better to do. Sometimes, the stoves would go off because of the shock from an explosion and one of us had to get up and relight them. During our time at 'Amar', almost 60 days, no one got hurt. The most dangerous time was dusk, when shelling would stop (probably because of the enemy's 'Namaz' timings) and everyone would be eager to get out of the bunkers. The Pakistanis would fire a few parting shorts after a gap to catch the people outside, but fortunately, no one got hurt. So we made it a point to go out only after waiting for some time.

    Our only contact with the world was the trusted ANPRC radio set. However, because of reduced ranges due to terrain screening, secrecy devices were not used. The radio operators created their own codes for daily chatter. South Indian troops were sought after as they were not understood by the enemy. There was, of course BBC and All India Radio to entertain us. Once in a while the helicopter would bring us mail which was sought after by the soldiers waiting for some news from their families. There was no leave during the six month tenure on the post, simply because of the time and effort required to reach the forward line. So everyone would be waiting eagerly for their time to come to an end.

    I don't want to give away the secrets of artillery fire control at these heights. For those who understand, distance from gun to target, 15,000 m; OP to target 1200-1600 m; and target height 6100 m ASL. Gunners around the world will understand the difficulty of hitting such a target, thanks to effect of slope and meteorology in mountains! I was a newly promoted Captain and had not yet done my fire control course. But later, I realized  some 'moves' that I improvised were part of standard procedure.
 
    At this height, normal blood pressure of  human being is 160 / 110 and our nursing assistant would check it every week. Walking even 5 metres was tiring and we would be breathless, especially when it was windy. Things were worse on a bad weather day - clouds, snow fall and extreme winds brought down temperatures to -50C. Just getting out of the bunker would be a difficult task. The good part: there was generally no shelling on such days, and there were no 'link patrols' on this post. It simply wasn't linked to any other place on Earth!

    Superstition was widespread among troops on the post. A day after we repaired our OP bunker, it was sprayed with medium machine gun fire and there were prominent pock marks all over the sand bags(these were white to merge with the snow). Obviously, the enemy was keeping an eye on us. A couple of infantry soldiers who were on duty at that time said that it was because we were eating meat. They tried to dissuade us from eating meat in future. To keep 'OP Baba' happy, no doubt! Firing and artillery duels were relatively less frequent in winter due to the cold. In spite of that, it was always 'hot' on Amar, and that's why it was notorious, especially because of the large number of artillery OP officers who'd bought it while on Amar. 

    I wrote to my CO, back in my own unit a couple of times. He promptly sent  copies of my letters to the brigade and divisional commanders. Sure enough, I got letters from them within a month. The brigade commander's letter was nothing interesting, but the General's letter was a morale booster and really well thought out. That's when I really understood how a small interaction with leadership can motivate juniors.

   Some 40 days down the line, we got a message that our relief team had started from base camp. Amar OP had normal tenures of 45 days only, due to extremes of height, cold, and hostility. They would, of course take almost two weeks and some days to reach us. We started looking forward to being 'relieved'. We kept track of their progress on a daily basis and talked to the transit posts en-route to make sure they were moving up. They reached the Bila helipad after ten odd days. Now I was  fairly certain that the officer would be up in three to four days. But it was not to be - we got news that he had been flown out to Srinagar!  It turned out that this officer had been aide de camp to a General, who'd recently taken over command of the Corps in Srinagar. And he wanted to meet his old ADC. So out he flew, although he was back in a couple of days. It seems they didn't want to waste his acclimatisation cycle....

    It was a happy day when our relievers, led by an officer who was senior to me, landed. Three days later, we were back in the Bila helipad. That's where we got our next piece of 'good' news. I was to be airlifted to Aman OP(19000+ feet) in the Southern Glacier area. The OP officer there had to be evacuated as he had frostbite, and the post was required to be manned by an officer immediately. This meant that I would be airlifted from here to base camp, then to Thoise, and then yet again to the helipad nearest to Aman post from where I would walk up. My team was also promised a lift, but that's not the way Indian Army works! We were yet to see the reality... 

    I was dropped at Base Camp the next day at around 12:30 PM. I threw the 2 odd sets of undergarments that I'd worn over the past two months, got a haircut, shave and bath. It was great feeling like a shorn chicken after a long time. A quick lunch, and the discovery that the roll of film that I'd sent over earlier from the post for developing was lost! That sorted out all photos that I'd clicked on Amar! To make matters worse, my camera was acting weird, switching on every once in a while- I guess Siachen has its effects on electronics as well! I was on the MI-17 headed for Thoise at 4 PM. The pilot was my Air Force course mate from NDA, who suggested that I stay on the air base itself for the night, as I had to catch a Cheetah sortie next morning to Southern Glacier.