AFT Judgement : What's Ailing the Army?

So many people have voiced their opinion on the Armed Forces Tribunal ruling on the distribution of AVSC vacancies and the way forward, that I thought of writing once again on the subject. The issue of allotment of vacancies is only the symptom of sickness and the disease needs to be treated, not the symptoms. I feel that these are some of the issues that need to be addressed.

The seriously flawed system of appraisals in the army needs to be overhauled. Inspite of reaching senior ranks through a stringent selection system of numerous promotion boards, many senior officers are manipulative, displaying partisanship and pettiness. The future doesn't seem to be too bright either, since these qualities are being demonstrated by many junior officers as well, the only difference being that their effects are much lesser. Working for one's own regiment / arm or service and favoritism seems to be the order of the day. One of the complaints is that officers with a series of outstanding reports from certain arms  do not get promoted due to lack of vacancies. This may not necessarily mean that they're actually outstanding. It could mean that reporting is inflated in that arm, since gentlemen cadets across the spectrum of merit and calibre are allotted to each arm and service. Reporting by reviewing officers (formation commanders or other senior appointments) is supposed to moderate confidential reports initiated by subordinate commanders. But in many cases, it is partisan, with officers of some arms being graded high due to a false sense of camaraderie and regimental spirit that creeps into reporting. A comparison of average Annual Confidential Report marks received by officers across arms and services would indicate so. It cannot be that the average ASC or EME officer is poorer in performance as compared to the average infantry, mechanized or artillery officer when graded on the same scale (within his own corps), since officers of all capabilities were distributed more or less uniformly on commissioning. I wonder why officers with character flaws slip through a system of confidential reports that 'measures' leadership traits and integrity, and rise to high positions of command? And I believe that this is so across all arms and services, not just in the arm that seems to be the current villain!

Formation commanders must give up their regimental affiliations in matters affecting the army as a whole. There seems to be no  sense of camaraderie between officers of various arms and services in-spite of a common training academy and other a training institutions. Junior officers are mostly brought up on rhetoric that one's own arm is 'best' as compared to other arms, while the focus should be on how a well organised, trained and coordinated army can fight and win a war with minimum casualties. Obviously, this will happen when everyone does his job, since it contributes to success of the operation. Senior ranks must stop looking at gobbling up the pie for themselves and their extended 'families'(corps, regiment, unit, coterie etc). Debate on promotional vacancies has been raging around who gained and who lost, not around good of the organisation. The newly thought up concept of 'Colonel Commandants for life' is just an excuse to provide perks to generals even after retirement and must stop. There are adequate appointments in the army to look after regimental requirements (and these shouldn't exist in the first place!) It does not make sense for a Corps or Army Commander to also be a 'Colonel' of his regiment. Its just encouraging him to be parochial, and this fact has been proved in the instant case, since senior officers entrusted with ensuring a healthy and competent officer cadre have failed because of parochialism.

The status of general cadre being given to officers based on arm/ service in which they were commissioned should be reviewed at the highest level. The question is not whether artillery officers should be part of the general cadre or whether an ASC officer can command an infantry brigade. No one should be inducted into general cadre without proving himself in his own as well as at least one more arm or service through cross attachment and responsibility. Infantry and mechanised forces officers included. Tougher standards of professionalism must be the filter, and not pedigree. Entry into general cadre should not be a one way ticket to leadership on being commissioned. The army has to find ways to identify outstanding officers, and not lower standards to include officers from a favored arm or service into an elite group.

Education and awareness levels of most officers (including senior officers) is limited to studies that they themselves order and direct based on their own perceptions, or studies that they have worked on earlier in junior ranks. No research or military paper that originates in a lower formation ever reaches the higher levels without tinkering by all and sundry up the chain, and claim staking at each successive level that its their own. Most 'researched' studies are not even  read by formation commanders, who read only the summary and watch a PowerPoint presentation, giving directions to modify it based on their own thought process. This vicious cycle must be broken by acknowledging ownership of research or study, even if it has originated at the lowest level. The tendency to modify everything based on the perceived likes of the next senior must stop and original thought must be encouraged.

Duration of command of formations should be increased so that commanders remain in touch with ground realities. A divisional or corps commander is in the seat for less than a year and barely sees his policies being implemented. For example, I personally drafted training instructions for one general, who signed it and was posted out immediately thereafter. The next divisional commander had to implement his ideas and thought process on a different set of training instructions which had been issued barely a month ago. Most commanders hurriedly implement their personal ideas as policies and leave before the effects are seen. Short term high visibility activities are therefore the preferred method of execution,  to prove within this period that they're good enough for the next rank . You can't run a marathon over 100 metres. So the formation is left running 100 metre sprints. Repeatedly. The most damaging fallout of all this is that there is a disconnect between generals and junior officers(and troops), which is magnified by sycophant staff officers who do not convey the reality.(You can either talk reality or impress the formation commander in 11 months)

It will not be enough to just redistribute vacancies proportionally or even convince the courts that the policy in vogue is fair and good for the organisation. That would be like using a painkiller for cancer. We need to introspect at the highest level on the issues that are repeatedly being thrown up and find long term solutions in a holistic manner.

These views are based on my experiences and are my personal opinions.